The Dual Face of Rafsanjani and the Middle Class of Iran

Confrontation, extremism, and monopolism were characteristics of the early years of the revolution. Few groups were excluded from this trend except for the group led by Engineer Bazargan and some of the old national groups that did not have a revolutionary spirit in the leftist sense. However, the essence of the revolutionary left spirit was to be monopolistic and to consider few, if any, as the main players except for themselves. The debris of this behavior first fell upon the officials and institutions of the Shah's regime. One called for the dissolution of the army, while another viewed any form of closeness and cooperation with the royal regime as deserving the harshest punishments, namely execution. Many also said and did not say that they sought to overthrow the main support of the Shah, namely the urban middle class, and replace the underprivileged in their stead. During the struggles at the beginning of the revolution, a group of clergy who saw themselves as reliant on the undisputed leader and interpreter of the religion of the general public gradually gained power and imposed their will on other groups through imprisonment, coercion, elimination, and execution. The remaining clergy, who were either spectators at the beginning or did not define themselves as revolutionary, were gradually attracted or removed from the scene of religious authority. Another group of clergy who were allied with groups like the Mojahedin-e Khalq or the National Front met a fate similar to that of these groups. The Republic of EliminationThe first political shock in the early revolutionary atmosphere was the dismissal of Banisadr from the command of the armed forces and then from the presidency. Banisadr was a symbol of the Iranian middle class and a representative of the modernist current in the revolution. A class that thought it had found a better successor for the Shah. The removal of Banisadr was the prelude to the larger elimination of the middle class, which was one of the most important classes participating in the revolution and the social support of Banisadr and aligned groups like the National Front, Freedom Movement, Mojahedin-e Khalq, and other groups emerging from modern urban classes. In this process, various political groups, both religious and secular, along with their supporters, were suppressed to ensure the dominance of the clergy close to the leader of the revolution. Throughout these developments, Hashemi Rafsanjani was central and one of the most important figures opposing political diversity and plurality. After the July 7, 1981 bombing of the Islamic Republic Party, Rafsanjani's main allies, including Ayatollah Beheshti, were removed from the scene, and he became the sole ruler in the political arena. Hashemi took control after the removal of Banisadr. He advanced the war, resolved the issue of the American embassy hostages, engaged in negotiations with the Americans, assisted in the rise of Reagan, played a mediating role in the Lebanese hostage crisis, and after a while, when the war had yielded all its political fruits, he brought the seemingly endless war to an end. At the end of the war, another political shock occurred, in which Rafsanjani was also a designer and executor; namely, the dismissal of Ayatollah Montazeri, who was the last survivor capable of tolerating political diversity and was specifically critical of the war and Rafsanjani's management during it. Shortly thereafter, Ayatollah Khomeini passed away, and the constitution was amended so that Rafsanjani and his close circle could continue their political authority without relying on religious authorities. The 'Akbarshahi' RepublicAfter a decade of war and revolution, Rafsanjani saw no rival for himself. From here on, he entered a period where he wanted to build Iran based on the models he had in mind. The post-war period also helped him because the need for reconstruction was a universal and national matter. If we consider the first decade of the revolution as the first republic, the period after that, with a new leader in power and a revised constitution, will be the second republic. In the first republic, Rafsanjani was alongside the most extremist religious forces from both the left and right, but in the second period, these forces were no longer effective. He inevitably had to rely on the suppressed social classes, and he did so. In the first republic, Rafsanjani was alongside the most extremist religious forces from both the left and right, but in the second period, these forces were no longer effective. He inevitably had to rely on the suppressed social classes, and he did so. Meanwhile, the training of new forces was mainly undertaken by the new leader, Khamenei. From the very beginning, Khamenei focused on two issues: training forces and information and security. For this reason, he took control of the cultural sphere alongside information (as Dr. Soroush also recently pointed out in his remarks about Rafsanjani). Rafsanjani initiated major projects in the second republic that had remained from the Shah's time, such as the metro project. Additionally, he presented the idea of the Azad