The Body of an Iranian Woman in the Culture of Acid Attacks (2)

Reza Kazemzadeh, a psychologist and researcher residing in Belgium, who authored the book "The Psychoanalysis of the Blind Owl," has examined the culture of acid attacks in Iran in five articles. The first part of this article was published last week. The context is set in an environment where the discussion of "enjoining good and forbidding wrong" has become a tool for expressing the dissatisfaction of hardline factions with the cultural policies of the eleventh government, and the Ansar Hezbollah on one side and the Friday prayer leaders on the other have periodically threatened "badly veiled women" with violent actions. In Isfahan, acid was thrown on the faces of at least four women. What can be stated with certainty about the series of acid attacks in Isfahan is that in the month of Mehr 1393 (October 2014), within a short time and under relatively similar conditions, an individual or individuals threw acid on at least four young girls or women (some media outlets have reported a much higher number) who had no prior acquaintance with each other, and at least one person has died from the injuries sustained. News related to these events quickly became headlines in news agencies both inside and outside Iran, particularly leading to a severe sense of insecurity among women in Isfahan. The reactions of domestic and foreign media, along with speculations about the perpetrators and instigators of these crimes, led to relatively swift and spontaneous protests from citizens regarding the lack of transparency and especially the lack of serious action by officials on the issue. If one day it becomes clear to us that the perpetrator or perpetrators were previously acquainted with their victims or that they suffered from psychological disorders, our current understanding of the reasons for these events will undergo a fundamental change. Prior acquaintance between the perpetrator and the victim strengthens the hypothesis of personal animosity and places the acid attack within the framework of civil crimes and ordinary criminal laws. In this case, acid attacks should be examined within the context of interpersonal violence and ultimately social harms. However, if, as the evidence and indications to date suggest, we assume the first hypothesis of non-acquaintance, absence of personal animosity, and also the mental health of the perpetrator, three different possibilities can be presented to explain the event in question: a) The first possibility is that the perpetrator or perpetrators received orders from a source to commit the crime. In this case, individual ethics are influenced by what can be termed "the ethics of obedience," and the individual acts within a cohesive system that has constructed obedience as a virtue far superior to other ethical principles prevalent in society. The culture governing such often closed groups is termed "the culture of obedience." b) The second possibility is that the perpetrator or perpetrators committed these crimes without receiving direct orders from any source. A criminal who commits such a heinous and inhumane act without prior instruction and acquaintance with the victim certainly possesses a very strong motive for their crime. In such cases, before confronting the victim, and despite any prior acquaintance, the individual firmly believes that they know their victim and considers them deserving of the harshest punishment. Based on this "hypothetical-belief-based knowledge," the crime becomes possible. This "hypothetical-belief-based knowledge" of the victim requires a systematic set of beliefs and dogmas (ideology); an ideology that has previously constructed the victim as a being devoid of any humanity. An ideology that creates an entity outside the circle of humanity from "the other" (whoever that other may be) resorts to primal feelings, unconscious fears, and death drives that continue their mysterious and secretive life in the underlying layers of every "civilized" human's psyche, thus facilitating the conditions for producing and subsequently promoting a "culture of hatred." Regarding the recent acid attacks, the victim has been reduced to a symbol of "the enemy" and a manifestation of evil solely due to her appearance in the public sphere ("bad hijab"). The ideology that creates an entity outside the circle of humanity from "the other" resorts to primal feelings, unconscious fears, and death drives that continue their mysterious and secretive life in the underlying layers of every "civilized" human's psyche, thus facilitating the conditions for producing and subsequently promoting a "culture of hatred." c) The third possibility logically is that both subcultures of "obedience" and "hatred" played a role in inciting the perpetrator. However, before delving into a more comprehensive examination of each of these two subcultures of "obedience" and "hatred," which the author considers to be the fundamental constructs of the culture of committing crimes under the aforementioned conditions (where an individual can throw acid on another's face from close range without prior knowledge of the other), it is necessary to pause briefly on the very concept of "culture" in this article. The culture of "acid attacks" unfortunately reflects not only a sign of "unculturedness" in our society but also a logical outcome of the prevalence of a specific type of "culture"; a culture that has been promoted by extremist forces (ranging from various types of Islamists to different leftist groups) in society since at least the beginning of the revolution. In a society, such behavior can be considered a sign of "unculturedness" only if the logic governing that culture (a logic that is particularly manifested in the educational system and the conventional methods of socializing children on one hand and in the way the government regulates relations with citizens on the other) strives in various ways to combat violence among members of the community in every form and situation. Unfortunately, the recent acid attacks on women in our society not only do not indicate "unculturedness" but are rather a logical result of the propagation of a specific type of culture; a culture that has been promoted by extremist forces in society since at least the beginning of the revolution. In such a society, an individual committing a crime such as an acid attack is regarded as a symptom of the ineffectiveness of cultural tools in controlling violence. The existence of such individuals in non-violent cultures is seen as a disease or affliction; an exceptional occurrence that, in most cases, has not been prevented by society and cultural institutions due to marginalization, deprivation, and other social disorders. In such a situation, the acid thrower is perceived as a social problem that simultaneously reveals the weaknesses of the educational system in the matter of cultural upbringing (in this case, meaning non-violence). However, in Iranian society, we have been faced with a type of "cultural production" since the inception of the Islamic Republic that has not only legitimized but also promoted the instrumental and therefore normalized use of various forms of violence. The two fundamental bases