The Death of Hassan Nasrallah: Costly Options and Difficult Choices for the Iranian Government

Since October 7, 2023, the Middle East has been experiencing an unprecedented situation in its contemporary history, and now, with the death of Hassan Nasrallah in an Israeli attack on his command center in Beirut, a new chapter has opened. The attack by the extremist group Hamas on Israel, which was followed by a broader retaliation from Israel against Gaza, initiated a series of events whose outcome remains uncertain. Hamas is considered a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union. Since October 7, Israel has repeatedly crossed Iran's red lines; initially, it carried out its ground operation in Gaza, which Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, the former Iranian foreign minister, had labeled as Iran's red line, and Israeli soldiers have been present in this strip for months. Subsequently, the Israeli army even entered Rafah on the Egyptian border. Earlier this year, an Israeli airstrike on the Islamic Republic's consulate building in Damascus resulted in the deaths of dozens, including several senior commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Now, nearly two months after the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas's political bureau in Tehran, the most powerful leader in the history of Hezbollah, which is the largest paramilitary group allied with the Iranian government and also a political party controlling a significant portion of southern Lebanon, has been killed in an Israeli airstrike on his command center in Beirut. Since these tensions erupted in the region, the Iranian government's only direct response to Israeli attacks has been to conduct missile and drone operations against Israel, which were communicated to Israel through Western and Arab intermediaries beforehand; an action aimed at minimizing casualties and damages and, of course, preventing further Israeli retaliation. Regional tensions are rapidly escalating, and the outlook for ongoing disputes and crises is more uncertain than ever. The United States considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, while the European Union has blacklisted its military wing but does not regard its political wing as terrorist, and the political party Hezbollah also has representatives in the Lebanese parliament. Now, however, the Iranian government finds itself in a difficult position. Even after the Israeli attack on the Iranian consulate building in Damascus, a group of more hardline forces within the Islamic Republic criticized this response, labeling it asymmetrical and emphasizing that it cannot restore Iran's damaged deterrent capability. This situation has escalated with continued Israeli operations, and louder voices in Tehran are calling for a more decisive response from Iran to these Israeli actions. This group argues that Iran's failure to respond has allowed this enemy of the Islamic Republic to rapidly escalate tensions and strike Iranian positions with greater confidence, knowing Tehran's inaction. The regional aspect of Iran's silence, however, is damaging to the Islamic Republic's proxy groups. When Israel began its attacks on Gaza the day after October 7, neither Tehran entered the conflict nor did Hezbollah take any significant steps beyond calculated attacks that did not escalate the situation. Now, Iran's proxy groups are witnessing one after another being targeted by Israel, with no practical support coming from Tehran. Consequently, the continuation of this situation could significantly undermine what Iranian officials refer to as their regional power tools. The second aspect of the situation is the blow to Iran's deterrent power. In recent years, the Iranian government has sought to encircle Israel by expanding its proxy forces in the Middle East so that these groups fight instead of Tehran and inflict damage on Israel. The advantage of such an approach for any state actor using proxy forces is that the fire of conflict stays away from home, and with lower costs, loyal groups fight the common enemy instead of the supporter. Through this method, Iran has been able to strengthen its deterrent power and manage the conflict in the 'gray zone' with Israel. However, for several months now, Israel has been striking Tehran's proxy forces and, more importantly, the Islamic Republic itself, attempting to remove Iran from the gray zone. Now, Iran's deterrent capability has been more damaged than ever, and Iran's failure to respond to Israeli actions has allowed Israel to take increasingly bold steps against its enemy without fear of Tehran's reaction. Hezbollah, under Hassan Nasrallah's leadership for over three decades, has gradually garnered more support from the Islamic Republic and has played the role of the most important proxy group for the Iranian government in the region. Why has Iran adopted such a policy during this time? Despite the media threats and uproar from senior IRGC commanders in their discussions and speeches, Iran has practically sought to adopt a conservatively optimistic approach; an action aimed at preventing a descent into a full-scale war. This policy can have several aspects: first, international sanctions and economic pressure have placed Iran under unprecedented financial constraints, resulting in its inability to sustain a full-scale war. Second, Islamic Republic officials have always prided themselves on never allowing the country to enter another war after the eight-year war with Iraq, viewing it as a sign of their 'power and military capability.' Entering a war with Israel could deprive the Islamic Republic of what it considers an 'achievement.' Third, Iran knows that a war with Israel would not be just a conflict with this country; Israel boasts international support, especially from the United States, which can support it in any military conflict with an enemy like Iran. Meanwhile, there is no guarantee that, should such a conflict arise, even Russia, due to its close relations with Israel, the Ukraine conflict, and its own policies, would come to Iran's aid. The fourth point is that internal dissatisfaction in Iran is a smoldering fire beneath the surface. Less than four months ago, at least half of eligible voters did not participate in the presidential elections as a sign of protest, indicating that despite more than two years since the widespread protests of the 'Women, Life, Freedom' movement, a significant portion of society is still not aligned with the government. Consequently, in the event of a full-scale war, the Islamic Republic would also be deprived of the widespread popular support it relied on during the eight-year war. The fifth aspect relates to the upcoming elections in the United States. Iran knows that escalating regional tensions would not only benefit Benjamin Netanyahu but would also create an opportunity for Donald Trump to attack Joe Biden's administration. The emergence of a regional war could provide this Republican candidate with the chance to accuse the White House of being unable to manage this crisis and prevent a regional conflict. Meanwhile, based on Donald Trump's four-year experience in power, Tehran likely prefers Kamala Harris to be in the White House in January 2025. In such circumstances, choosing the right approach towards Israel has become a so-called million-dollar question for Iranian officials. Monitoring the Iranian government's reactions since the beginning of this crisis in the Middle East shows that none of the previous approaches have been able to push Israel back or restore Iran's deterrent power. On the contrary, during this time, Israel has taken steps forward each time and, disregarding the threats and rhetoric of the Islamic Republic, has taken further steps to cut off the wings of the Islamic Republic's loyal forces in the region. Furthermore, Benjamin Netanyahu's speech at the United Nations and, more importantly, the cycle of Israeli actions over the past year indicate that, at least in the short term, there is no prospect for stopping these Israeli strikes against the Iranian government. In contrast, all options before Iran are hard, costly, and limited. An analysis of the situation shows that choosing any of these approaches, whether from a position of passivity or from the angle of initiative, will incur costs for Iran that outweigh its benefits. This is why Iranian officials will likely remain in the current game of media rhetoric for now, but perhaps from now on, louder voices within the Islamic Republic will speak of the necessity of moving towards building an atomic bomb; especially as Iran's efforts to resume nuclear negotiations have not gained traction, and despite the efforts of Masoud Pezeshkian and Abbas Araghchi in New York, it was predictable that no significant developments in Iran's nuclear talks would occur before the U.S. elections. This potential approach, if implemented, could superficially restore Iran's deterrent power sustainably, but there are many doubts that Western powers and Israel would sit idly by and watch this event; the likelihood of preemptive military attacks on at least Iran's nuclear facilities to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons would significantly increase. The Islamic Republic, through a series of strategic mistakes over many years, especially in recent years, has now placed itself in a position where an easy and low-cost exit from it seems unattainable.