The Challenge Between the Leader and the President

The public challenges between the Leader and the President have become glaringly obvious and have even been numbered by some. Why has this challenge arisen and intensified? The emergence of this challenge primarily relates to more distant and deeper "remote" causes, which are structural issues within the dual power system (Leadership/Republic) in Iran, with a history spanning three decades. However, the more immediate causes and factors exacerbating it can be twofold: A) The disruptive interference of the Leader in the affairs of the country and the executive system, which deeply reflects the two different political approaches of the Leader and the President. The Leader is concerned about and opposed to the President's approach, while the President sees that managing the country's affairs is becoming increasingly difficult under these circumstances. Particularly now, the Leader's positions and approaches, along with his interferences, have hindered the results of the JCPOA or slowed its pace, preventing at least the country's economic affairs from emerging from a critical state and moving towards stability. B) More timely issues related to the illness and potential loss of the Leader, as well as long-term rivalries and ambitions. Some believe that the President and some of his allies, through explicit criticism and sometimes subtle hints at the Leader's positions, aim to diminish his stature and undermine the legitimacy of his quotes and references. Others speculate that the President harbors ambitions for leadership and is raising his profile through direct confrontations with the Leader. Conversely, the Leader is concerned about a system that has been in his hands for two decades and fears it may fall into the hands of the incompetent. This is the same concern that the previous Leader had. Now, we can view the issue of the challenge between the Leader and the President through one of these two possibilities or even a combination of both. An important point to add to these two possibilities is two matters that are no longer speculative but are almost certain and real: First, the Leader of the system, who has claimed to be the most resolute and uncompromising leader against enemies and Zionism for two decades, has been frustrated and wounded by the perception that he has retreated against global arrogance and treacherous enemies, even if under the guise of a "heroic flexibility." Especially since everyone, even if they do not voice it, knows that all nuclear negotiations, as repeatedly stated by the negotiating team, have occurred under his guidance and support. Although he has donned the garment of opposition today and frequently expresses complaints and criticisms against the JCPOA and its proponents, sometimes even making false statements, no one can misunderstand the repeated and unprecedented approvals of the negotiating team and the prompt approval of the JCPOA in the parliament within twenty minutes. Second, the second factor of the Leader's frustration and aggression is the severe and sometimes humiliating defeat of his faction in the recent elections, especially in Tehran (with a result of 30 to 0), and the elimination of some prominent figures of the Velayat front, such as Mesbah and Mohammad Yazdi. Ultimately, he could not endure the people's vote being challenged and referred to this popular elimination as a loss. Now, considering the two options above and the subsequent two realities, we can more accurately "visualize" and analyze the scene of the challenge between the Leader and the President and their occasionally intensified direct and indirect conflicts. If we set aside the broader and strategic discussions regarding the relationship between the President and the Leader and the behavioral models that have existed in Iran so far, despite their analytical importance, and focus on more current issues, today, given the Leader's deep political and psychological frustrations, an important question arises: to whom will the occasional challenges of the President and some of his supporters, like Hashemi Rafsanjani, ultimately benefit? In other words, what is the best way to resolve the obstacles posed by the Leader in the current affairs of the country (the first option) or to undermine the credibility of his verbal authority (the second option)? Will these confrontations compel him to cooperate with the government, or will they lead to further obstruction? Will they increase his concerns about leadership after him and compel him to plan (including appointing a successor before his death), or will they make him calmer about the future and consequently less active? It seems that within the framework of the first possibility, considering the current balance of power in the power structure, whether politically, economically, especially in terms of security, intelligence, military, and law enforcement, the Leader holds the upper hand. And within the framework of the second possibility, due to the Leader's illness and his concerns about the future, especially following the recent electoral defeat, the challenge with the Leader must be managed more than intensified. Previously, it was discussed how the President should communicate with the Leader, noting that a confrontational and direct criticism approach, especially if accompanied by sarcasm and insinuation, is more likely to backfire than to help the government resolve executive matters obstructed by the Leader. This means it provokes him further and unites his supporters against the government more aggressively, ultimately leading to the government's retreat in practice. The President or his ministers and associates have often made statements and positions that sparked controversy and then, in practice, yielded to the Leader's demands and the opposition's wishes. The Leader, who is "uncompromising," presents a significant challenge. However, the important point is that despite the fact that "interaction" is the best approach for a President of the system (who holds a different position than that of an opposition figure) in relation to the Leader, the issue is not that simple. The Leader is, in some, if not many, cases, entirely unyielding and holds a hardline position. Here, merely repeating the word interaction does not resolve the issue. Therefore, the President may be "forced" to at least publicly vent his frustrations or exert pressure on the Leader with external positions, compelling him to retreat. The experience of the confined Sheikh "Mahdi, son of Ahmad" supports this approach. However, this approach may not always serve the President well, and while it may compel the Leader to silence and sometimes retreat in his public positions, it does not result in the necessary cooperation that the government and the country's executive and managerial system require. This is where the discussion of "expert language" and "dialogue with public opinion" (with a rhetoric and logic that ties politics, including differences in approaches, to the daily lives and economic conditions of the people) comes into play. It seems that instead of sarcasm and venting his frustrations, which may temporarily boost the morale of some of his supporters and then lead to a retreat in practice and dishearten everyone, the President should utilize expert language to express public dissent without provoking and seek public support while potentially moderating the Leader's positions with the language of security