The Empty Train of the JCPOA

With the United States' withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran and the five remaining countries in the nuclear agreement are facing an extraordinary situation, one that has made the future of the JCPOA very unstable and uncertain. The positions of each of the remaining players are briefly described as follows: European Union - The EU's foreign policy representative, Ms. Mogherini, expressed the Union's concerns before and after the announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and called for the U.S. not to impose new sanctions against European allies. She has consistently emphasized that 'as long as Iran continues to fulfill its commitments,' Europe will remain committed to these obligations. France - While France, as a member of the EU, agrees with the overall direction of the Union, it has continuously tried to adopt multiple positions that distinguish France's policy from other EU members. French politicians aim to show that France has an independent voice in such matters and even claims leadership in the European community, capable of acting independently. Nevertheless, France has yet to reach a common language with other signatory members beyond the 'necessity of preserving the JCPOA.' Ultimately, the three European countries, Britain, Germany, and France, which are still in the JCPOA, hope primarily to reach a common formula with the U.S. that prevents the implementation of U.S. sanctions against Europe or minimizes their impact. If such an agreement is reached, part of Iran's economic interests will also be secured, but Iran can still be sanctioned for secondary reasons. These secondary reasons encompass a wide range of issues from human rights and individual freedoms to cybersecurity, missile program development, and regional interventions. The shadow war (Syria - Israel - Iran) or proxy wars (Hezbollah, Palestinians, Israel and Hezbollah, Yemen, and through that, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, or Bahrain) are other facets of this confrontation. Russia and China - Russia and China are distanced from the three European countries in two ways. Economic enterprises in these countries are mainly (though not necessarily all) owned or controlled by the state, and their monetary systems have a greater capacity to withstand U.S. impositions than those of Europe. For instance, China operates in a way that does not necessarily engage in international trade through SWIFT and, wherever necessary, does not pay for goods in exchange for dollars or delivers consumer goods to Iran in exchange for receiving oil. China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, but as indicated by Mohammad Javad Zarif's recent trip, China is not willing to guarantee that it will buy Iranian oil under any circumstances. In principle, neither China nor Russia is completely immune from U.S. sanctions, although their economies will be less vulnerable compared to the years before the JCPOA (2011-2015). Zarif's dealings with the remaining players within the JCPOA framework resemble a gamble where the cards held by the players are identical and publicly visible. Even the words exchanged and the content of conversations leave no doubt that none of the players hold a winning card. The relationship of these two countries with the U.S. is profit-oriented, and as we have seen in recent days, unexpected shifts from the U.S., such as the 180-degree turn regarding the telecommunications-technology company ZTE, which is considered a primary seller of telecommunications technology to North Korea and Iran, are noteworthy. Trump's unexpected order halted the ban on American companies selling parts to this Chinese company, effectively allowing American companies to trade with this large Chinese firm. Such actions disarm China regarding accepting sanctions against Iran, and due to the high volume of trade with the U.S., what China gains from such licenses far exceeds the amounts it loses due to sanctions on trade with Iran. In such exchanges, there is always the possibility that import and export policies may be overshadowed by the pursuit of greater profits. The Russians and Chinese do not place much importance on the principle of loyalty in such cases and act as their interests dictate or alter the terms of contracts. Therefore, it is unlikely that in the next two months, during the period of reshaping U.S. sanction policies, the content of these two countries' policies will not be influenced by their relationship with the U.S. and change to Iran's detriment. Of course, until now, both countries have theoretically defended remaining in the JCPOA. The 1+4 talks - Mohammad Javad Zarif's trip to China and Russia, followed by meetings with European leaders in the JCPOA, has created a new diplomatic framework, although its content or success is not clearly defined. Zarif's dealings with the remaining players within the JCPOA framework resemble a gamble where the cards held by the players are identical and publicly visible. Even the words exchanged and the content of conversations leave no doubt that none of the players hold a winning card. In the first round of negotiations, a sense of despair and hopelessness prevailed everywhere. One player, the U.S., contrary to the rules of the game, left the game at a moment of its choosing, leaving the remaining players in uncertainty. None of those remaining have a winning card, either individually or collectively, to decisively determine the outcome of the game. Russia has called for cooperation among the remaining countries, and China has promised 'neutral, fair, and responsible behavior.' Europe is bewildered that the U.S., by its withdrawal, only intended to strike Iran or all European and Asian players. Undoubtedly, Iran's game is different because its role within the JCPOA has also been different, and the JCPOA was fundamentally created to curb Iran's nuclear activities. However, until the U.S. withdrawal, Iran made every effort to convince the U.S. that leaving the JCPOA would be a loss for the U.S.; now it finds itself in a situation where it holds no winning card. Threatening to start enrichment or compliance with the 