The Divergence of Rouhani's Government from the Institutions Controlled by the Supreme Leader

More than two months have passed since the implementation of the comprehensive nuclear agreement. The outlook ahead, at least in the short term, confirms the continuation of its implementation. However, this reality has not quelled the conflicts within the power bloc regarding the JCPOA. These disagreements are not about the JCPOA itself but rather the implications of it in foreign and domestic policy. The dominant power sector and both factions had accepted the principle of the nuclear compromise and the halt of nuclear adventurism in the final months of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency. This decision created an opportunity for Hassan Rouhani's presidency, and with public support for a candidate promising to lift sanctions and ease tensions with the West, he made his way to the building on Pasteur Street. The system also entrusted him with the mission of the nuclear deal within the framework of maintaining nuclear infrastructure. However, from the very beginning, it was clear that the consensus on the principle of the JCPOA was accompanied by serious disagreements regarding the details of the JCPOA and its consequences. The intensification of attacks on the JCPOA by the leadership and forces close to him, especially the Friday prayer leaders at the beginning of the year 1395 (2016), indicates the separation of Rouhani's government from the institutions controlled by the Supreme Leader. The issue began when the coalition of reformists, moderates, and Rafsanjani's circle sought to extend the JCPOA into domestic politics during the electoral campaigns for the tenth parliament. Hassan Rouhani explicitly stated that he was seeking to realize JCPOA 2 to resolve domestic issues. The leadership's explicit positioning in attributing JCPOA 2, 3, and 4 to a Western conspiracy and critical engagement with JCPOA 1 has placed the government’s vision of JCPOA 2 on a rocky path from the outset. In the comprehensive nuclear agreement, the government moved along a relatively smooth path, having the green light from Khamenei and successfully completing the assigned responsibility under his guidance and oversight. However, now there is not only a lack of alignment but also an intensification of divergence within the power bloc. This event makes the issue of dual sovereignty more prominent in the last year of the eleventh government’s activity, although it is still not at the scale of the reformist era and Khatami's presidency and remains far from it. What clarifies the points of contention and disagreements is the position of the JCPOA in foreign policy and its implications in domestic policy and the state-nation gap. The opposing and critical current has been concerned from the beginning about the exploitation of the JCPOA by reformists and Rafsanjani to gain political power. The results of the tenth parliamentary elections, especially in Tehran, have intensified this concern. Therefore, the escalation of attacks is a strategy to mitigate this threat. The main focus in the containment policy is to clarify the position of the JCPOA. A propaganda line has been launched that seeks to devalue the JCPOA and claims the existence of both positive and negative points within it. In this propaganda line, it is argued that the JCPOA is not a panacea and has made the country vulnerable to external infiltration in some areas. It is also maneuvered that American hostilities have not diminished and that it has not fulfilled its promises under the JCPOA. However, these actions are only to curtail the government and its political supporters from exploiting the JCPOA in the domestic arena and do not indicate the system's policy of disrupting the implementation of the JCPOA, at least in the short term. This reductionist and negative approach seeks to influence public opinion by focusing on the exaggerated responses of Rouhani's government regarding the JCPOA. The leadership and the dominant power sector do not view the JCPOA as a model but rather as a case-by-case and exceptional engagement that was inevitably a result of the inability to withstand the pressures of sanctions and their dangerous consequences domestically, leading to a heroic flexibility. However, from their perspective, this engagement is a one-time use, and there is no intention for a meaningful change in the system's grand foreign policy strategies. Similarly, there is no comparable model for solving domestic policy challenges. In reality, the leadership and conservatives still want to keep the channels of political participation narrow and continue a confrontational foreign policy strategy with tactical retreats and expedient measures. In this context, the resistant economy package has been devised as a discursive and strategic framework to contain the JCPOA and limit it to nuclear compromise. The goal of the resistant economy is to utilize post-JCPOA opportunities to address vulnerabilities and weaknesses against external pressures so that, at the appointed time, confrontational policies can regain momentum and not be manageable by punitive external actions. Within this framework, Khamenei expects that opportunities for foreign investment and trade exchanges with the outside world will be arranged in such a way that the country's resistance against the West is strengthened. Therefore, while he defends de-escalation with Europe, he insists on further strengthening relations with the East and continuing hostility towards the American government. His view, which seems utopian and unrealistic, is in stark contrast to the government's approach of increasing communication and interaction with the West and integrating into the global trade network. The resistant economy envisioned by the leader has a completely different direction from the movement and flexibility that led to the JCPOA. In fact, he believes that economic growth that relies solely on itself through the growth of knowledge-based companies and reducing dependence on oil revenues can block the path that inevitably led to the 'heroic flexibility' and create a kind of immunity for the system against the West. Therefore, the resistant economy envisioned by the leader cannot be reconciled with Rouhani's interpretation of the JCPOA and initiates tensions within the government in a new direction. Rouhani, in his usual manner, tries to accept the resistant economy while emphasizing its formal aspects but organizes its content in a way that continues the JCPOA. However, such an interpretation is not acceptable to the authoritarian forces and those known as the loyalists. Since the executive branch has the upper hand in the economic sphere, it is difficult for the Supreme Leader to intervene directly in the implementation of economic policies. Its strength lies in policymaking. In this atmosphere, it is likely that the leadership will think more about disrupting and immobilizing the government in positioning the JCPOA as a model for organizing affairs and try to prevent the expansion of Western presence in Iran and especially to prevent normalization of relations with the United States. This current in domestic politics not only does not accompany the win-win approach in reducing the police atmosphere and increasing political participation but also moves towards maintaining strictness over society and weakening Rouhani's government. Of course, the specific conditions of society, increasing divergence, and the structural characteristics within the power bloc do not allow either of the two opposing poles to be in a position to fulfill all their demands. However, Rouhani's government has relatively more limited tools for resistance and advancement, and the moderate approach has not shown the capacity to stop the attacks and fulfill promises. The coming months will show where the outcome of the resistant economy and the JCPOA will lead. Although monitoring developments strengthens the scenario that until the 96 presidential elections, the current political situation will continue in a slow and cautious manner, and it is unlikely that a significant political event will occur.