The Dynamics of Forces in the 2017 Presidential Election: Old Faces, Old Conflicts

Four factors have ensured that politics in Iran, like in other countries, is never devoid of political competition related to elections within the ruling class: 1) News media, both inside and outside the country, that cannot be silenced (internet sites, radio, and Persian-language satellite TV channels) and dedicate parts of their space to speculation alongside news, 2) Political activists and politicians for whom politics has become a full-time job even without holding office; political lobbyists can be added to this group, 3) The continuous political competition among political factions even when one faction holds power in an institution or branch, and 4) The efforts of groups to gather financial resources, which in Iran occurs discreetly in alleys, restaurants, and mosques, lacking transparency. As long as rent-seeking and rent-seeking behavior exist, the wheel of politics in rentier systems does not stop. Therefore, after the composition of the fifth Assembly of Experts and the tenth Islamic Consultative Assembly was determined, and the formation of parliamentary factions occurred, the mindset of Iranian political activists and politicians has turned towards the twelfth presidential election. Discussions and activities of potential candidates have even begun since the beginning of 2016. What is the state of this field? Who is active in this field and what are their chances? What are the central issues? What is the status of Rouhani's government in this context, and with what achievements does Rouhani enter the 2017 elections? Candidates from the clerical Islamists: Ahmad Tavakoli/Mohammad Reza Bahonar/Ali Akbar Velayati. Ahmad Tavakoli, having run twice (in 1993 against Rafsanjani, gaining 4.5 million votes, and in 2001 against Khatami, stepping aside in favor of Qalibaf), has familial ties to the Larijani family and has freed himself from membership in the parliament, making him capable of entering this race again. However, his failure to be elected in the second parliament is a serious weakness for him. Mohammad Reza Bahonar's chances are much less than Tavakoli's, but he has always carried such ambition, and his position in parliament, up to the vice-presidency, assists him. He did not enter the parliamentary election field like Tavakoli, and in Iran, the likelihood of voluntary political retirement is very low. Given that the Coalition Party seeks to have its own exclusive candidate in the 2017 elections, the possibility of one of these two, who are close to the Coalition and have held high positions, being nominated increases. Even if Tavakoli and Bahonar are not among the final candidates, their names are likely to be mentioned in the initial lists. Bahonar has stated that he currently does not intend to run. Velayati, having taken over Rouhani's previous job (head of the Center for Strategic Research of the Expediency Discernment Council) and commenting on current national issues, still has his sights set on the presidency as in the eleventh election. He is a trusted figure of Khamenei, and the Islamic Republic's propaganda apparatus pays special attention to him. One of his works, in 50 episodes of 15 minutes each titled 'Once Upon a Time, My Land Was Iran,' has been produced in animation form and will be aired on state television. Candidates from the military-security spectrum: Qalibaf/Jalili/Soleimani. Qalibaf's jabs at Rouhani with the phrase 'If some could not solve the country's problems with their key, they should not make locks for their key' indicates his aspirations for the presidency. Qalibaf has had his eyes on this position since 2001, and unlike Mohsen Rezaei (who now thinks he has no chance and has stated 'I will not run for president again'), he still sees himself as having a good chance. Jalili also sees the ground for his presence as suitable, relying on the 4 million votes from the previous election and believing in Rouhani's failure to meet demands and promises—especially regarding the JCPOA. He has been very active in recent months regarding current issues, especially the nuclear agreement, and has been a critic of the government. He and Ahmadinejad were special guests at the opening ceremony of the fifth Assembly of Experts. However, Hadad Adel has no significant chances among his peers due to his defeat in the parliamentary elections and poor performance in the previous presidential election. The possibility of Qassem Soleimani's candidacy in the 2017 presidential election has been raised by some militarists. For example, some media quoted Mehdi Taeb, head of the Ammar Strategic Base, as saying that he referred to Qassem Soleimani as the best option for next year's presidential election. This has been met with concern and opposition from Ahsan, an advisor to the President. Mohammad Reza Bahonar does not consider Qassem Soleimani a candidate for the principlists in next year's presidential election, but if Rouhani is not their candidate (which he is not), they have limited options against Soleimani. However, despite his presence and speeches in the parliamentary faction of the loyalists, the likelihood of his candidacy is low due to the role Soleimani plays for the Islamic Republic in Syria and Iraq. Former government: Ahmadinejad. Ahmadinejad has begun his provincial campaigns for the 2017 presidential election with trips to Varamin, Kerman, and Zanjan since the beginning of the year. Despite his silence in the first two years of Rouhani's government, Ahmadinejad has recently been very outspoken in criticizing the government: 'Shame on that politician who only gives orders from afar and acts as if there are no people... If our enemies think they can overcome the Iranian people with the JCPOA, they are mistaken... Whenever Iran has neglected its enemies, it has suffered a severe blow, and now some politicians trust the enemy.' His close associates are still busy gathering letters of requests during Ahmadinejad's appearances in mosques and various cities, and both sides hope that he can one day fulfill the requests contained in these letters. In Ahmadinejad's speeches, his close associates from the previous government are also present, suggesting that he is likely to present himself as the head of a team. His supporters believe he has twenty million votes; even his critics believe he has 10 to 15 million votes. However, among the potential candidates for the upcoming presidency, Ahmadinejad is the one whose chances of facing corruption cases and disqualification by the Guardian Council are the highest. Moderates: Rouhani. Rouhani will remain the candidate of reformist, moderate, and some pragmatic hardliners because they will have no other option: 'Our candidate for the twelfth presidential election is Mr. Rouhani.' (Mohammad Reza Khatami, IRNA, June 5, 2016). Some of Rouhani's voters have even discussed moving beyond him, but they have no alternative. If they had such an option, they would not have brought him to the scene in the 2013 elections. Rouhani has shown that he can create a balance between some demands of these groups and their opponents in the cabinet. He has also shown that he can work with Khamenei. Despite some disagreements with the IRGC and the clergy, Rouhani has managed to work with them and avoid tensions. Given the unsuccessful experience that Khamenei and his circle had with Ahmadinejad, they will prefer a more familiar figure with all differences over an unknown one. Khamenei and the IRGC commanders and close associates of the office are dissatisfied with Rouhani's government's performance, especially in foreign policy. The intensity of the government's propaganda attacks and Khamenei himself against the government since the first day of 1395 shows this dissatisfaction. However, they know that the government cannot achieve much in the economic sphere while the IRGC and the office control smuggling, companies, and large contracts, do not pay taxes, and cover the costs of war in three countries. There are currently no signs that they want to turn Rouhani's government into a four-year government.