The Case of Hashemi's Death, Rouhani's Shift to the Right, and Its Consequences

1. The social credibility of reformists has diminished. This is not, as some rival political forces (especially the regime change advocates claim), indicative of the end of this political faction, nor is it as some optimistic believers think that all the lost water will return to the stream. Reformists have been and continue to be part of the political-social forces in Iran, although due to the doping of power conditions, they have been positioned higher than their actual existence. 2. The biggest blow to the reformists has come from Rouhani's second government. This blow is even more significant than the dominance of the conservative faction's voice within the reformist camp in recent years or their gaining the upper hand in councils and organizations surrounding Seyyed Mohammad Khatami. If Rouhani had not suddenly turned to the right and had some noteworthy achievements, or at least engaged in a consistent but intermittent discursive resistance against the power establishment (known as the hidden or parallel government) and the losers of the elections, he could not have harmed the credibility of reformists to this extent. 3. Concurrently with the opposition of the top of the political hierarchy to the solidity and continuity of the JCPOA through extensive economic relations with all companies and countries in the world, especially the United States, and completing it with JCPOA 2 and 3 after the emergence of the abnormal Trump administration in the U.S.; Hassan Rouhani found himself at a major crossroads. He had to either emphasize his interactive approach in foreign policy, which he had received votes for in the elections, or move towards the policy of the establishment. Like his other shifts in this arena, he leaned towards the opposing current for reasons that need to be revisited. 4. The dangerous and adventurous hardline faction relying on the power establishment, which was defeated in the elections where the majority of the diverse reformist spectrum and their allies supported Hassan Rouhani (who cleverly managed to win their hearts with slogans aligned with their desires); has not yet lost hope. Riding on the wave of economic dissatisfaction, they sought the presidency and then the leadership of Ebrahim Raisi (and still do). The increasing economic problems of the country (due to the economic mismanagement and political rightward shift of Rouhani's government and the dominance of the power establishment's line over foreign policy following the abnormal Trump administration's withdrawal from the JCPOA) which led to widespread protests among low-income groups, has made this extremist faction reconsider reviving its political dream to ride the wave of economic dissatisfaction to seize governmental power. 5. This faction, which has a history of the 2009 election coup, tried to defeat Rouhani this time through the ballot box with uproar and demagoguery, learning from the Green Movement in the 2017 elections. However, the ruinous and seductive promises of multiplying subsidies even in the severely deprived provinces did not deceive anyone. Some indications suggest they have not yet lost hope and, like the coup plotters on August 19, 1953, are again thinking they can repeat their operations this time using the destructive effects of structural corruption, economic mismanagement, and economic sanctions for the worried society in a new form. 6. This faction needs the approval of the top of the political hierarchy and the cooperation of its other partners, including the clergy and other forces of the so-called principlist current. However, the top of the political hierarchy has not yet agreed to this adventurous project as it sees no need to remove Rouhani's government. Ironically, Rouhani's government can serve as a cover for the policies of the power establishment, taking the blame for all problems, and if there is to be a retreat in foreign policy, it can be attributed to him. The recklessness of the extremist faction in attacking the clergy and the seminary in the recent gathering in Qom (stemming from arrogance and bullying due to their proximity to the power establishment) has currently backfired like some of their previous actions! However, the threat to the president regarding the Farah pool and the writing on the placard was an important sign that emerged. 7. The main problem for the majority of the Iranian people is economic. However, everyone knows that the solution is political and its key lies, contrary to the government, in the hands of the power establishment. Changing individuals (executive managers) instead of changing policies and judicial crackdowns leads nowhere. However, it can provide false directions or be a means of procrastination and floundering under the system's tolerance ceiling (the power establishment). The dismissal of two ministers in a short period is indicative of this approach and sacrificing symptoms instead of addressing the main causes and performing superficial reforms instead of deep surgeries. 8. If economic problems and consequently public dissatisfaction and protests continue and expand, the approach based on providing false directions and sacrificing symptoms instead of causes can persist and even reach Rouhani's government. This is the point where the adventurous and suspicious faction (suspected of infiltration by Israeli agents among them) once failed but may have a gambling desire again in that path. At this point, the leader may also have nothing left to sacrifice to justify the problems directly stemming from his policies and may be forced to accept the removal of Hassan Rouhani's government by a parliament where opportunism is on the rise. Opportunists in the parliament (even among those who voted in the name of reformism and showed their colors in the impeachment of the Minister of Economy) will also cooperate in this regard to escape the pressures from their voter base in protest against economic problems or to share in the power pie. Others will also be paralyzed in the face of the legitimate and widespread social dissatisfaction. Under such hypothetical conditions, Rouhani's government will also leave no room for anyone to defend it for various reasons and will be sacrificed. The staunch, blind supporters and justifiers of Rouhani's government, who until recently would not accept that Rouhani had shifted to the right, have also begun to criticize and sometimes insult him these days, let alone other critics and opponents. 