The Economic Life Culture After Four Decades of the Islamic Republic's Establishment

The culture of economic life is a specific rationality of a group that shapes the economic approaches and actions of various groups within a society. For example, the rationality of a knowledge-based society that seeks to maximize utility through knowledge production and human resource development differs from that of a group focused on discovering and concentrating on rent-seeking holes to achieve maximum profit. Both groups aim to achieve the highest utility, but the first group's utility is based on increasing productivity from human capital and knowledge, while the second group seeks to maximize its profit by exploiting rent-seeking opportunities. Both groups have their own specific rationalities, but the first group aims to create value through human capital development, while the second group's approach is to utilize rent-seeking positions. In no society does a uniform economic culture exist; rather, this culture always remains a composite of various subcultures. To examine the economic culture of Iran in its current situation, four decades after the fall of the Pahlavi monarchy and the establishment of the Islamic Republic, we need an introduction. The position of Iranian society in transition from an economic perspective is at a stage between the pre-industrial and industrial periods. It is neither entirely traditional and agricultural nor developed industrially on par with advanced Western societies. The economic culture of such a society is a mixture of various subcultures, such as agricultural, artisanal, brokerage, and rent-seeking cultures. The production and distribution of physical goods, especially essential goods, still constitute a significant part of Iran's economy. The country has not yet entered the global commodity competition, and the main source of financing for the government's public expenses is crude oil exports. The standard of domestically produced goods lacks economic advantages, which is why supportive policies for the survival of industries such as automotive are emphasized. These points explain many of Iran's economic shortcomings, including inefficiency and rent-seeking in resource utilization. However, the function of oil revenues is not limited to this, as the government's access to foreign exchange resources from oil exports has covered many of Iran's economic and social problems, and management inefficiencies at various macro, mid-level, and micro levels have obscured this. Perhaps if oil revenues were not at the government's disposal and the government did not have a centralized oil structure, there would be hope that the necessities of real life would provide motivation for transformation. Economic developments in Iran have often been exogenous and reliant on changes outside the managers' will. The idea of reform and endogenous changes with the participation of internal factors has not held much place in the managers' thoughts. Today's economic culture in Iran is not uniform; it is a collection of various subcultures that have historically come together and are now in challenge and friction within a single frame. Among the most important parts of this collection are the shepherding culture, peasant culture, traditional market culture, artisanal culture, bureaucracy, quasi-modernism, import-brokerage culture, and rent-seeking. It should be noted that during Iran's shepherding economy period, the shepherding culture explains a significant portion of the economic behavior of rulers and even some economic actors. Of course, other subcultures, such as peasant and artisanal cultures, exist alongside this culture, but since a significant portion of the public sphere is under the influence of a government arising from shepherding relations, this culture naturally prevails over other subcultures. The economic culture of peasant groups is shaped by their gaze towards the sky and rain-fed agriculture. In both of these two economic subcultures, although humans participate in arduous work, the basis of production is in nature, and therefore the social role of humans as value creators is absent, and it is fate that determines their destiny. Political absolutism complements this economic culture. The pre-Pahlavi culture is a combination of these two economic subcultures in harmony with the specific religious outlook of this period. The shepherding and agricultural culture explains a significant part of the economic behavior of economic actors during the Qajar and even Pahlavi periods. With the activation of the oil sector in Iran's economy and the expansion of bureaucracy and the military, all of which are symbols of the authoritarian quasi-modernism of the Pahlavi era, new subcultures are added to the puzzle of the Qajar period subcultures. During this period, the foothold of rent gradually opens up in Iran's economic culture. The import-brokerage sector in the second Pahlavi period, despite the resistance of past subcultures such as agricultural and artisanal cultures, prevails over them. In this process, by the end of the Pahlavi period, compradorship becomes the dominant aspect of economic culture, although other subcultures also continue to exist alongside it. In the first and second Pahlavi periods, new classes emerge in Iran. Military personnel, bureaucrats, technocrats, real estate owners, and compradore merchants are among the most important classes that form the new middle class of Iran during that period. During this time, the new middle class of Iran could not realize its potential, which was one of the regime's significant challenges that contributed to its downfall. With the overthrow of the previous regime, Iran's economy enters a new condition. The revolution and war create the conditions for the emergence of a new class composed of a range of various groups, especially traditional market sectors. Although the final step in the overthrow of the previous regime is shaped by the participation and consensus of the middle classes of society and their intellectual and nationalist elites, clerics, and figures from the traditional market and marginalized masses, this event, which was very fragile, does not last. Subsequently, clerics and their traditional market allies, along with some social groups from the city's margins—many of whom later appear in quasi-military and security institutions such as committees and the Revolutionary Guards, which have political functions—are presented as the raw material for this class. During this period, the culture of bureaucracy and rent dominates over previous subcultures and shapes the official economic culture. Currently, the existing economic culture of Iran's economy is a collection of elements that have historically come together in the current frame and form, facing challenges and friction while also achieving a kind of compatibility. Such a combination of elements, including plunder culture, rent, traditional market, import brokerage sector, bureaucracy, and quasi-modernism, does not align with the conditions of the international economy, which emphasizes a knowledge-based economic culture focused on knowledge production and value creation through this path. However, since these cultures—plunder culture, rent, traditional market, import brokerage sector, bureaucracy—have become institutionalized, they continue to exist independently of external conditions. The institutionalization of these cultures, which perhaps once had their specific functions, has now become an obstacle to entering the modern world and the culture of knowledge-based economics.