1+4? - Ali Akbar Salehi, head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, stated a month before the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA that Iran has the capability to inject gas into the centrifuges at the Fordow facility and begin 20% enrichment within four days. Following the U.S. withdrawal, Donald Trump threatened that if Iran took steps to rebuild its nuclear capacity, 'that would be another matter,' and it is clear that he meant resorting to military actions and regime change in Iran. How practical Mr. Salehi's statements are is also debatable. The Arak heavy water reactor is buried under tons of cement, and beyond that, Iran cannot simultaneously tell the 1+4 survivors that it is committed to the JCPOA while also informing the U.S. that it is rebuilding its nuclear infrastructure at sites that are under constant surveillance by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Therefore, at least until today, we must think that Iran is adhering to its commitments, and the threats it has sometimes uttered are empty. Leadership guarantees - In the statements of the leadership and the president, there is talk of requesting guarantees from the Europeans. It is unclear what this guarantee encompasses. What is Iran's reciprocal guarantee, and will Iran accept the conditions posed by Donald Trump, such as agreeing never to produce nuclear weapons, abandoning missile capability development, and refraining from intervening in regional affairs (Syria, Iraq, Palestine, Yemen)? If so, then why did it not give such promises to a country capable of sanctioning all JCPOA members? Recently, North Korea unexpectedly released three American citizens of Korean descent from prison and sent them on Secretary of State Mike Pompeo's plane to Washington. After that, Pompeo - perhaps to test Iran - stated that Iran could also release dual-national American citizens. However, no response was heard from Iran. Will Iran release dual-national European citizens like Nazanin Zaghari? And if it does, and then Britain restricts its trade relations with Tehran under U.S. sanctions, what will happen? Will the multitude of the Leader's loyalists again storm the British embassy in Tehran to take new hostages? Is releasing imprisoned Iranian-Americans still an effective pressure lever, or has it lost that capability? It seems that when the U.S. was inside the JCPOA, this lever had more impact; but now Iran must use this lever like North Korea merely to demonstrate goodwill or to create motivation for the U.S. to enter into renewed negotiations. Does Iran have a pressure lever? - Iran does not seem to have sufficient diplomatic or legal capacity to pursue the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA through international legal channels; nor would such an action be beneficial for Iran. This could open Pandora's box and bring the Security Council back to previous resolutions that are not in Iran's favor. As Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, also confirms, Iran cannot and does not want to provoke Europe against the U.S. Until recent developments, Iran could have engaged in discussions regarding some of the West's demands, particularly concerning Iran's intervention in Yemen or the range of its ballistic missiles, and could have gained concessions. The indirect conflict between Iran and Israel in Syria and the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has weakened this lever as well. However, if Iran agrees to re-enter international negotiations regarding the JCPOA and its conditions, it will be left empty-handed. In the JCPOA negotiations, Iran offered nearly everything it had. With a complete withdrawal from the JCPOA, only a limited portion of that capability will be reversible, and in other words, Iran will not return to the zero point before the JCPOA, which means a lack of pressure leverage. Until recent developments, Iran could have engaged in discussions regarding some of the West's demands, particularly concerning Iran's intervention in Yemen or the range of its ballistic missiles, and could have gained concessions. The indirect conflict between Iran and Israel in Syria and the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA has weakened this lever as well. Engaging in military adventures could provoke a direct military response from the U.S. or Israel, which would not be in Iran's favor. The last resort being discussed is the withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Iran's withdrawal from this treaty would mean a formal entry into the stage of producing nuclear materials. This would leave Iran with a bankrupt economy and under complete global sanctions. Additionally, Iran would be exposed to direct military attacks from the U.S. and Israel on its nuclear facilities. This choice, rather than being a source of power, would become a factor of weakness and vulnerability. Angela Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, has a realistic view of the JCPOA and Iran. While she acknowledges the necessity of preserving the JCPOA, she believes that the JCPOA has flaws and that if Iran wants to maintain the JCPOA, it must make concessions. Merkel is correct. The U.S. has now exited the JCPOA, and the survival of this agreement as a contract still depends on U.S. approval because U.S. sanctions have the power to undermine this agreement. To garner U.S. support in a new agreement, it is essential to first clarify the legal framework for its continuation and cancellation and to precisely define the reciprocal obligations of each signatory. Currently, divisions, an explosive state, despair, and uncertainty about the future among the people have reached their highest levels. There is a visible rift between the government and the leadership. In such circumstances, only a revision of the principles of international interactions, at the regional and global levels, new alliances, and efforts to create balanced relations with the world is a healing prescription that Iran must test. Achieving such a situation would also place European powers in a better bargaining position and even challenge the U.S. more effectively, allowing them to better support Iran.