The Defeat of Religious Reformists in the 2016 Elections

On the eve of the 10th parliamentary elections, authoritarian forces are presenting reformists and moderates as infiltrators for two reasons: 1) Disappointment over the fragmentation of reformists and moderates due to the alignment of Rouhani, Hashemi, Khatami, and Hassan Khomeini, and 2) Severe division among the principlist faction in forming joint candidate lists across the country while the three branches of the Stability Front, the Front of Followers of the Line of Imam and Leadership under Bahonar's secretaryship, and the followers of Velayat close to Larijani are struggling with each other. The accusation of infiltration against reformists has two main reasons: 1) Creating an atmosphere for widespread disqualifications by the Guardian Council, and 2) Preparing the political ground for imposing restrictions on reformist activities (such as summoning them by the IRGC intelligence). However, despite the fear that authoritarian forces have of reformists and their allies, reformist forces suffer from low self-confidence, excessive fear of military and security forces, retreat from past reformist positions, and alignment with Khamenei's forces in most policies without any cost to them. This position places reformists in a state of defeat. Freedom of expression is marginalized. Compromising with the government on the issue of limiting freedom of expression with justifications like insulting sacred values and thus sacrificing the media has always been a point where reformists, by accepting them, try to satisfy the security and military forces. Jamileh Kadivar, a reformist living abroad and a member of the sixth parliament, who is not exposed to any danger for her opinions, comments on the publication of George Clooney's remarks at the Oscars about Charlie Hebdo in the newspaper Mardom-e Emruz: "I don't know what interpretation such a headline for a political newspaper could have among journalist colleagues? Wasn't this like scoring an own goal? Couldn't they have depicted their condemnation of violence and extremism on one hand and their sympathy with the victims on the other in a more prudent way? I believe this time the mistake was on the part of our colleagues, even if I am criticized by friends." (January 17, 2015) The newspaper Mardom-e Emruz only transmitted George Clooney's remarks, which is referred to in journalism as "reporting," and there is no fault in that. In response to the closure of the Bahar newspaper, no reaction was seen from reformists. Despite the fear that authoritarian forces have of reformists and their allies, reformist forces suffer from low self-confidence, excessive fear of military and security forces, retreat from past reformist positions, and alignment with Khamenei's forces in most policies without any cost to them. Kambez Nourouzi, a reformist lawyer and a member of the Press Supervisory Board during Khatami's era, says: "What became the front page and the main photo of the newspaper was extremely unprofessional and erroneous, and let’s not even discuss whether it was worth it or not. A professional journalist must first know the history and geography of words. It was easy to understand how problematic it would be to publish the phrase 'I am Charlie Hebdo' right after an issue of Charlie Hebdo that published a cartoon of the Prophet of Islam." (January 17, 2015) Compare these remarks with Kambez Nourouzi's positions in the 1990s to see the impact of repression. Intellectuals and religious reformists, both inside and outside the country, usually convey the government's discourse on the issue of "insulting sacred values" or "disturbing public opinion" and "damaging national security" and tend to favor limiting freedom of expression on religious-political issues instead of supporting it. The path to gaining the government's trust by reformists involves conveying the idea to the rulers that they want the good of the government. For this reason, they say: "The solution to the house arrest is only in the hands of reformists and the government; the house arrest issue is not detached from this relationship, and publicizing it every day may cool some hearts, but it is unclear how much it affects the tranquility of society and the goal of lifting the house arrest... The issue of house arrest is neither at the level of the political actions of Mr. Motahari nor even at the level of the political actions of the government, and most importantly, this issue is political and has no legal solution." (Abbas Abdi, Tasnim quoting a weekly, January 17, 2015) This type of positioning goes far beyond legal frameworks and individual rights and is based solely on current politics and pragmatism, aiming to pave the way for political activity. The government has been very successful in taming reformists and lowering their expectations from themselves and the expectations of society from them. Ali Tajernia, a member of the sixth parliament, in an interview with ISNA regarding the protests of 2009, says: "The reality is that a distinction must be made between reformists and the reformist candidate; in fact, the reformist candidate in 2009 was Khatami." (ISNA, January 22, 2015) Tajernia, in distancing himself from Mousavi and Karroubi and replacing them with Khatami, does not realize that Khatami is also considered one of the leaders of the sedition and, in addition to being banned from leaving the country, his voice and image and reports about him are banned in the media. Reformists have tried to show the rulers that they are loyal to the government in different ways. Saeed Hajarian, Khatami's advisor and a member of the first city council, in order to separate the reformists from Rouhani, especially on the eve of the parliamentary elections, says: "Rouhani will face strange and bizarre problems in a few months; lack of money, construction projects, firing workers, inability to pay subsidies, and even part of others' salaries... We have no choice but to defend Rouhani... Rouhani's failure is not our failure. He is not a reformist." (Etemad, March 14, 2015) However, Abbas Abdi is not even willing to distance himself from Rouhani's government because he rightly knows that Rouhani is one of the cogs of the system's machine and to participate in the elections, one must come to terms with the system. For this reason, he critiques Hajarian's remarks: "All this drawing of borders between reformism and the government and even the regime is due to a lack of strategy, as there is no clear understanding of the reasons for the rise of this government, and that is why he sees support for it as a result of compulsion rather than choice. When it comes to the election of the government, they all consider themselves the reason for Rouhani's victory and even demand the presence of reformists in the government, which they are present in, but when it comes to failure, they back away, saying this government is not ours." (Etemad, March 15, 2015) Government reformists during Khatami's era have never criticized the Islamic Republic's military intervention in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, while they have been critical of the military intervention of other countries (such as the United States or Saudi Arabia). Government reformists know that they cannot independently and without a relationship with part of the government even step into the electoral scene, let alone succeed. However, on the other hand, they realize that Rouhani's government has not had a significant record in the areas of economy, society, politics, and culture and cannot rely on it to enter the scene. This is why Hajarian wants to separate the reformists from Rouhani's government while being unwilling to separate from it (emotional divorce). If we look at the behaviors of government reformists during Khatami's era who held positions in the seventh government and the sixth parliament and distanced themselves from Karroubi and Mousavi after the 2009 elections (mainly members of the Participation Front and the Executives of Construction Party; most members of the Mojahedin-e Enghelab and their like-minded individuals are currently silent and withdrawing from politics), we observe trends among them that indicate a change in their behavior as a result of the repressions of the last two decades against themselves and their close ones. This is evident not only in their retreat from expectations and demands (such as the abolition of the Guardian Council's oversight, increasing the president's powers, and freedom of the media in theoretical areas and criticism of policies) but also in some conciliatory behaviors or avoidance of upsetting and worrying the Supreme Leader and military and security forces. For example, government reformists during Khatami's era have never criticized the Islamic Republic's military intervention in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon, while they have been critical of the military intervention of other countries (such as the United States or Saudi Arabia). They have always tried to avoid distancing themselves from the official positions of the regime because it makes their return to power difficult. In this regard, security and military agencies can report all these behaviors as a success in neutralizing this current to their higher officials. The government has been very successful in taming reformists and lowering their expectations from themselves and the expectations of society from them. In a sense, religious reformists and their close associates and supporters are returning to their intellectual and discursive state of the 1980s under conditions of intimidation and repression without having any share in power or the government paying any significant cost other than reducing its legitimacy. Reformists have abandoned their critical and reformist positions from the 1990s and 2000s without any gain or compensation.