The Coalition of Hassan Rouhani and Ali Larijani for Leadership and Presidency

The Islamic Republic has never been a unified system. The power struggle has been openly pursued since the beginning, but over time, this rift has deepened. Ayatollah Khamenei and the military believed that by making Mahmoud Ahmadinejad president, they had transformed the 'dual sovereignty' into 'a single and unified sovereignty.' However, the elimination and suppression of reformists did not resolve the power struggle, and Ahmadinejad and his closest circle publicly exposed a new internal rift within the system, leading to the imprisonment of members of this circle after his presidency. The story of the Green Movement and the issue of 'effective fraud' in the presidential election of June 2009 was so immense that after the disqualification of Hashemi Rafsanjani and the approval of eight insiders for the 2013 election, Ayatollah Khamenei issued two public orders: First, the military should not interfere in the elections in any way. Second, he referred to the people's vote as 'the right of the people' and considered altering it as contrary to Sharia. On one hand, Khamenei and his followers sought a presidency for someone like Saeed Jalili, while on the other hand, they were reassured that any of those eight candidates would not turn the sovereignty into a dual one. However, with the election of Hassan Rouhani, the structure of the 'dual sovereignty' and the power struggle of the Islamic Republic quickly revealed its storm. Elected and appointed institutions confronted each other, and the power struggle became openly visible everywhere and in all subjects and issues. The presidential elections of 2013 and 2017, as well as the elections for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts, became the arena for the largest revelations, attacks, and wars. The past—including the suppression and massacre of political and ideological prisoners in the summer of 1988—also entered the electoral disputes, and Ayatollah Khamenei defended Ebrahim Raisi—who was called the 'Ayatollah of Massacre'—and addressed Hassan Rouhani, saying: 'Those who are thoughtful, reflective, and judge the 1980s should not confuse the martyr with the executioner!' In the power struggle, neutralizing the rival's plans is at least one of the actions taken. However, destruction and undermining are also a more significant part of the power struggle. The nuclear agreement is an example of a power struggle where 'national interests' held no importance. The only issue was that our rival should not succeed. Negotiating with the U.S. is another example. The firing of missiles by the IRGC, which bore the slogan 'Death to Israel,' provided the best excuse for the Israeli government and its powerful allies in the U.S. to move towards canceling the nuclear agreement and initiating crippling sanctions. Hassan Rouhani had several achievements; internationally, his most important achievement was the nuclear agreement or JCPOA. Relations with European countries and the Obama administration improved. Iranian and American foreign ministers regularly met and discussed. Rouhani visited European countries and met with European leaders. He not only spoke with Obama over the phone but also exchanged letters with him. It was supposed that if all JCPOA commitments in the economic domain were fulfilled, discussions in other areas would also begin. Following the nuclear negotiations and the JCPOA, the World Bank reported that Iran's average annual economic growth increased to five percent from 2013 to 2017. Additionally, inflation decreased from 35 percent to single-digit inflation. Accordingly, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund predicted that Iran's economic growth would exceed four percent in 2018, 2019, and 2020, while inflation would rise to 11 to 13 percent. However, with Trump's withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and the return of unilateral U.S. sanctions, inflation surged significantly, and the price of the dollar multiplied, reaching as high as 19,000 tomans before falling below 14,000 tomans. The IMF also predicted that Iran's economic growth would drop to negative 1.5 percent in 2018. Inflation was likely to increase to 40 to 50 percent that year. Voter discontent with Hassan Rouhani's failure to fulfill electoral promises has led to widespread disappointment and frustration, with many questioning what has happened and what he is planning. Even regarding the critical issue of the economic crisis, the government's lack of a program and inefficiency are evident. The country needs structural and fundamental transformations to overcome the crisis, but Rouhani has not only taken no action but has also not promised any structural transformation. He does not listen to the voices of specialists. Undoubtedly, Ayatollah Khamenei and the military will not allow him to fulfill his promises. They do not trust him and believe that if they allow him to negotiate with the West, led by the U.S., he will squander everything for his own interests (using the results of negotiations to strengthen his position). If there is ever to be a negotiation with the U.S. government, it must be conducted by someone approved by the leadership—from the principlists. Khamenei, the principlists, and the military oppose 'fundamental reforms' or 'structural transformations'—especially in political and economic realms. Hassan Rouhani's overarching plan for the future is under attack from both internal and external fronts (the Trump administration). The U.S. withdrawal from the nuclear agreement and its consequences have further weakened Rouhani's domestic position. The simplest explanation might be to claim that 'Hassan Rouhani is