9. But why did Rouhani's second government, the government after Hashemi Rafsanjani's death, shift so much to the right and align all its ministers with the power establishment, turn its back on former allies, hold closed-door meetings with the IRGC, which have not yet been reported, violate its promises even regarding low-cost commitments like the Ministry of Women, overlook the invitation of Molavi Abdolhamid, a symbol of the Sunni community whose votes helped him into the presidency, and take astonishingly budgetary measures filled with bribes, engage in costly rhetoric like threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz, make openly corrupt and destructive decisions regarding the gold, currency, and stock markets, and dozens of other whys? To understand the reason for Rouhani's behavior, one must reflect thoroughly. Is it as some have thought, that he has been forced into silence due to the corruption case of his close associates; how much is the volume of this corruption in a completely corrupt system, and how committed has Hassan Rouhani been to ethics and loyalty in his political behavior throughout his political life characterized by ambition and opportunism? Has he, as usual, run out of breath in all second-term governments; he who had just taken a leap for his lofty personal dreams? Has he made a deal with the IRGC and traditional clergy to pave his path to leadership; the IRGC, which is severely distrustful of him, and during this time, instead of demonstrating competence and capability to charm and engage with the clergy and sections of the IRGC and various segments of society, has shown more incapacity, confusion, mismanagement, and submission? So what is the story, and where should the cause be pointed? 10. Until recently, I also viewed Rouhani's opportunistic rightward shift primarily in relation to his transactional principles and personal opportunism and his leap to test his leadership chances (an important element that still exists and is effective); however, for some time now, another important factor has occupied my mind, which has much evidence to support it: the investigation into Hashemi's death at the Supreme National Security Council. This case is being pursued under Hassan Rouhani's supervision. Immediately after Hashemi's death, his wife and two children, Mahdi and Faezah, questioned the cause of it. However, shortly after, Fatemeh Hashemi, more than anyone else, pursued the suspicious nature of his death and later alluded to and explicitly mentioned Hashemi's murder. Mohammad Hashemi, his conservative brother, who initially took a hasty denial stance on this matter, changed his opinion and joined the other family members regarding the suspicious nature of his death. One of Hashemi's close associates and advisors (Gholamali Rajei) also later explicitly questioned the naturalness of his death and cast doubt on its naturalness (I have previously provided documentation of this matter in two writings here and here). Now the important question is whether the main reason for Hassan Rouhani's brake-pulling is knowledge of the results of the investigation in this case? Have those accused in that case sent clear and hidden threatening signals to him? These days, with some images and videos, proving these threats does not even require much evidence. Hassan Rouhani, due to his security background, believes these threats (and sometimes bluffs) more than usual. Because he knows that the opposing current can do anything. But whether the possibility of action exists or not is something a political element can discern better than a security individual. Whatever it is, caution is usually a condition of reason! Mr. Hajarian also faced the same threats and bluffs during his detention in 2009, which, of course, no longer had the possibility of being realized. However, he also, due to his security background, believed it and yielded to their demands. 11. Now, no false directions should be given anywhere; the main factor of the country's problems is the power establishment, not the government, although the government is not without influence. The main factor in damaging the credibility of reformists among various segments of the people (and not just intellectuals and those who are politically active) is the performance of Rouhani's government. Although other individuals and factors are also not without effect (especially in the long term). The low-income people are entirely justified in their economic protests. Although some of their actions can also be criticized. The authenticity of these protests is undeniable, even if some extremist coup plotters and some deluded foreign political figures seek to ride the wave. If they intend to sacrifice Rouhani's government as the last weapon against the protesting people, all its supporters will be paralyzed, and the field will fall into the hands of the extremist opportunists and brazen riders, and false directions cannot stand against the legitimate and angry people's desire for improvement. Finally, some regime change advocates who fan the flames of anger and hatred and offer a paradise of freedom and prosperity will also be among the first victims of that.