University, which also originated from the Shah's era, in a new format. In this period, he was practically no different from the Shah, both in terms of political power and in terms of development and urbanization plans. And of course, for his radical opponents, this made him something akin to 'Akbar Shah.' The monopolistic trend he was one of the leaders of and gradually distanced himself from reacted particularly to the return of the suppressed middle-class forces. The peak of these conflicts was the period when the newspaper 'Hamshahri' was established and introduced new urban management ideas. Ideas that were essentially all products of the thoughts and work of non-religious or non-radical experts. In a sense, one could say that the hallmark of this period and its management model is Karbaschi, who is also the product of his management. The next hallmark is the reform movement that emerged with the rise of Khatami. The radical current's reaction was the trial of Karbaschi and then the assassination of intellectuals and crisis creation for Khatami's government. Although the assassinations had begun before the reform period, their decisive presence as a tool of public policy is related to this period. In fact, the first republic, if under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini had a kind of uniformity where all types of politicians seemingly became one under his umbrella and had 'unity of word,' in the second republic, this uniformity reached a clear political duality. This duality stemmed from the continued presence of Rafsanjani in the political scene and Khamenei's efforts to establish his leadership in this arena. Therefore, gradually something emerged known as dual governance, and one of its main critics was Khamenei himself, who was harmed by such a trend. Khamenei was a king who did not want to merely reign; he wanted to govern. This trend fueled the hidden government of the leader's house and the open government of the presidency and all the known harms. Throughout this period, Rafsanjani stood alongside the open government, which gradually isolated him. At the beginning of the second republic, Rafsanjani was, in a sense, a partner in Khamenei's power, but as his inevitable confrontation with Khamenei became clearer, he became more marginalized until after the Green Movement, when the alignments became public, he was completely isolated. Since the Green Movement, Khamenei's criterion has been the alignment of the open government with the government of the leader's house, and he has accepted no compromise, describing the emergence of any other power as 'sedition.' Rafsanjani, both because of his personal nature, which was worldly (due to his travels in other countries) and his business background, and due to his increasing contact with expert forces, engineers, and designers, became the godfather of the reformist forces, while Khamenei sheltered the radical and hardline forces and religious Salafists who thought they were left out. From the very beginning, in 1979, Rafsanjani paid attention to the middle class and considered this class the 'guarantor of the revolution's continuity' (Memoirs of 1979, 405). At that time, he may have wanted to attract the social base of Banisadr and the National Front towards himself and his allies, but after a long pause during the war, he continued this path during the reconstruction period and opened a field for their social advancement. The Iranian middle class has had a temptation for higher education since its formation, but during the revolution, it remained outside the doors of selection for state universities. This is why Rafsanjani acknowledges that the Azad University is a university for the children of the middle class of society. Dual Governance: Rafsanjani and KhameneiIn this way, Rafsanjani and Khamenei represent two types of Iranian clerics. Rafsanjani was a continuation of a tradition among clerics who are more modern and have no problem with the manifestations of modernity, and who coexist with the people based on a pragmatic identity and reliance on their customs, while Khamenei inevitably adopted the model of a cleric who is more closed and conservative, suspicious of people's beliefs, and reliant on force and authority. The members of the Guardian Council and his appointed managers for the Qom seminary and senior managers of the judiciary are the best representatives of Khamenei's thought. The Islamic Revolution inherited many dualities from the Shah's era. The duality of miniskirt / chador. The duality of Western-oriented / anti-imperialist. The duality of Mojahedin-fighter / courtier. The duality of cleric / intellectual. Dualities that sometimes became singular: clerics who became intellectuals and dressed formally, and chador-wearing individuals who became unveiled (or vice versa, unveiled individuals who became chador-wearing like Zahra Rahnavard) and fighters who joined the Shah and the court or officers of the Shah who served Khomeini. Thus, the Iranian revolution has been between two massive currents. One current that preferred rigidity and stability of policies and promoted various forms of velayat ideology, with its social base being the lower