The Decline of ISIS in Syria; Increased Likelihood of Military Conflict Between Iran and the U.S.

As ISIS gradually retreats in Syria, its enemies are facing off against each other in a race to occupy the remaining territories. The U.S., determined to liberate Raqqa, the de facto capital of ISIS, is arming and supporting the Syrian Democratic Forces, while Assad's forces, supported by their allies, especially the Islamic Republic, aim to reach the Iraqi border by moving eastward in Syria. The U.S. perceives this movement as contradictory to its plans and objectives in Syria and has reacted accordingly. On Sunday evening, June 18, an American F-18 Super Hornet fighter jet shot down a Syrian Su-22 near the town of Al-Tabqa in southwestern Raqqa. Three days later, an Iranian-made drone was targeted by an American F-15 Eagle near Al-Tanf, in southern Syria close to the borders with Iraq and Jordan. The U.S. has established a base at the strategic point of Al-Tanf, where, according to Pentagon spokesman Captain Jeff Davis, "American military advisors" train anti-ISIS militia groups. Reports from some Western media indicate that several British soldiers, possibly from the SAS special forces, as well as members of the Revolutionary Commando Army (formerly known as the New Syrian Army), are stationed at this base. Earlier, on Thursday, June 8, the U.S. had shot down a similar drone near the aforementioned base. As emphasized by the Pentagon spokesman, in both cases, the Iranian-made drones were armed and considered a threat. Trump's Policy Shift Donald Trump, during his election campaign, promised American voters that he would prevent the direct involvement of U.S. troops in the Syrian war. However, he has now become a key player in the Syrian war and the region's destructive proxy wars, which could shape post-war dynamics in the Middle East. The American fighter jet's attack on the Syrian Su-22 highlighted the risk of escalating military confrontation and the diversity and complexities of the actors and their alliances in the Syrian war. The U.S. conducted this attack in defense of the "Syrian Democratic Forces," which is an alliance of Kurds, Sunni Arabs, and Christian Arabs and Turkmen in Syria. The leadership of this coalition is held by the Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG), and the Syrian aircraft targeted the position of this coalition near Al-Tabqa, around the strategic Assad Dam, an area that had been under ISIS control for several years and was recently liberated by the Syrian Democratic Forces. Over the past year, the Syrian Democratic Forces and the YPG have avoided confrontation with Assad's forces, but given the expansion of Assad's supporters' activities towards eastern and southeastern Syria, a clash between these forces and the U.S.-backed coalition seems inevitable. The Pentagon, through organizing, arming, and training the Syrian Democratic Forces, which has continued for the past year, is determined to prepare these forces for a final assault on Raqqa. Following this program, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) stated on June 19, following the downing of the Syrian Su-22: "The coalition [led by the U.S. against ISIS] is not seeking to confront the Syrian regime, Russia, or regime-supporting forces, but will not hesitate to counter threats to the coalition and aligned forces." Conflicting Objectives, Rising Tensions Since Donald Trump's presidency began, at least five military strikes have been carried out against Bashar Assad's regime and its allies, most of which aimed to "protect and support American advisors and U.S.-backed groups." Given the course of the war in Syria and the fact that various military and paramilitary forces are focusing their attention on the east and southeast of Syria to push ISIS out of strategic areas, as mentioned, the likelihood of clashes between these forces will increase, even if the Pentagon is reluctant to engage directly with Assad's forces or those supported by Iran and Russia. In this regard, according to the Washington Post, White House officials have asked the Pentagon to establish observation posts in eastern and southern Syria. The purpose of this is described as monitoring movements and preventing the military presence of Assad's forces and the Islamic Republic in these areas. According to American military officials, retreating ISIS fighters are concentrated in these sparsely populated areas and could regroup and reorganize to carry out terrorist operations in Western countries. Furthermore, Assad's control over this region of Syria could complicate efforts to reach a political solution to the Syrian crisis, while the American goal of establishing stability in Syria, including reducing Assad's power and ultimately removing him from the political scene, will not be realized. In any case, the deployment of more troops to Syria and the expansion of military actions in the country, which, according to General Raymond McMaster, the U.S. National Security Advisor, is on the Trump administration's agenda, will increase the risk of direct confrontation between American units and Iranian and Russian forces supporting Assad. In response to the downing of the Syrian Su-22 by the U.S. and condemning this action, Russia announced that it would halt cooperation with the U.S. under the memorandum of understanding on "military aircraft flight safety" and would consider American and other coalition aircraft in western Euphrates as targets. Iran's Missile Strikes on Syria The risk of confrontation with Iran has become more serious due to the unprecedented action by the Islamic Republic in launching several medium-range missiles into Syria. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) launched six medium-range surface-to-surface missiles from the provinces of Kermanshah and Kurdistan at ISIS positions in Deir ez-Zor, Syria, in the late hours of Sunday, June 18. According to the IRGC, the missile strikes were a response to ISIS terrorist attacks in the parliament and the Khomeini mausoleum. Meanwhile, the IRGC could have avenged ISIS using less conspicuous means. After all, the Islamic Republic and the IRGC have many allies in war-torn Syria and Lebanon. The missile strikes from Iran into Syria for revenge, aside from domestic uses and showcasing power to appease the public following ISIS's terrorist attacks, carried a message to the Trump administration and Saudi Arabia, a point that Brigadier General Ramadan Sharif, the IRGC spokesman, implicitly emphasized. He stated, "International and regional supporters of the terrorists must understand the warning message of the missile operation." The missiles launched are of a type with a range of 700 kilometers, capable of reaching major cities and key points in Saudi Arabia. In recent months, Saudi Arabia has intensified its anti-Iran propaganda, and Donald Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia and his statements about unconditional support for Riyadh have further fueled this. Concurrently, Trump's inclination to use military force