The End of Strategic Depth

Whatever it was, it seems we are nearing its end. Ayatollah Khamenei, along with many of his reformist opponents, referred to it as strategic depth, claiming that our presence in this depth is a guardian and guarantor of the country's security and a sign of the regime's power. Some of these reformists even echoed Khamenei's assertion that if we were not fighting in this depth, we would have to fight in the capital sooner or later. For the opponents of the Islamic Republic, however, this strategic depth has been nothing but a pit and a quagmire. A place where the powerful squander Iran's financial and human resources for their regional ambitions. Strategic depth or a deadly quagmire; whatever it was, it is now slowly but surely coming to an end. The presence of the IRGC in this depth had nothing to do with the emergence of ISIS, nor was it based on effective diplomacy or long-term investment power. What has been and is, is the skill in forming militia groups, especially in countries where their central governments are either weak or in decline. And for this, there is no need for a seasoned diplomat or a visionary industrialist and capitalist. What is needed are only experienced fighters who have enough experience in organizing militia groups, which the Islamic Republic of Iran has the largest and most skilled of; the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is their exclusive playground of strategic depth. Brigadier General Hossein Hamadani, the highest-ranking IRGC member killed in Syria, once revealed the secret of the IRGC's victory in saving Bashar al-Assad, explaining how he and his colleagues brought their experiences from suppressing the Green Movement in the streets of Tehran to Syria. In any case, such IRGC members have always had the final say in the strategic depth of the Islamic Republic, and thus it is not surprising that Mohammad Javad Zarif, in the five or six years he has been Iran's foreign minister, has visited Baghdad or Damascus less frequently. These capitals are the main centers of Iran's strategic depth. It may be said that Zarif has not been allowed to say or do anything regarding Iran's diplomacy in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Who becomes Iran's ambassador in Baghdad and Damascus and Beirut is not determined by Zarif, but by the IRGC. In the 15 years since the fall of Saddam, all Iranian ambassadors in Baghdad have been IRGC members, and the story of the appointment of the last Iranian ambassador in Iraq shows the IRGC's stubbornness in maintaining their playground. For months, Iran had no ambassador in Baghdad because apparently, no agreement was reached among the power centers regarding this sensitive position. But Qassem Soleimani, the IRGC's unrivaled man in the strategic depth, wanted to appoint the closest IRGC member to him as Iran's ambassador in war-torn Baghdad, and he finally got his way, with Iraj Masjedi, the deputy commander of the Quds Force, becoming Iran's ambassador in Baghdad. Iraj Masjedi, a former commander of the Quds Force and the current Iranian ambassador in Baghdad, shows that in every country within the strategic depth, it revolves around this axis. It is the IRGC that dominates the field with their money and guns, while Hassan Rouhani and Javad Zarif are merely their spokespeople. In any case, whatever it was, this strategic depth is now sometimes rapidly and sometimes slowly coming to an end. The reasons for Iran's failures in the countries that were within its strategic depth are varied. Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Lebanon each have their own conditions, but in all these countries, Iran's presence has always had common characteristics: short-sighted political thinking, military reliance on militias, and an ideologically tainted view mixed with corruption. The Beginning of the End in Iraq The recent elections in Iraq and the unrest in the past months in the predominantly Shia cities of this country conveyed a single message: dissatisfaction with the Shia politicians, most of whom are affiliated with Iran. More than half of the Iraqi people did not go to the polls, and those who did mostly voted for parties and groups that distanced themselves from Iran in word and deed. The distancing from Iran is like a political currency that has many buyers in today's Iraqi political market. Even Hadi al-Amiri, who entered parliament with the money and unwavering support of Qassem Soleimani, speaks less about Iran in his speeches. It should not be forgotten that Amiri is a full-fledged IRGC member who grew up in Iran, knows Persian better than Arabic, and his wife and children, like other IRGC families, mostly live in the Shahid Mahallati neighborhood of Tehran. The meeting of Muqtada al-Sadr with Mohammed bin Salman, the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia, demonstrates better than anything else why distancing from Iran is the common currency of today's Baghdad. In all his activities in recent months, he has always pursued one goal: how far he is from Iran. From his closeness to Ayatollah Sistani to his travels to Saudi Arabia and his coalition with the communists. The recent elections in Iraq and the unrest in the past months in the predominantly Shia cities of this country conveyed a single message: dissatisfaction with the Shia politicians, most of whom are affiliated with Iran. In the 15 years since the fall of Saddam, Iran's policies in Iraq have consistently exhibited the same characteristics mentioned earlier: militarism through the formation of various militia groups such as Hashd al-Shaabi, Nujaba, Hezbollah, etc., totaling 17 groups, an ideologically exclusive and corrupt Shia perspective. Iraq, like Iran, is among the countries where corruption in its political system is systemic. Muqtada al-Sadr, the election winner, seeks to form coalitions with groups that share only one commonality: distance from Iran. After all this material and spiritual investment over 15 years, Haider al-Abadi, the Shia Prime Minister of Iraq who once came to power with Iran's help, now wants to accompany the U.S. sanctions against Iran. This is the same country that, according to Mahmoud Sadqi, a member of the Iranian parliament, owes $1.1 trillion in compensation for the direct damages of the imposed war to Iran, as per Article 6 of Resolution 598. Do all these not indicate the end of Iran's strategic depth in Iraq? Iran's Main Loss in Syria The situation of strategic depth in Syria is much worse. The IRGC has taken thousands of fighters from Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran to Syria over the past five years, branding them as defenders of the shrine. However, in practice, they were