The Day After Karimov Has Arrived for Uzbekistan

Noah Tucker*The zero hour has finally arrived, and the people of Uzbekistan are entering an era that has not been ruled by Islam Karimov for 25 years since the country's independence. This is a day that many Uzbek migrants and government opponents have long awaited and hoped for. For this reason, analysts and academics like myself have pondered for years what impact this event will have on the future of Uzbekistan. It was clear that the only way to create political change in one of the most stable autocratic political systems in the world would be for Islam Karimov to one day succumb to the forces of nature. I cannot recall how many times my conversations with Uzbek friends began or ended with the phrase, 'if Islam Karimov dies.' They expressed this phrase while thinking of a future where conditions might allow them to meet their families, travel abroad, start economic activities, or pursue education. As Uzbekistan becomes increasingly isolated and the government tightens its control over the economy and society, each of these actions has become more difficult, dangerous, and nearly impossible. A few weeks ago, I traveled with one of my Uzbek friends in southern Kyrgyzstan near the border with Uzbekistan. The border area is protected by tall security fences and heavily armed guards. Both of us had lived in Tashkent for some time, and during our conversation, we expressed our longing for the city and our inability to return. My friend shook his head and said, 'After Karimov's death.' Today is that day, and a new era has suddenly arrived. But what changes will occur? Regardless of how many discussions, analyses, or articles and research have been dedicated to the events following Islam Karimov's death, the bitter truth is that we have little knowledge about his successor or the direction of the most populous country in this restless region. One of the possible scenarios that many experts warn about is that Islam Karimov may have passed away without designating a 'heir' or a clear process for choosing his successor. Those who have focused on his role and personality rather than the governmental system that developed during his rule have long warned that such a situation could have catastrophic consequences. They argue that Islamists, who were kept under control during Karimov's authoritarian rule, may rise up. Alternatively, the country could become embroiled in tribal conflicts, which Karimov, an orphan raised by the Soviet state with no tribal political affiliations, skillfully managed by pitting tribes against each other to maintain a balance of power. Although there are elements of truth in these widespread analyses, the main commonality in both is that they claim, based on somewhat unrealistic hypotheses, that the people of Uzbekistan are incapable of taking charge of their own affairs. These hypotheses justify the current political system in Uzbekistan, which Alana Lednóva has referred to as 'systema' in relation to the political system in Russia. An autocratic system and a central leader have crafted a rationale for seizing and controlling power in the country that extends beyond the authority of one man and even his lifespan. Today, Karimov is gone, but his security regime and its tight control over the country's economy, which has been in place for many years with his portrait hanging in every classroom and government office, still remain. The reason for this situation is largely due to the prevalence of beliefs that claim this system is still healthy and efficient. As researchers on Central Asian affairs like Larry Markowitz and Scott Radnitz have explained, in the state-controlled political economy that has developed in Uzbekistan, in stark contrast to neighboring countries, all aspects of the country's economy are concentrated in the hands of the government and its loyalists, protected by powerful security agencies that can punish and suppress any dissent or opposition from domestic economic actors. Outside of this rent-seeking and repressive system, there is little opportunity for advancement, and for this reason, the ruling and privileged class of Uzbekistan, whether during Karimov's era or afterward, has no incentive to change this economic system that benefits all of them. The complete dominance of security agencies creates a situation where no one can challenge this class. An example of daily life under this 'systema' and the prevailing beliefs in the country can be seen in a case that occurred earlier this year. Aramais Avakian, an innovator of small economic projects in the Jizzakh region, owned a property that included two small ponds. His goal was to earn income from fish farming in these natural ponds. He made some progress and had several workers until the local mayor became interested in his business. A local official in the rent-seeking and repressive regime of Uzbekistan pressured Mr. Avakian to transfer his properties to him using his authority. Mr. Avakian refused and was shortly thereafter arrested by the police on charges of affiliation with extremist groups. His family and lawyer say he was severely beaten and mistreated in prison and eventually 'confessed' under pressure that he and all his employees were a secret unit of the 'Islamic Caliphate' and intended to overthrow the government. Beyond all the flaws in this story, it should be noted that Mr. Avakian is Armenian and a follower of the Orthodox Church. However, for a regime that has taken root in Uzbekistan, this fact posed no obstacle to sentencing Mr. Avakian to years in prison for collaborating with jihadist groups. This is the same regime that is likely to rule the country with or without Karimov. As Eric McGlinchey, a political science professor, recently wrote: 'The ruling class in Uzbekistan has a lot of vested interests in maintaining this autocratic system, which serves as a means for them to achieve substantial economic benefits.' The institutions and structures that sustain this regime, which many believe are even more powerful than Islam Karimov himself, strongly defend the claim that without them, radical Islamists would plunge Uzbekistan and the entire region into chaos. In the coming weeks, as developments may unfold in Uzbekistan, especially if there are no changes in the daily lives of ordinary people, when some analysts and commentators raise the specter of an Islamist onslaught and the possibility of a religious regime like ISIS, one should remember the fate of Avakian, the fish farmer. Other options exist, but the people of Uzbekistan have not even had the opportunity in the past 25 years to know what those other options are.