against Bashar Assad and his supporters could add further dimensions to the Syrian civil war and prevent him from achieving his top military priority in the region, which he defined as "defeating ISIS in Iraq and Syria." The Ground Connection Between Tehran-Baghdad-Damascus-Lebanon From the Trump administration's perspective, the Islamic Republic is considered the most significant threat. Although Trump has adjusted some of his campaign promises after entering the White House, he has not changed his stance on the Islamic Republic. He believes that the Islamic Republic is the world's leading supporter of terrorism and the greatest threat to U.S. interests in the Middle East. He has alongside him figures like General Mattis, the Secretary of Defense, and General McMaster, the National Security Advisor, who advocate a confrontational approach to contain Iran. The expansion of the Islamic Republic's power and military presence in Syria is significantly greater than in Iraq. Since the onset of the civil war in Syria, the Islamic Republic has provided billions of dollars to Assad's regime and sent thousands of IRGC soldiers and Shiite volunteers, especially Afghan and Iraqi, to the Syrian front. According to Hossein Salami, the IRGC deputy commander, the dispatched personnel are actively present in "four strategic, operational, tactical, technical, and humanitarian levels in Syria." Over the past two years, Russia and Iran, along with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Iraqi militias, have assisted Assad's regime in reclaiming territories held by jihadists and opposition groups. In December of last year, Assad's forces, under the cover of extensive Russian airstrikes against opposition positions and the broad support of the Islamic Republic's forces on the ground, regained significant parts of Aleppo from opposition groups, marking Assad's largest military victory since the start of the civil war. The next target for Assad's regime and the Islamic Republic and Russia is the Deir ez-Zor province in eastern Syria, which contains the country's oil wells. Damascus lost most of this province in the last months of 2013, although it still maintains control over parts of the city of Deir ez-Zor, the provincial capital. Nevertheless, the city of Deir ez-Zor, with a population of 200,000, is surrounded by ISIS. This strategic province has several border crossings between Syria, Iraq, and Jordan, and one of the main roads connecting Damascus and Baghdad passes through this province. Therefore, in recent weeks, Assad's forces, with the help of Hezbollah and other Shiite groups, have focused their attention on this province to establish a connection with Shiite militias supported by Iran in Iraq, who are fighting against ISIS on the other side of the border. One of the main objectives of this connection is to create a ground corridor from Tehran to Baghdad to Damascus to Hezbollah in Lebanon, which the Islamic Republic is striving to achieve with all its might. By establishing this corridor, Iran can significantly enhance its capability for expanding power and logistical support in the region. Currently, Tehran relies on air and sea routes, which are not ideal. The sea route can be vulnerable to interception by the Israeli navy, and the air route has specific limitations in terms of capacity, volume of transport, and keeping flights secret. Therefore, establishing a land corridor would significantly increase Iran's capabilities regarding support and material transport and would directly connect Iran to the Mediterranean Sea. The establishment of this corridor, referred to as the "Shiite Crescent," which includes Hezbollah, the strongest military and political force in Lebanon, is a major concern for the U.S., Israel, and Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the Trump administration, unlike the previous U.S. administration, has taken a hard stance against Iran, alongside openly supporting Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries in the region. This shift in Trump's position was showcased during his visit to Riyadh last month, which was his first Middle Eastern trip. Trump, alongside Saudi officials, described the Islamic Republic's defiance and extremist Islamist groups as the source of all Middle Eastern problems without mentioning Saudi Arabia's destabilizing actions and its disastrous war in Yemen. Cutting ties with Qatar and besieging the country are also new destabilizing actions by Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, Iranian officials have become frustrated with Trump's constant opposition to the JCPOA, which was supposed to lead to the lifting of international sanctions. Trump's speech in Riyadh, which accused Iran of fueling sectarian warfare and terrorism, has further exacerbated the situation. This, combined with the imposition of more sanctions against Iran and support for opponents of the Islamic Republic for regime change, has led to severe criticisms from Iranian officials, to the extent that in one instance, Ayatollah Khamenei stated that one should not fear the bluster of Donald Trump, the inexperienced newcomer, who will be met with a punch in the mouth and have his nose rubbed in the dirt. Deteriorating Situation It seems that the U.S., by putting all its eggs in one basket and emphasizing extensive support for its vulnerable allies, has added to the complexities of the Syrian civil war. The Obama administration, prioritizing the containment of ISIS, paid little attention to the Assad regime and discouraged its allies in the region from fighting and clashing with each other. However, today, the Trump administration, by abandoning Obama's cautious doctrine, is confronting the ambitions of the Islamic Republic in the region and the Assad regime. Concurrently, Trump, despite Turkey's objections, has supported the Pentagon's plan to support Syrian Kurds. In May of this year, as part of this plan, the Trump administration provided heavy weapons to the Syrian Democratic Forces to be used in the liberation of Raqqa. This action by the Trump administration has increasingly pitted Turkey against the Syrian Kurds. Turkey considers the YPG to be part of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). While the Pentagon describes the arming of the "Democratic" forces led by the YPG as a defensive measure, the Assad regime and the Islamic Republic view it as aggressive, claiming that the U.S. has shot down a Syrian military aircraft in the airspace of this country. At the same time, Iran's assistance to Syrian forces in reclaiming Deir ez-Zor from ISIS and efforts to establish a ground corridor from Tehran to Lebanon are likely to significantly increase tensions between the IRGC and the hardliners of the Islamic Republic with the Trump administration, leading to clashes in eastern and southern Syria. The realization of the mentioned corridor not only calls into question the Trump administration's plan to militarily defeat ISIS in Syria but will also strengthen the Islamic Republic's position in Syria in the long run.