nothing more than the infantry of the Russian Air Force, and their goal was the same as Russia's: to keep Bashar al-Assad in power. After five years and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, the displacement of half of Syria's population from their homes, and the flight of more than five million Syrians abroad, Russia and Iran have achieved their goal. Assad remains in power in a ruin called Syria, and the international community has reluctantly accepted this reality. We will skip the human casualties and financial costs that Iran has paid for this goal, as there are no accurate and reliable statistics available. However, it is said that hundreds of Iranians have been killed and billions of dollars have been spent by the Islamic Republic in this war. And now, the time has come to reap the benefits of these selfless sacrifices. What will happen to the Islamic Republic and what will become of Iran's strategic depth in Syria? Everyone wants Iran to exit Syria. All the powers involved in this devastating war now have plans, programs, or aspirations for Syria's future. How strong will Assad be? Will Syria be a centralized country in the future or federal? What will the relationship of the Syrian Kurds be with their enemy Turkey and with Assad? And finally, will millions of Syrian refugees return home, and if so, what will Assad do with them? For all these questions and other problems, Russia, the U.S., Turkey, and Israel each have their own plans and schemes, some coherent and some immature and merely wishful thinking. But despite all their differences, they all agree on one thing regarding Iran: Iran must either completely leave Syria as Israel and the U.S. say or minimize its activities as Turkey and Russia suggest. One of the bases used by the Fatemiyoun Brigade will be near Halabja. We do not know. What is clear is that due to sanctions and its internal economic and political problems, Iran no longer has the ability to showcase itself in Syria. For this reason, it has been a long time since we have heard the exaggerated claims of IRGC commanders that Iran has reached the shores of the Mediterranean Sea and the borders of Israel. Iran's strategic depth in Syria has long since come to an end. And perhaps it is a historical irony that Iran's ally, Russia, has repeatedly stated clearly or implicitly that Iran's role in Syria has ended and the IRGC must minimize its activities. For this reason, there have been no reports of the defenders of the shrine for several months. Israel has also shown through its deadly and targeted airstrikes that it is closely monitoring all of Iran's movements in Syria. The protection of the Israeli border and the Golan Heights has also been taken over by the Russians, who do not even allow Syrian forces to approach the Israeli border, lest the Iranian forces disguise themselves as Syrians. It may not be an exaggeration to claim that among all the countries involved in the Syrian war, Iran is the main loser. Yemen: The Peak of the Regime's Short-Sightedness And yet, the sad tale of Yemen is the pinnacle of the Islamic Republic's short-sightedness regarding its strategic depth. The history of the Houthis' war with other tribes in Yemen predates the existence of the Islamic Republic. There was a time when even Mohammad Reza Shah and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser had a hand in this tribal war. Back then, both Saudi Arabia and Iran were concerned about the fragmentation of Yemen and the formation of a socialist republic in southern Yemen, and thus supported the Houthi tribe in the north. The five Imams of the Houthis, who would have faced a much worse situation if they were in Iran, suddenly became the pure oppressed Muslims that the global arrogance intends to destroy. Those days are over. Yemen has fragmented. The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen emerged with the help of the Soviet Union and cast a shadow over Yemen during the Cold War. Until we reached the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the reunification of Yemen, and the beginning of Ali Abdullah Saleh's dictatorship. Throughout all these years, however, tribal wars never completely ceased. In Yemen, all people have always been armed. No Arab country has as many weapons among ordinary people as Yemen does. Until the Arab Spring reached this poorest Arab country. Apparently, amidst this chaos, the Islamic Republic seeks to weave a cap for itself from the Houthis' felt and find a place in the Saudi backyard. A few Houthi leaders are invited to Tehran and Qom, and weapons and missiles are sent from Iran to Saada, the main city of the Houthis. It does not take long for the five Imams of the Houthis, who would have faced a much worse situation if they were in Iran, to suddenly become the pure oppressed Muslims that the global arrogance intends to destroy. The Arab Spring ends Ali Abdullah Saleh's presidency, but the unrest does not cease. The Houthis, aided by Iranian weapons and their coalition with the ousted Ali Abdullah Saleh, gain new life and surge from the north to the south, capturing the capital. This is when alarms go off in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and even the U.S. that Iran might establish a base next door to Saudi Arabia. For over three years, Saudi planes have been raining deadly bombs on the people of Yemen. Neither hospitals nor schools nor even buses carrying students are safe from these deadly attacks. And since the Houthis killed their ally Ali Abdullah Saleh, not only has their progress stopped, but they have lost more and more areas and have gone into a completely defensive position. Now the Houthis, along with Iran, are calling for peace, but Saudi Arabia and the UAE apparently have no intention of backing down. This was the short story of the Islamic Republic's strategic depth in Yemen. Yemen is heading back to the Stone Age and will not reach stability anytime soon. A place where al-Qaeda and ISIS fight and die alongside various armed tribes, and peace will not come anytime soon. Here, the Islamic Republic wanted to establish a center for its strategic depth. The last significant country remaining in this strategic depth, for which the Islamic Republic holds special credibility and has opened a separate account, is Lebanon and Hezbollah. However, the story of Iran and Hezbollah is so eventful and costly that it requires a separate evaluation. Moreover, the complexity of Lebanon's political situation and Israel's direct role in the matter is a long story that we will leave for later. The opinions expressed in this note do not necessarily reflect the views of Radio Farda. Ali Sadrzadeh is an analyst of Middle Eastern and Arab world issues.