middle classes or the conservative market middle class, and another current that has allowed for change, revision, and opening space and field, relying on the urban and modern middle class. Rafsanjani is close to the duality that creates clerics who are intellectual and modern. In practice, the management model of Rafsanjani's era, namely Gholamhossein Karbaschi, is a cleric who has set aside study and school to manage, and in his management, he has no significant difference from other technocrat managers of the Shah's era, who nurtured the middle class. Rafsanjani, who in the first republic believed that only revolutionary clerics were qualified to govern and was thus a true disciple of Ayatollah Khomeini, gradually, whether we assume his thinking changed or it was a political necessity, leaned towards the idea that other groups should also be involved. In contrast, Khamenei sought to cultivate specific and pure revolutionary forces. A doctrinal current completely loyal to the principles and values of the absolute rule of the jurist. A current that was mainly formed in the IRGC and military, security, and judicial forces and also inevitably brought some government managers along with it. However, the peak of the rule of this new generation of managers, namely the Ahmadinejad era, faced such disgrace, failure, and defeat that the managers nurtured by Hashemi had to return to the field. Thus, the Iranian revolution has been between two massive currents. One current that preferred rigidity and stability of policies and promoted various forms of velayat ideology, with its social base being the lower middle classes or the conservative market middle class, and another current that has allowed for change, revision, and opening space and field, relying on the urban and modern middle class. Rafsanjani was initially a man of certainty. In the first year of the revolution, all were men of certainty and had their dogmas. He was no exception. However, gradually he began to doubt his certainties. And this changed him. His opposing front in the governance did not doubt their certainties, and even when it became clear that they believed in rigid dogmas, they did not retreat. These two currents confronted each other. From here, Rafsanjani became the target of criticism and attack from radical groups - or very conservative ones. They feared that Rafsanjani would hand the revolution over to 'outsiders' and like Safar Harandi, they wanted the Hashemi of the 1980s. The manifestation of this change, after an eight-year presidency of Hashemi, was shown in the reform movement. Those who entered the reform movement were all people who believed that the time for change had come. However, the idea of change had political requirements, and since it had occurred among the Islamic left, which had been driven from the political scene for eight years after Khomeini's death, their return to the scene faced resistance from Khamenei, who had sidelined them. Therefore, the issue of reform was intertwined with a power struggle with the new leader who relied on other forces. For this reason, Khamenei has never forgiven Khatami because he was the embodiment of this confrontation. Khamenei's relationship with Rafsanjani completely changes after the reform period. However, it is during the era of the velayat managers, namely the last days of Ahmadinejad, that this relationship leads to open confrontation and, with Rafsanjani's support for the Green Movement, results in Rafsanjani's expulsion from the house of power because power moves towards unification around Khamenei. Khamenei himself expressed satisfaction with Ahmadinejad's government, which ended the dual governance. The Exiled Leaders of the Middle ClassThe further Rafsanjani distanced himself from Khamenei's circle of power and was expelled from the leadership house, the better his standing became among the urban middle class. The leaders of the middle class in the Islamic Republic have all had painful fates, whether political or intellectual. From Banisadr, who was forced to flee the country, to Karbaschi, who was tried and imprisoned, and to Khatami, who was banned from travel and image, and Mir Hossein Mousavi and Karroubi, who were placed under house arrest. The intellectual and social leaders of the middle class have also had similar or even worse fates; intellectuals were suppressed, imprisoned, assassinated, housebound, or chose exile and were effectively 'migrated.' Rafsanjani and many other revolutionaries who worked in his government played a role, more or less directly or indirectly, in the suppression of the middle class and its intellectual and political leaders in the first republic. However, the historical nature of Iranian society is such that it absorbs and assimilates the aggressor. The Iranian middle class had a significant share in the revolution, but it lost all its share in the suppression of Banisadr and political groups. The revolution it had made fell into the hands of the clergy, who thought the middle class was a class created by the Shah and should be rejected, thus leaning towards the lower middle classes and rural populations. This is a subject that can be well studied during the war.