of the "culture of violence" in our society are the reinforcement of the spirit of obedience on one hand and the production and intensification of feelings of hatred towards the other on the other. In fact, the governmental culture of violence in our society is composed of two subcultures of obedience and hatred. One of the main objectives of this inquiry is to draw attention to the important point that the phenomenon of acid attacks, alongside many other manifestations of violence in our current society, is not an accident but rather a logical result of the promotion of a culture that has been systematically and comprehensively propagated by even conflicting groups since the beginning of the revolution. The culture of obedience is an important point to consider when analyzing the acid attacks of last year; even if these crimes were committed by parts of the regime itself and based on direct orders from some of its officials, they occurred outside the framework of existing laws in the Islamic Republic. This means that the individual or individuals have consciously placed themselves outside the framework of the official laws of the political system to which they belong (or are employed by) or at least believe in. Over the past three decades, only those benefiting from immunity have been able to systematically, calculatedly, and purposefully commit acts of violence against the law, either in the name of religion or under the direct supervision of certain government and official religious authorities (such as the Ansar Velayat or Hezbollah on one side and "plainclothes" individuals and agents of various security organizations on the other). Numerous and varied evidence in the past has shown that crimes such as political murders, serial killings, bombings, and assassinations abroad have been carried out under the direct orders of these authorities. The culture of obedience within the framework of the ideology of Iranian Islamists, by modernizing (i.e., modernizing) the traditional hierarchical system, ultimately led to the cult of personality of the leader of the revolution ("Imam Khomeini") and the establishment of a totalitarian regime. The modernization of the traditional hierarchical system within the framework of the ideology of revolutionary Islamists began with theories of "Ummah and Imamate" by Dr. Ali Shariati and reached its peak in the established Islamic Republic with the theory of "absolute guardianship of the jurist." Two important examples of this crisis can be observed at two poles of society, namely in the political power structure on one hand and in the Iranian kinship system on the other; a deep and fundamental crisis that, after the Islamic revolution, not only failed to achieve a rational and sustainable solution but also increased in dimensions and intensity. Of course, in those early years of the revolution, Khomeini's supporters were not alone in personality cult and promoting the culture of obedience; many leftist political groups had already completed the process of modernizing the traditional hierarchical system within the framework of their revolutionary organizations (by promoting hero worship and the cult of personality of their leaders). Some Leninist leftist organizations referred to the final product of the modernization process of the traditional hierarchical system as "democratic centralism." Nevertheless, it was only Khomeini's Islamists who, upon gaining power, were able to institutionalize their hierarchical system in an ideological cultural framework and structurally in the country's constitution under the title of "guardianship of the jurist." The theoretical and practical efforts to modernize the traditional hierarchical system before the revolution were, in fact, a response to the ideological extremist tendencies to the crisis of authority in Iranian society. The numerous and sudden changes brought about by the uneven and rapid urbanization in the pillars and institutions of ancient Iranian society, by undermining the foundations of the traditional hierarchical systems in power, confronted traditional authorities, some of which had existed for thousands of years, with a serious and unprecedented crisis. The above crisis can be observed more than anything in the gradual decline of the legitimacy of two important symbols of authority in traditional Iranian society (namely, "the Shah" and "the Father"). As a result of and in continuation of unprecedented, radical, and deep social and economic changes in Iranian society (especially since the beginning of the 1960s), the possibility of a return to the stability and order of the past (both in the political system and in the kinship system) had become impossible. In a situation where the crisis stemming from deep changes in the infrastructure of society, while simultaneously reducing the unprecedented power of traditional authorities, had also severely diminished their legitimacy, there were only two paths left for Iranian society: the first path was to pursue and intensify the changes in a more radical direction to realize the logic governing the ongoing transformations, changes that could ultimately lead to a fundamental transformation in the foundations of authority, turning the hierarchical system and belief groups in Iranian society into an egalitarian and individualistic system. Such a transformation would mean simultaneously democratizing the structures of both political and kinship systems. In this case, the coordination between the rapid growth of urban life and the structure of an egalitarian interactive system would lead to the emergence of a new type of legitimate authority (democratic authority) and would establish the fabric of affairs on a completely different foundation from the past. Unfortunately, due to the resistance of the ancient power structure in Iran (the monarchy) on one hand and the efforts of extremist political forces and the main body of our intellectual community's collaboration with them on the other, instead of transitioning to a democratic and egalitarian system, a second path was chosen, the turning point and point of no return of which was the revolution of 57. In this second path, instead of creating a substantial and fundamental change in the power paradigm (i.e., transforming the hierarchical interactive system into an egalitarian interactive system), the traditional hierarchical system was reconstructed, albeit in a modern and more radical form than before. In the twentieth century, the vast majority of political forces that came to power under conditions similar to our country achieved this success by reconstructing and strengthening the hierarchical system based on the mechanisms of the modern world and, on the other hand, by intensifying various social crises and creating revolutionary conditions that, in the framework and discourse of emerging and indigenous ideologies, promoted a radical break from both traditional and democratic institutions. One of the most important commonalities among the revolutions of the twentieth century, which also distinguishes them from classical bourgeois revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, is their shared fate in establishing dictatorial regimes and, in many cases, the...