The 'Delusion' of a Strategic Navy and Establishing Bases in Yemen and Syria

Major General Mohammad Baqeri, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on the eve of the Navy Day on December 7, addressed the commanders of the naval regions, stating that in addition to the fleet in the Sea of Oman, a special fleet for the Indian Ocean should be established, and it may be necessary to build naval bases in Syria and Yemen at some point. He further added that having distant bases is not only not less than nuclear technology but is 'dozens of times' more valuable. Admiral Habibollah Sayyari, Commander of the Navy, also emphasized during a meeting with military attachés from foreign countries residing in Tehran, held on the occasion of December 7, that '... today, the Navy has transformed from a green water navy to a blue water navy with long-term planning.' Three years ago, Brigadier General Abdolrahim Mousavi, then Deputy Commander of the Army and currently Baqeri's deputy, described the mission of the deployed naval groups to distant waters as 'developing diplomacy, showcasing the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic, and creating bilateral interactions with countries around the world.' In February 2013, Baqeri, then Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, proposed an ambitious plan at the end of the 'Conference on the Development of the Makran Coasts and the Maritime Power of the Islamic Republic' in Chabahar, stating that Iran's future forces would be present in the South Pole and that 'we have direct access to the open waters from the Makran coasts and... we can claim sovereignty in part of the South Pole according to international laws.' Ayatollah Ali Khamenei also emphasized in 2009 that 'the Navy is a strategic force in many parts of the world and in our country; it should be viewed as a strategic force.' These statements and similar repeated claims by several military commanders in recent years, which have been expressed in line with the strategicization of the Navy, raise several fundamental questions: What characteristics define a strategic navy? Has the Army's Navy truly become strategic? Does this force have the necessary capability to execute the plans and fulfill the demands of high-ranking military commanders? Types of Naval Forces In a classic classification, naval forces are divided into three types: brown water navy; green water navy; and blue water navy (or strategic navy). While the brown water navy is a riverine force and operates in very close coastal waters, the green water navy is a coastal naval force. The operational area of this force is limited to territorial waters (12 nautical miles or 22.2 kilometers) and, in some cases, the 'exclusive economic zone' waters, which extend up to 200 nautical miles or 370 kilometers from the coast. Waters beyond that are considered open seas, and the strategic navy operates within this expanse. Characteristics of a Strategic Navy The mission of a strategic navy is international in nature. Such a force, which operates on a global scale, not only enhances deterrence and provides depth to the defense of its country in open waters but also safeguards maritime communication lines and contributes to global security and stability. However, protecting communication lines and commercial interests of a country, including Iran, is far more complex than it seems, and during wartime, a strategic navy must have the capability to counter potential threats in three dimensions: aerial, surface (from ships), and subsurface (from submarines). Therefore, a strategic force must have the capability to operate independently and for extended periods in open waters, and for this, it first requires at least an efficient special fleet – a fleet generally composed of various units, including ocean-going ships, supply ships, amphibious ships, as well as aircraft carriers, submarines, and aerial support (or naval aviation). Additionally, such a force needs suitable naval bases on its own coasts and in the coasts of friendly or allied countries to meet the logistical needs of its deployed ships, including fuel, provisions, weapons, and ammunition. One very important component for establishing a strategic navy is having advanced maritime industries – industries capable of building surface and subsurface units; possessing advanced technology; prioritizing training and having skilled human resources; having sufficient budget; and investing for continuity and advancement. Maintaining such a force will be costly and requires time, planning, and extensive effort. Currently, the naval forces of the United States, France, Britain, Russia, China, and India are considered strategic or blue water forces, although experts do not unanimously agree on labeling the forces of Russia, China, and India as strategic. Old Ships, Insufficient Capability The Navy has made efforts in recent years to optimize and modernize old equipment, carry out major and periodic repairs of floating units and submarines, and also build new equipment. The military industries and the Navy have made progress in producing fast boats, mines, anti-ship