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The December Protest Movement: The Third Voice

Jan 26, 2026 January 26, 2026 6 min read 📰 Radio Farda
📋 Key Takeaway

The December protest movement introduced a new political voice in Iran, highlighting widespread social frustration with the government's inability to meet citizens' needs. The article questions why the reformist movement failed to engage with this uprising, despite its history of advocating for political change. This situation underscores the ongoing struggle for genuine political reform in Iran.

🔍 Quick Context Guide
💡 Bottom Line: The December protest movement represents a critical juncture in Iran's struggle for political reform and citizen rights.

👥 Key Players

Hassan Rouhani MENTIONED
Former President of Iran
"His administration's failure to fulfill promises contributed to public frustration."
Reformist Movement MENTIONED
Political faction advocating for gradual change
"Their inability to engage with the protests highlights the limitations of reform within the current political structure."
Conservative Factions MENTIONED
Political groups supporting the existing regime
"Their alignment with reformists on certain issues indicates a shared concern about maintaining power."
Protesters MENTIONED
Citizens participating in the December protests
"They represent a growing discontent with the regime and a desire for significant political change."

📰 What Happened

The December protest movement emerged in Iran, reflecting widespread dissatisfaction with the government's failure to address citizens' needs. This movement introduced a new political voice that challenges both the reformist and conservative factions.

  • The protests were fueled by social frustration following the 2021 presidential election.
  • Protesters expressed a desire for political change, criticizing both reformists and conservatives.

💡 Why It Matters

🇮🇷 For Iran: The protests signify a potential shift in the political landscape, challenging the existing power structures.
🌍 Regional: Increased instability in Iran could have ripple effects across the Middle East, impacting neighboring countries.
🌐 International: Western nations may reassess their engagement strategies with Iran in light of these protests.

📚 Background

Iran has a complex political system dominated by religious authority, limiting genuine democratic processes. The reformist movement has historically struggled to enact meaningful change within this framework.

Iranian political reform Civil rights movements in Iran
📡 Source: NEUTRAL
📊 Confidence: 70%
The analysis provides a balanced view of the political dynamics in Iran, drawing on historical context and current events.

The December protest movement, despite its characteristics that may prevent it from becoming a sustainable movement and lead to complete suppression, introduced a third voice into the current political landscape of the country that will influence the process of change in Iran's political structure. This article raises the question of why the prevailing reformist movement in the country failed to grasp and influence this uprising. Why did reformists defend citizens' right to protest but, sharing concerns with conservatives regarding subversive slogans, distanced themselves from this uprising? One of the factors behind the nationwide protest movement in December (aside from its initial trigger) was widespread social frustration regarding the system's capacity to respond to the country's needs. This frustration intensified particularly a few months after the presidential election, in which over 23 million people voted for Hassan Rouhani, when various social groups realized that the government and parliament, relatively aligned with it, did not want and could not fulfill their promises. Since the mid-1970s, when dozens of countries joined the third wave of democracy, most of them have followed a peaceful transition by ending single-party and single-discourse structures. However, in Iran, since the revolution, no serious political party independent of the ruling religious discourse and with a development program has been able to operate sustainably. Therefore, the December uprising was not without context, as for about six months prior, dozens of protests by workers, teachers, depositors of credit institutions, retirees, nurses, and victims of air pollution and water crisis had raised similar slogans in their demonstrations in Tehran and other cities. If we delve a little deeper, the political failure of reformism in the Islamic Republic has more chronic and fundamental reasons that date back to the beginning of the reformist movement. This is when reformists assumed that the political opening resulting from the June 1997 movement, which was itself a form of protest and civil disobedience, was a type of democracy that could guide the country toward serious changes. While democracy, or political development, requires two essential pillars: political participation and discursive competition, the absence of either of these pillars makes political development impossible. After the revolution in Iran, a type of political participation became possible within the framework of non-free elections. This means that people could vote for the lesser of two evils with hopes for minor changes. However, elections have never been genuinely free, and even with maximum political participation, they could not bear fruit because the other pillar of free elections, discursive competition against the dominant discourse, namely the religious government based on 'Velayat-e Faqih', has never been feasible. Reformists attempted to circumvent the concerns of the main institutions of absolute power by proposing 'religious democracy', which is essentially a conceptual fallacy (and at best means the freedom of religious tendencies) but lacks any logic or discursive element, and by settling for the pillar of political participation, they provided reform programs. However, since the implementation of any serious reform program requires reforms in the political structure, these programs, which were mostly presented in the form of electoral promises, quickly faced dead ends. In the absence of serious political competition based on a transformative discursive competition, it is natural for people to turn to their recent historical memory and compare the present situation with the past. In the December protest movements, young people who opened their eyes to the world after the revolution but have read, seen, and heard history expressed gratitude for the achievements of the Pahlavi era, during which, despite the lack of political freedoms, modern Iran was founded and the country achieved significant economic, social, and cultural development, with slogans like 'May the spirit of Reza Shah be blessed' and 'A country without a king has no accountability.' Celebrating the Pahlavi era does not necessarily mean a desire to return to the past, but rather a comparison with a regime that, relying on a discourse alien to the spirit of the times, has blocked every path to forward movement and political dynamism in society. Since the mid-1970s, when dozens of countries joined the third wave of democracy, most of them have followed a peaceful transition by ending single-party and single-discourse structures and political competition based on freedom of expression and freedom of parties. However, in Iran, since the revolution, no serious political party independent of the ruling religious discourse and with a development program has been able to operate sustainably, and the political life of the country has been limited to small currents that have activated around a single individual during each election to create a façade of democracy. Existing civil institutions have also lacked independence and immunity and have continuously been subjected to attacks by the religious government. One argument made by some reformist leaders has been that in our society, traditions, beliefs, and religious culture are serious structural obstacles to secular democracy, while Iran experienced decades of independence of the state and civil society institutions from religion between the Constitutional Revolution and the February Revolution. Nevertheless, the prevailing reformist movement has not only failed to make serious intellectual efforts to separate religious institutions from government and propose a secular democratic discourse, but has also considered loyalty to the religious government an inseparable part of its identity. Mohammad Khatami, after June 1997 and at the height of discussions regarding the relationship between civil society and democracy, stated: 'Democracy will not be established in this country except through religion, and non-religious democracy will not only not be established, but we do not want it, and the majority of our society does not want it.' Leaders of the Green Movement also did not go beyond the discourse of 'returning to the golden age of the Imam' in explaining their political discourse. It is clear that the transition from a religious government to democracy in Iran requires a reconsideration of the legal structure of power, primarily changing the constitution. The first step for this is to propose a discourse of change in society and move toward changing the balance in the actual structure of power. The protesters of the December uprising and, prior to that, the depositors of credit institutions emphasized the necessity of reconsidering the religious government with the simple slogan 'You used Islam as a step, you made the people miserable,' and students warned of the end of the forty-year period of refusal to think in political currents dependent on power with the slogan 'Reformist, conservative, the story is over.' Will this third voice be heard?

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Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →

Translation confidence: 85%

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