The Degradation of Diplomacy with the IRGC and Soleimani

Three years have passed since the diplomacy-centered government of Rouhani took office, yet the security forces ruling over the IRGC continue to dominate this realm (diplomacy) as well, revealing signs of the shadow government’s effects. Two unprecedented statements from Qassem Soleimani (commander of the Quds Force) and the IRGC in support of the Shiite leader in Bahrain and an explicit threat to Manama illustrate the dire state of the Islamic Republic's diplomacy—similar to other areas. General Soleimani, who has shown indifference to the suppression of Iranians and the violation of the fundamental rights of his compatriots, has protested against the 'creation of oppression and increased pressure on the people of Bahrain' in his statement. During the 2009 election coup and the bloody violence directed at the civil protests of millions of Iranians, he showed no concern for the fundamental rights of the Iranian people; he has also aligned himself with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic during the entire 65 months of house arrest of two prominent candidates from that election (Mousavi and Karroubi). However, now in his statement, he has become concerned about the fundamental rights of the opponents of the Al Khalifa in Bahrain, even defending the 'armed resistance' of Bahraini protesters and speaking of the 'flames of fire' rising. Simultaneously, the IRGC also issued a statement with a similar theme, stating that the 'torch of revolution' in Bahrain is becoming 'more ignited' and the realization of a 'devastating uprising'. In its statement, the IRGC not only wrote about the 'arrogance of the child-killing regime of Al Saud' and the 'conspiracy of Al Saud' but also promised that 'soon the foundations of the palace of oppression and tyranny of the American criminal agents will be toppled by the determination and revolutionary will of the people of Bahrain.' It is noteworthy that the IRGC's statement evaluated the revocation of Sheikh Isa Qasim's citizenship as 'contrary to the principles and values of the true religion of Islam and recognized international norms'; whereas some senior commanders of this force (including Mohammad Reza Naghdi, the commander of the Basij) have explicitly called for the annulment of the 'identity and citizenship' of the leaders of the Green Movement in recent years. The security forces of the IRGC and their violence-oriented policy show no doubt in relying on violence and repression for the continuation of the authoritarian regime based on the absolute rule of the jurist. Whether it is the Green Movement or the civil protests of Iranians against the results of the 2009 elections, or standing alongside the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Assad and resorting to violence to achieve the Supreme Leader's desired strategic depth, the IRGC's position and confrontation remain the same. We are in the post-JCPOA era. The Rouhani government is trying to end sanctions and their heavy consequences by de-escalating tensions and gaining the trust of Western parties, aiming to increase foreign investment and revive the ailing economy; however, this is where the shadow government re-emerges on the scene, showcasing itself both domestically and to regional governments and global powers. Just a few months ago, in the post-JCPOA period and less than two weeks after holding two elections for the Parliament and the Assembly of Experts, the IRGC conducted a missile drill and showcased missiles with a range of 2000 kilometers to its regional rivals and Western governments. This is independent of the direct military-security intervention in the Syrian crisis alongside Assad's Damascus. One can consider one of the symbols of this type of IRGC policy to be Hossein Hamadani; a senior commander who went to Syria after the violent suppression of the Green protests in Iran to ensure the survival of Assad's regime and achieve the Supreme Leader's desired strategic depth, and was killed there. This serves as a clear witness to the security forces' perspective on domestic politics and diplomacy. Although military power still plays an effective and undeniable role in international power relations, the importance of territorial borders has long been overshadowed by economic and cultural borders. Information technology and communication technology have accelerated this process by focusing on effective and useful presence in global public opinion. Not only economic power but also cultural assets, advertising potential, and the ability to persuade public opinion based on global information networks have influenced the realm of international politics and diplomacy. As such, reliance on hard power and military and security forces is increasingly affected by soft power and cultural and normative influences. From this perspective, advancing diplomacy with missiles and bullets and military personnel, without regard to public opinion—whether at the national or transnational level—becomes increasingly untenable and difficult. If at one time diplomats were individuals with military backgrounds or mere executors of the decisions of autocratic rulers, it has long been the case that diplomats have focused on policy-making processes in their agendas; and if decisions were once made in the backrooms of government in consultation with military personnel, it has been a long time since diplomats have been in networked communication with specialized researchers and academic experts, making decisions and methods in such a process. This is all independent of the fact that diplomats and actors in the diplomatic sphere are experienced and skilled elites who act thoughtfully and prudently even in expressing a smile or choosing a word. The distance between General Soleimani and the ruling security forces of the IRGC from this description and characteristics is significantly meaningful and perceptible. The sworn commanders of the absolute rule of the jurist not only pursue their adventurous political-security projects in Iran and the region but also simultaneously explore the realm of politics and diplomacy from their ideological starting point. They justify the material and human costs in Syria from the perspective of the continuity and survival of the 'Resistance Front' and 'Line of Resistance' and the 'strategic depth' of the regime, showing indifference to the intensification of a very costly competition with Saudi Arabia in the region. One day they use the execution of Sheikh Nimr as a pretext to deepen the conflict with Riyadh, and today they make the revocation of Sheikh Qasim's citizenship a pretext for adventurism in Bahrain. One of the characteristics and assumptions of public diplomacy is coordination and alignment among the effective components and main actors in foreign policy and uniformity in decision-making. However, the ruling security forces of the IRGC, ignoring this important aspect, have pursued their desired strategy and path. It is noteworthy that Soleimani's statement, the commander of the Quds Force, was not drafted and published without coordination with the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic. If this assumption is considered, then the fragmentation and disunity in the diplomacy of the Islamic Republic become more evident; where two fundamental approaches continue to challenge each other, and only in specific cases (such as the necessity of realizing the JCPOA from the perspective of the economic crisis in the country) is unavoidable alignment achieved. It can be confidently said that the efforts of Zarif and Rouhani's diplomatic apparatus to gain the trust of Western parties and improve relations and deepen trade-economic relations are continuously at risk due to the strange actions of the IRGC's security forces and the ideological approaches and pessimistic views of the top of the political system towards the West. As evidenced by Zarif's recent trip to France, he was compelled to explain the IRGC's recent statements; and it is unlikely that his response would convince Western investors and policymakers: 'Iran is not a monolithic society.' The foreign minister of the moderate government is ultimately an executor of the Islamic Republic's macro policies in international relations and the specific axes defined by the top of the system in interaction with other countries; however, the differences in perspective, approach, language, method, expertise, and experience between Zarif—and pragmatic and realistic political actors like Rouhani—and the adventurous generals of the IRGC are significant. These generals have not only exhausted and wounded politics and economics within Iran but have also degraded diplomacy with their provocative, adventurous, and irresponsible actions, continuously putting it at risk. The consequence of this situation for Iran and Iranians has been and continues to be the continuation of costly challenges and dangerous, exhausting conflicts.