in a state of despair.' He does not know what to do in this crisis and how to get out of this situation. While this possibility cannot be dismissed, and he lacks the necessary courage for making significant decisions in the economic field and abandoning 'populist opportunism,' he is also pursuing broader plans. Hassan Rouhani: a) is seeking leadership and succession to Ayatollah Khamenei; b) considers solving political and economic crises contingent on friendly relations with the West and the U.S. government. Recall his expression about 'building with the godfather of the world.' He has never been one of the reformists, and although he belongs to the principlist camp, he considers himself a 'moderate.' This expression is derived from Aristotelian ethics. Aristotle placed moderation between two extremes of excess and deficiency. Two decades ago, in an article titled 'The Theory of Poverty and Misery of Moderation,' I demonstrated the inaccuracy of this theory, at least in the political realm. However, as his predecessor—Hashemi Rafsanjani—said: eliminating or sidelining extremist political forces is a necessary condition for this political approach. To achieve this goal, he needs a coalition. He has only used reformists as a ladder for his ascent. As Rumi said: 'When you reach your desired goal, it is inappropriate to demand knowledge now; when you are on the rooftops of the sky, seeking a ladder should be cold.' The reformists are not present in the Assembly of Experts, which he needs their votes. He has long been conducting his affairs in coalition with Ali Larijani. Larijani is also one of the moderate principlists, as described by Hashemi Rafsanjani and Hassan Rouhani. Larijani is seeking the presidency. He has previously tried his luck as a principlist candidate, but midway through, the extremist principlists—Khamenei's office and the commanders of the IRGC—elected Ahmadinejad instead of him in 2005. He still seeks this opportunity. He believes that if they form a coalition with Hassan Rouhani, the reformists will have no choice but to support him as a presidential candidate in 2021, since the Guardian Council will not approve any of their candidates for the presidency. Hassan Rouhani fully agrees with this. The important task of the coalition between Hassan Rouhani and Ali Larijani is to marginalize the extremist principlists, reformists, and the military. They believe that if they push the extremists to the margins and neutralize them, the way for dialogue with the West and the U.S. will be opened, and through negotiation and reconciliation, economic and non-economic crises can be resolved. Hassan Rouhani knows that Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi is dying, and thus one of the serious competitors in the leadership competition will not be present. It is expected that Sadegh Larijani will replace Hashemi Shahroudi in the Expediency Discernment Council. Sadegh Larijani's term as head of the judiciary will end in August 2019—about nine months later. Although Sadegh Larijani has been one of the extremist principlists and has not refrained from any suppression to please Ayatollah Khamenei, it seems that the leadership office is not particularly satisfied with his performance. Another important rival for Hassan Rouhani in the leadership competition is Ebrahim Raisi. He was labeled one of the 'criminals of history' by Ayatollah Montazeri due to the 1988 massacre and was called the 'Ayatollah of Massacre' in the 2017 presidential election, where he suffered a severe defeat and is even unable to deliver a compelling speech. On the other hand, someone whose only pride is 'crimes against humanity' and suppression will provoke global reactions against the Islamic Republic. At the same time, it should be noted that the Assembly of Experts is: First, entirely in the hands of extremist and traditional principlists. Second, they will heed Ayatollah Khamenei's opinion and vote for his preferred candidate. However, according to Hassan Rouhani, in the special and emergency conditions following Ayatollah Khamenei's death, if the groundwork has been laid in advance, Rouhani can be chosen as the savior of the system and someone whom Western governments consider a 'moderate.' For these reasons, Hassan Rouhani does not take any steps toward fundamental transformations. He also selects his ministers in coordination with Ali Larijani and gives him his share. The planning of these two coincides with the U.S. presidential election. They hope that a Democratic president will enter the White House on January 20, 2021. However, history and reality are not malleable in the hands of planners to shape as they wish. Neither the future of America, Europe, and the Middle East is clear, nor will internal extremist forces remain silent in the face of these two. The rejection of the bill for Iran's accession to the Convention on Combating the Financing of Terrorism—namely, the 'most important' bill related to the implementation of the Financial Action Task Force regulations—by the Guardian Council, which Hassan Rouhani and Ali Larijani sought to pass, is an example of the hardliners' reaction. The anti-American remarks of the military—such as the foolish statements of General Naqdi on November 4, 2018—are another example of the hardliners' reaction. Even reformists are no longer willing to be used as a 'ladder.' Most importantly, democracy-seekers who pursue justice as the removal of all forms of ethnic, gender, religious, and class discrimination are seeking to empower people in civil and professional institutions at the level of civil society. Their non-violent struggle is aimed at transitioning from the Islamic Republic and the rule of the jurist, not inventing another jurist.