and national interests. It is very positive that it has been officially announced that the Ministry of Interior has provided a technical report on social damage to the Leader (which is not unprecedented), and it is also reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has provided a technical report regarding the situation in Syria, concluding that Iran should not support Bashar al-Assad and that the Syrian issue, in particular, and the conflict with Saudi Arabia, in general, should be managed. However, if this approach does not prove effective and does not resolve the government's issues (according to the first option), or if a higher purpose is intended (the second option), where every word, cough, and glance from the Leader (including regarding the selection of the next Leader) does not become an unchallengeable decree that everyone must accept, which the aging and narcissistic Leader is very interested in, and which has long been the backbone of the country's official propaganda system and the training of the military and clandestine forces loyal to the Leader (who obey the "Master's" command and are ready for any repression and oppression), what other path and approach remains? The language of Rouhani and Hashemi or the language of Motahari? Mohammad Khatami, despite his soft and calm alternative rhetoric to the Leader, usually tried not to engage in direct and explicit challenges with the Leader's discourse, unlike Hashemi and Rouhani, who sometimes took opposing positions shortly after the Leader on the same topic or key phrases. This spirit and approach may stem from their higher confidence and the current situation of the Leader's illness on one hand and his daily interferences in executive matters and destructive involvement in all details on the other, which is not unprecedented. Moreover, we set aside longer-term issues such as the selection of the next Leader, which may require questioning the legitimacy of "any" statement from the Leader from now on. We also set aside less provable speculations that in these confrontations, Rouhani intends to elevate himself as a leader. Now, for whatever motivation, creating a rift in the culture of polytheism and monarchy (as the command of God; as the command of the King) and the astonishing interpretations of "the desires" and "the Master's view" that have lost their meaning due to excessive repetition (and sometimes even have been accepted at least superficially and practically by the opposing side) is beneficial for both the nation and the growth and expansion of democratic culture in the country, as well as for religion, which has presented polytheism under the guise of monotheism. In this regard, however, the language of Rouhani and Hashemi is a weak and passive one. They bow their heads until the pressure and intensity of the opposing side's propaganda and uproar increases. Rouhani speaks of the government's complete obedience to the Leader's wishes in the cabinet, and Hashemi, as usual, denies or brings up the issues of distortion and misunderstanding, and in a few sentences, he again praises the Leader, reciting his repetitive poetry that there was no better leader than Mr. Khamenei to choose, and he still holds that view! In this context, we do not want to engage in the polluted atmosphere of extreme pragmatism and minimalism that dries up the roots of courage and audacity; rather, we point to a truly existing and readily available example: the language of Ali Motahari. When Ali Motahari's opinion clearly differs from that of Mr. Khamenei (for example, regarding the house arrest and his analysis of the events of 2009) or any other official like the head of the judiciary, he states within the framework of the usual rhetoric of the system and even the rhetoric of the so-called principlists that he accepts the guardianship of the jurist and is obedient to the Leader, but this does not mean that every word and opinion of the Leader is correct or that the Leader's opinion cannot be criticized. He defends his approach with religious language and references the leaders' accountability and the fallibility of the Leader. This language and approach, especially if Hashemi Rafsanjani takes a step forward and speaks with this language, will achieve both his goals (whatever they may be, whether related to the first option in assisting the government or the second option regarding the next Leader) and provide a significant service to the political culture of the country and particularly the discourse within the system, which has grappled with the deadly damages of this culture throughout the tenure of this Leader, the previous one, and beyond. Furthermore, this language and method, instead of using sarcasm and historical references that often provoke and irritate the opposing side, if presented with a gentle tone and concern for the country and the system and with a technical substance, will have fewer negative consequences, if not more. Although the effectiveness and success of this language in moderating the Leader's positions cannot be guaranteed, the same goes for the confrontational language. However, if this discourse, despite initial resistance and even attacks and insults, becomes widespread, one can guarantee that it will break the destructive and polytheistic legitimacy of that harmful and fatal logic and language (apart from the structural problems that the Islamic Republic suffers from), so that at least the Presidents of the system can engage in logical and expert-based confrontations with the Leaders of the system, aligned with the law, the majority vote, and the national interest, with less concern about the official and media uproar from the opposing faction. This language also weakens the legitimacy of referencing the current Leader to establish an individual as the next Leader (according to the second possibility). Especially if this individual is of the stature of a short figure like the current head of the judiciary. If that language and logic are undermined, it does not matter much if some quotes from the previous charismatic Leader are also undermined, as it is famously said by Mirza Hashem Amoli (the father of the Larijani brothers) that he did not have a very positive view and advised his children not to accept high and important positions. The irony of fate is that the next Leader "in practice" nullified the previous Leader's "promise" and handed over two important branches of the state to the two sons of the aforementioned Mirza. However, this time, it should not only be the case that the words and claims of narcissistic and arrogant leaders are undermined "in practice" but also "logically" and "religiously" and "in speech" as well. In this case, a greater pathway for collective reason and national interests will be opened. Many paths and methods, and goals and objectives that previously seemed difficult and unattainable within this system (and still do) have later been realized at least for "some" of them, if there remains a little courage and audacity to move forward and if instead of hidden and covert paths and languages, what is genuinely pursued is ethical, rational, and national politics. Civil society will continue its path for other obstacles, but establishing this language and logic may be the greatest assistance that moderates and reformists can provide to the continuous movement and change-seeking society with a majority desire for change, and earn the nation's prayers as a blessing on their path.