The Context and Implications of Morteza Pashaei's Death

Morteza Pashaei, a pop singer, passed away at the age of 30 after a year-long battle with death. He sang sad songs, but the sorrow he embodied was not the same sorrow promoted by mourners and reciters. The announcement of his death brought large crowds to the streets in most cities in Iran, surprising both the government and the people, as well as the opposition. How did such a large crowd gather spontaneously, without the invitation of official media, through internet messages (Viber, WhatsApp, Facebook, etc.) and in person? What were they there for? Collective mourning, like any other individual and collective human act, is a meaningful behavior. People display the 'meaningful action' of the autonomous agent through their behaviors. However, here, as in any other field, we will encounter different meanings. Initially, the actors/agents give meaning (purpose, intention, motivation, etc.) to their actions, and subsequently, observers/analysts reinterpret it. One of the burning questions in the philosophy of social sciences is: Should the meaning that an observer derives from an actor's behavior be the same as the meaning the agent ascribes to their action? Which meaning (the actor's interpretation or the observer's interpretation) is the primary meaning of the behavior? Which interpretation is the best explanation of collective behavior? The government was surprised by the crowd. It believes that it alone is authorized to hold large funerals for its own. The opposition has also always tried to conduct funerals for their symbols well. However, firstly, they need government permission. Secondly, the regime not only does not grant them permission but also employs repressive methods to prevent their gatherings to commemorate symbols that have opposed the regime. Ayatollah Montazeri is an example of this tradition. In recent years, his memorial ceremonies have not been held due to regime opposition. The regime's opponents were also surprised because they were neither familiar with Morteza Pashaei nor had they heard any of his songs, nor were they expecting such a gathering in most cities of the country. The people were also surprised. They suddenly faced a large crowd and a city locked down. They have seen much mourning, but this one was different from the rest. What did this mourning signify? What constituted the 'text' and what were the 'margins'? Every observer and analyst attempts to construct their own text and margins by ascribing meaning to the event. Thus, we will face many texts and margins. Was Morteza Pashaei— as a pop singer who tragically died at 30— the text himself or merely an excuse for the emergence of other matters? Pop music is not recognized by the Islamic Republic. However, those who sing have created their own specific social movement. Young people make up the majority of this social movement. Pashaei sang sad songs that were understandable to a segment of the young generation because they had experienced it. The leaders of the Islamic Republic usually ignore such movements. They believe they still control the dominant discourse through national media (IRIB), Friday sermons, mosques, schools, and universities. However, the truth is that Iranian society is now 'multivocal,' and no one can claim to have a dominant discourse at the level of civil society. When a governmental cleric dies at over 80 years of age, the entire regime mobilizes for his funeral. All issue statements, and all media call for attendance at the ceremony. Even for a cleric who has lived over 80 years, three days of public mourning are declared. None of this happened for Pashaei. His ceremony revealed the multivocal nature of society. It seemed that the dissatisfaction of a social movement, due to its lack of recognition, remained waiting for an opportunity, and as soon as the opportunity arose, it manifested itself en masse. A repressive government sees only the surface of society. Ayatollah Khamenei constantly speaks of decline and growth. His claim is that although there has always been decline, the rate of growth has been much greater than the decline, and the younger generation is fully aligned with the regime's ideals and lifestyle. On the other hand, the voices of religious authorities and Friday prayer leaders are loud, stating that even in cities considered religious, the outward appearances of Islam are not being observed. Religious authorities are dissatisfied with the situation in Qom. Recently, Ayatollah Alam al-Huda expressed concern about the situation in Mashhad. All of these focus on the surface of society, which they believe is not 'Islamic.' However, none of them pay attention to what is happening in the depths of Iranian society. Many institutionalized processes have formed and are expanding. What should be seen more than clothing and food is the self-expression of the modern era. The desire to be seen through self-expression. New 'identities' are constructed this way. Using a specific type of glasses or a specific type of hat creates identity with others using the same symbol worldwide. Participating in pop music ceremonies also creates identity with others. These identities demand display and recognition. However, they face a regime that denies such identities. In other words, Ayatollah Khamenei seeks to create a 'model of Iranian-Islamic lifestyle' that remains undefined. If one day he succeeds in creating such a thing, it will also be one lifestyle among hundreds of types of lifestyles. Many identities have formed and institutionalized in Iranian society. Pashaei was a symbol. A symbol of the internal currents of society. The opposition and the Islamic Republic quickly tried to claim Morteza Pashaei for themselves. The government, seeing the opposition's initial efforts, reacted swiftly. They published a photo of Pashaei at Imam Reza's shrine, claimed that he sang a song from a religious television series, stated that he had requested his father to recite the mourning of Imam Hussein at his funeral— and he did— held a ceremony for him at the Vahdat Hall, and some officials attended the ceremony, while others issued statements. The Fars news agency— affiliated with the IRGC— made a film for him, and all government media published many photos from the ceremony, etc. The large crowd made it impossible to bury him. They said the body would be buried another day. Many who had dispersed buried the body. Thus, they at least did not allow the opposition to turn the ceremony into a 'political protest.' Pashaei did not belong to the discourse of the Islamic Republic, but the opposition cannot claim him either. 'Corpse snatching' is the work of the Islamic Republic; democracy advocates and human rights defenders should not resort to the morally unjustifiable methods of the regime. Simin Behbahani is a good example. She was undoubtedly opposed to the Islamic Republic, but the political statements she signed were against the attacks on Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Those statements were so anti-imperialist and against any foreign intervention that some considered them 'Marxist-Leninist.' However, after the death of this national poet, advocates of so-called just wars and paralyzing economic sanctions tried to claim her for themselves. This national poet's political thoughts fundamentally conflicted with the political thoughts of some individuals and groups. Just because Pashaei did not belong to the Islamic Republic does not mean he belonged to the opposition. He was on his own path, which was neither the path of the Islamic Republic nor that of its opponents. Have we forgotten how some of the opposition reacted to the participation of a group of artists and writers— including Mahmoud Dowlatabadi— in Hassan Rouhani's speech? In Iran, the majority of people are dissatisfied with the current situation and the Islamic Republic for various reasons. 'Public dissatisfaction' is a necessary condition for 'political protest.' However, one should not fall into the false belief that public dissatisfaction is the same as political protest. Democracy advocates should use opportunities to empower the people and create a social base for themselves. The ground for fighting the regime must be expanded. Art and sports are also fields of struggle. However, just as one cannot hope for the participation of workers in 'political protest' without connecting with them and pursuing their interests, one cannot expect cooperation in other realms without connection. The force that seeks to transition from the Islamic Republic to a democratic system must take action to reap the fruits of its labor. Morteza Pashaei is gone. But he worked within Iranian society. He had little time. From that very short opportunity, he made use of all the obstacles that had been placed before him. The opposition— more than the government— did not know him. But now everyone knows him. He carried many hearts with him and sparked a wave to show that society is alive and ready to seize opportunities.