The Controversial Section of the JCPOA: What Do We Know About Clause 'T'?

With the rise of a new government in the United States that criticizes the JCPOA, the discussion about the future of this agreement has taken on new dimensions. Initially, criticisms of the JCPOA were presented in general terms. Then, discussions about the deficiencies of the agreement emerged. Inspections that Iran opposes, including those of military facilities, once again made headlines in the middle of summer, and now Clause 'T' has become a topic that can be expected to be heard more about in the coming weeks, especially with the approach of October 15, when the U.S. government must report to Congress about the JCPOA. Clause 'T' is part of the first appendix of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding nuclear commitments. This section refers to 'activities that could contribute to the design and development of a nuclear explosive device.' The official translation of Clause 'T' by the Iranian Foreign Ministry is included in the first appendix of the JCPOA. Recently, Clause 'T' made headlines after Reuters in Vienna asked Yukiya Amano, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), about it. Mr. Amano responded that the Agency's tools for verification in this area are 'limited.' In this interview, published on September 25, he stated that in other areas, Iran has committed to 'provide declarations, bring its activities under safeguards, or guarantee access for the Agency.' However, according to Mr. Amano, such commitments are not seen in relation to Clause 'T.' The Director General expressed hope that the parties to the agreement would discuss this in the Joint Commission, and he noted that 'clarifying the terms used, including the technology mentioned in the text, could lead to progress in this area.' One of the reasons for the scrutiny of Clause 'T' by critics of the JCPOA is this approach. Unlike what is seen in other sections of the JCPOA verification, this clause does not mention the Agency's responsibilities; rather, it is the Joint Commission of the JCPOA that is responsible for confirming Iran's actions. David Albright, the head of the Institute for Science and International Security, and Olli Heinonen, a former Deputy Director General of the IAEA, two analysts known as critics of the JCPOA, published an article on this topic on the website of the Institute for Science and International Security in August. One of the points made by these analysts, referring to the Parchin facility, is that 'the basis of Clause 'T' should not be that an allegation of violation is raised by one of the countries and then examined.' They wrote in their article that they believe 'the nature of the conditions of Clause 'T' corresponds to verification that ensures activities and equipment are used correctly.' In other words, these two analysts state that just as IAEA inspectors go to the Natanz facility to ensure the nature of Iran's nuclear program, they should also have such access for verifying Clause 'T.' The items referred to in Clause 'T' include activities and equipment that could have dual-use applications; they could be used in nuclear activities as well as in conventional military activities. One of the most complex aspects of Iran's relations with the Agency in recent years related to actions in this area, and the Agency referred to this issue in its 2011 report. The military facility at Parchin and activities such as research into explosive triggers were the main contents of the PMD file, which, with the implementation of the JCPOA, the IAEA Board of Governors voted to close. The main challenge of the PMD at that time was the issue of 'access,' which was ultimately resolved with Yukiya Amano's presence at the Parchin facility and sampling from this facility, leading to the closure of the file. Albright and Heinonen also refer to an issue that is the main reason for the controversy surrounding Clause 'T.' They write, 'Although the conditions mentioned in Clause 'T' are not institutionalized in existing safeguards, the inclusion of this section in the JCPOA indicates that the necessity of addressing it and Iran's commitment to full cooperation in this area were considered by the negotiators.' Previously, Iranian negotiators and the P5+1 group had repeatedly emphasized that the JCPOA is a very complex agreement in the field of disarmament, and comparable examples are rare. Additionally, diplomats from both sides have often discussed the extent of access to Iran's activities and the oversight of Iran's nuclear program, and now it seems that a more scrutinizing perspective from analysts has revealed one of these complexities. Tarek Raouf, who was the head of the IAEA's Verification and Security Policy Coordination Division from 2002 to 2011, also comments on the novelty of the contents of Clause 'T.' Mr. Raouf tells Radio Free Europe that the items raised in Clause 'T' are outside the Agency's area of expertise, and during the nuclear negotiations, discussions on this topic were led by the U.S., and 'due to a lack of expertise in this area, the Agency was not questioned.' According to this former Agency official, the Agency's regulations limit it to peaceful nuclear programs, and the five nuclear-armed states (China, France, Russia, the UK, and the U.S.) are all opposed to the Agency's involvement in the verification of nuclear weapons/disarmament issues. Kelsey Davenport from the Arms Control Association, like Mr. Raouf, is one of the analysts who supports the JCPOA. She also states that Clause 'T' opens a new space in the topic of inspections and verification. She tells Radio Free Europe that it is not surprising that questions in this area arise over the course of the agreement's implementation, and it is a positive matter that Mr. Amano is seeking clarification in this area so that the JCPOA is fully implemented, and providing explanations in this regard is the responsibility of the Joint Commission. However, Ms. Davenport emphasizes that such clarification should not be confused with requests for 'renegotiation' or 'changing' parts of the agreement. As the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency announced last week, discussions on how to address Clause 'T' continue. Although Mr. Amano also mentioned that Russia opposes the Agency's action for verification regarding Clause 'T.' On October 1, Nikki Haley, the U.S. representative, stated that some countries want to protect Iran from further inspections. However, this American diplomat did not mention Russia by name, unlike Mr. Amano.