missiles, surface-to-air missiles, midjet submarines, torpedoes, various drones, small marine engines, and various parts. Nevertheless, the Navy's progress in constructing large ocean-going ships, which is one of the essential requirements of a strategic navy, has been slow. Over the past three decades, this force has operationalized a new ship named Jamaran in the south and another of the same kind named Damavand in the Caspian Sea. Apart from this, the Navy has an educational ship (named Persian Gulf), a wave-class destroyer (Sahand), and is constructing a semi-heavy submarine with a displacement of about 600 tons, which will be suitable for coastal waters. Currently, the Navy has four destroyers, namely the Jamaran plus three others named Alvand, Alborz, and Sabalan, which were built nearly 45 years ago in Britain. Other Iranian ships with combat and navigation capabilities in open waters, which are considered corvettes, are named Bayandar and Kharg, both of which are over 50 years old and were built in the United States. Additionally, the mentioned force has three Russian Kilo-class submarines that can operate in offshore and open waters. Since one-third of these units are always under periodic and major repairs and are not operational, the Army's Navy has, at best, four surface ships and two submarines ready for combat in coastal waters and open seas. In practice, the Navy sends a task group consisting of a destroyer (or corvette) and a supply ship on missions that are often limited to presence in the waters off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden to combat piracy. In recent years, some of these task groups have occasionally traveled to ports in Djibouti, Syria (Latakia), Saudi Arabia (Jeddah, for pilgrimage), Sri Lanka (Colombo), India (Mumbai), China (Zhanjiang), and finally, in early December of this year, to South Africa (Durban). The Delusion of Strategicization Traveling to foreign ports for training and gaining experience in open waters is beneficial and is considered friendly visits, but this level of maritime activity by the Islamic Republic, given the number of deployed ships and their sporadic nature, is neither considered maritime diplomacy nor power projection, which, from an international relations perspective, refers to a country's capacity for rapid, effective, and sustained deployment of forces beyond its borders to confront crises, assist in deterrence, and strengthen regional stability. Therefore, the plan to send one or two ships towards the South Pole or the shores of the United States, as claimed by some military commanders, if realized, would be merely symbolic and could not be considered a 'powerful presence' in open waters. Iran's old ships have been optimized as much as possible through the persistent efforts of Navy personnel and the factories of this force and have maintained their navigational capabilities. However, the capacity of Iran's shipbuilding industries, considering their output over the past three decades, is insufficient for building new ships to replace old ones while simultaneously strengthening the Navy and transforming it into a strategic force, although increasing the number of ships is only one aspect of the strategicization process. If the shipbuilding factories in Iran do not experience significant development and the Islamic Republic avoids purchasing large ships with open-water navigation capabilities from foreign countries, including Russia and China, under the guise of self-sufficiency, it can, at best, maintain its current capabilities at sea. Contrary to the claims of military officials of the Islamic Republic, the Army's Navy is not a strategic navy, and its capability does not align with its mission, and if the General Staff of the Armed Forces continues to waste opportunities and remain negligent, the possibility of transforming it into a strategic force in the short term will be impossible. In such circumstances, Major General Baqeri's statements about the need to establish naval bases in Yemen and Syria border on wishful thinking. Furthermore, these two countries are mired in internal wars, and it is unclear how the political future of Assad and the Alawites in Syria and the Houthis in Yemen will unfold in the battlefields. Major repairs and optimization of surface and subsurface units, conducting various exercises at different levels, enhancing training levels within the force, establishing and developing bases along the Makran coasts, and the Islamic Republic's advancements in producing certain vessels and equipment are effective steps for maintaining and preserving the Navy's capabilities, which is a green water (or coastal) force. While the rationale for the strategicization of the Navy from economic to security and strategic perspectives in the northern Indian Ocean or, as Admiral Sayyari puts it, in the 'golden triangle of the Malacca Strait, Bab el-Mandeb, and the Strait of Hormuz' is justifiable, strategicization requires long-term programs with the necessary financial resources and achievable goals that also encompass the potential of the Army's Navy and the country's shipbuilding industries.