The Dormant Security Crisis on Iran's Eastern Borders

The official announcement of the end of NATO's military mission in Afghanistan at the beginning of January this year, and the transfer of direct military responsibility against the Taliban to the Afghan army, marks a significant security development that could seriously impact the security equations on Iran's eastern borders in the coming months. Iran shares land and maritime borders with more than 15 countries. The eastern borders of Iran with Afghanistan and Pakistan have been among the most vulnerable border lines in Iran over the past two decades. In 1998, during the presidency of Mohammad Khatami, after the fall of Mazar-i-Sharif to the Taliban forces, 11 personnel of the Islamic Republic's consulate were attacked, and several were executed on the spot. In response to this incident, Mohammad Khatami stated, "We are seriously committed to the security of our borders and will not tolerate insecurity at our borders." Despite deploying a large military force to the Afghan borders in response to this incident, Iran refrained from entering Afghan territory. Ten years later, during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency, Alireza Afshar, then Deputy Minister of Interior, accused Khatami's government of "weakening military forces and neglecting border security during its tenure." At that time, Alireza Afshar was in charge of the cultural and propaganda department of the armed forces. Considering the current situation of the Afghan government and the internal security conditions of that country (as well as the unstable borders of Iran's Balochistan with Pakistan), security threats on Iran's eastern borders are significantly more serious than 15 years ago, while the Islamic Republic's defensive measures and preventive actions have been entirely focused on the western borders and Iran's extraterritorial actions in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. The internal security of any country is influenced by the security of its borders, and insecurity in neighboring countries can always spill over into the neighboring country. Currently, Afghanistan is in a transitional state. For the past 13 years, NATO forces have been responsible for the war against the Taliban. The transfer of this responsibility to the Afghan army, which many regional security observers believe has occurred without adequate preparations, could put even the Afghan government at risk of collapse within the next six months. In addition to the minimal readiness of the Afghan army to effectively counter the Taliban, despite four months having passed since the election results and the political compromise between Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai and his electoral rival Abdullah Abdullah, a formal government has yet to be established in Kabul, and its members have not been introduced. Due to the lack of a central government and ongoing political bargaining over the composition of the government, Afghanistan's political stability is extremely fragile, and scattered efforts to achieve serious political-security cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan have not progressed as needed. Both of Iran's eastern neighbors, Afghanistan and Pakistan, suffer from the military actions of the Taliban insurgents. In a completely unconventional arrangement, the Pakistani Taliban has established its leadership within Afghan territory, while Afghan Taliban leaders have settled within Pakistan's borders. Despite being in a shared security threat, neither the Kabul nor Islamabad governments have taken effective action to counter the Taliban in each other's countries; rather, they have cooperated with rival Taliban factions to exert pressure on one another. Both the Ghani government in Kabul (if formed) and the Nawaz Sharif government in Islamabad are willing to negotiate with their respective Taliban factions, but due to the presence of Taliban leaders in the neighboring country, they require the cooperation of another government. If the Afghan Taliban achieves several military victories within Afghanistan, the Kabul government's efforts to reach a political agreement with them will become more difficult, resulting in an even more complicated security situation in that country. Iran's Exclusive Focus on Western Borders Tehran's indifference to political and security developments along its eastern borders comes at a time when the Islamic Republic has engaged in extensive military operations on its western borders to support its preferred government in Baghdad. The announcement of sending arms shipments to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq to counter ISIS forces after the fall of Mosul, Mohammad Javad Zarif's visit to Erbil, the participation of Iranian Air Force Phantom jets in bombing ISIS positions in Diyala Province, and numerous reports and images of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force, in Iraq indicate the extensive range of preparations and military efforts by Iran in its neighboring country of Iraq. Hossein Salami, the deputy commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, stated the day after the funeral of Brigadier General Hamid Taghavi, who was killed during military clashes with ISIS forces in Samarra, that "today we have a popular army in Iraq connected to the Islamic Revolution that is ten times the size of Hezbollah (Lebanon) in terms of quantity." Salami also emphasized during the same ceremony that "in Syria, as the central ring of resistance on the ground, we have a popular army connected to the Islamic Revolution with a Basij-style mindset. In Yemen, where the pivot of American policies lies, Ansar Allah operates like Hezbollah within our geopolitical space." Evidence on the ground indicates the extensive military presence of Iran in countries that do not share a border with Iran (Lebanon and Syria), and their security considerations are not regarded as Iran's national security concerns. Iran's military presence in Iraq (according to the admission of the deputy commander of the IRGC) is not aimed at creating defensive or deterrent measures on vulnerable borders or increasing the depth of Iran's strategic defense, but is sectarian and focused on power struggles in the region and the escalation of Sunni-Shia competition. The Islamic Republic's complete focus on military preparations and extraterritorial presence in the western part of the country—with the motivation of exporting the Islamic Revolution and consolidating the Shia government in Baghdad—while simultaneously neglecting political and military developments on its eastern borders and national security in the mentioned regions, could soon expose Tehran to risks that have been bitterly experienced in the borders of Balochistan and from Sistan to Herat over the past 15 years.