The End of the Nuclear Honeymoon Between Iran and the U.S.; Implementation of the JCPOA Becomes More Difficult

The media dispute between Abbas Araghchi, one of the senior nuclear negotiators of the Islamic Republic, and John Kerry, the U.S. Secretary of State, regarding "U.S. commitments and voluntary actions in implementing the JCPOA," reflects Washington's reluctance to take further voluntary steps toward Iran and Tehran's insistence on continuing its challenging foreign policy in the region, indicating increasing difficulties in implementing the JCPOA in the coming months. On October 14, John Kerry, in a calculated conversation with the American magazine "Foreign Affairs," seemingly aimed at delivering a direct political message to Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, claimed that "the U.S. has gone beyond its commitments in implementing the JCPOA and has made additional efforts to encourage banks to trade with Iran, but there are other problems, including the banking system, commercial issues, and transparency (a polite term for referring to financial and administrative corruption, money laundering, and smuggling) that must be resolved within Iran." In another part of the interview, which primarily aimed to highlight Washington's dissatisfaction with Tehran, Kerry criticized the Islamic Republic's regional behavior, reminding that "we can help Iran with technology transfer and some other matters, but as long as Iran is involved in Yemen and supports Assad and Hezbollah in Lebanon and launches missiles, our efforts to advance relations will be severely hampered." In a televised response two days later, Abbas Araghchi showed no sign of readiness for greater alignment of Iran with U.S. expectations in the region; rather, there was a clear insistence and threat to continue the current path, as the deputy foreign minister affiliated with the IRGC emphasized: "Security, defense, and missile issues and the Islamic Republic's regional policies (military presence in the region and war in Syria, Yemen, etc.) and issues related to the principles and values of the Islamic Revolution are non-negotiable and have nothing to do with nuclear negotiations." Araghchi claimed that the U.S. has not only failed to take any action beyond its commitments but has also fallen short in fulfilling its accepted obligations; a claim that U.S. officials do not accept. The reality is that the Obama administration, regardless of having a positive judgment and willingness to support the Islamic Republic as an elected Islamic government, has been determined to accept any possible action to successfully implement the nuclear agreement with Tehran, presenting the nuclear understanding with Tehran as a significant foreign policy achievement of its administration. The costly and time-consuming resistance of the U.S. president against congressional actions that are strongly opposed to the nuclear agreement and the repeated cancellation of sanctions by lawmakers against Tehran using the veto power is considered an example of Washington's voluntary efforts to assist the Iranian government. Additionally, earlier this year, the Obama administration delivered $400 million in cash to Tehran as part of a suspended military agreement following the revolution. Along with the payment of $400 million, Obama also provided $1.3 billion as interest and compensation for the delay in payment, an action that was portrayed by the Republican Party and some media as a ransom payment for the release of several dual-nationality Iranians. The U.S. government has denied this, stating that the payment was made to prevent further legal claims and additional compensation. A few months later, after Tehran expressed dissatisfaction with the reluctance of major banks to engage in transactions with Tehran due to fears of being subject to U.S. Treasury penalties, the Treasury Department announced a new commercial guide that would facilitate transactions between foreign companies and Iran. This commercial guide stated that some dollar transactions by banks and financial institutions with Iran that were previously prohibited would be allowed, provided that the funds do not enter the U.S. financial system. In another action by the U.S. Treasury, broad sanctions against those Iranian companies managed by individuals subject to U.S. sanctions were lifted. To encourage European banks to conduct banking transactions with Tehran, John Kerry, along with senior representatives of the U.S. Treasury, held bilateral and multilateral talks with European governments and major banks during the summer, which were not part of the JCPOA implementation commitments. Nevertheless, the leaders of the Islamic Republic, especially the conservatives, took every possible opportunity to attack the U.S. and gradually aligned the actions of Rouhani's government with this line. The statements of Hassan Rouhani during the September General Assembly meeting this year compared to his statements at last year's meeting, where the JCPOA was agreed upon but not yet implemented, reveal a change in Tehran's perspective on this issue. Last year at the assembly, Rouhani stated: "The nuclear understanding recently signed is the foundation for lifting sanctions and limiting Iran's nuclear programs to achieve change." Rouhani emphasized last year at the assembly: "We were not only seeking a nuclear agreement; we were thinking of constructive ways to rebuild a new order on the international stage." During the same assembly, a friendly phone conversation took place between Obama and Hassan Rouhani, and if the president of Tehran had been allowed and given the green light, a bilateral meeting between Obama and Rouhani would have occurred. In a noticeable shift, at this year's assembly, Rouhani was obliged to avoid confrontation with senior U.S. political representatives, and his speaking time was arranged in such a way that his path would not "accidentally" cross with Obama’s in the hallways of the United Nations. Unlike last year, Rouhani bitterly criticized the U.S. in his current remarks, accusing it of failing to fulfill its commitments to Iran. In line with Rouhani, Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization, also warned in October during a public meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna that if sanctions are not completely lifted, the fate of the JCPOA will be at risk. While the officials of the Islamic Republic seem dissatisfied with the current situation resulting from the lifting of sanctions, European countries are even considering imposing further pressures against Tehran. In recent weeks, the General Court of the European Union found the Iranian National Tanker Company’s objection to the sanctions imposed in 2015 inadmissible and gave the company one month to defend itself. The removal of the Iranian National Tanker Company from the scope of European sanctions is particularly significant in the normalization of Iran's oil exports to Europe. On Sunday, October 16, British Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson predicted that new sanctions against Russia and Iran would be considered in light of the critical situation in Syria. While the Obama administration is neither able nor willing to take further voluntary steps toward the Islamic Republic due to the unchanged regional behaviors of the Islamic Republic and the escalation of hostile actions against the U.S. (including the sentencing of five dual-nationality Iranians on charges of friendship or espionage for the U.S. to ten years in prison), it is not difficult to predict the harder stance of the next occupant of the White House toward Tehran. If Hillary Clinton wins the upcoming U.S. elections, the new president will likely not want to position her administration against a Congress that, at least in one of its two legislative chambers (the House of Representatives), is predicted to remain under Republican control. Undoubtedly, after the U.S. elections, the JCPOA will be maintained as an executive document for months, at least because Tehran, by delivering its enriched uranium stockpile, shutting down Fordow, and removing the heavy water reactor at Arak, has almost lost all bargaining chips and pressure points and is forced to continue the status quo. A significant influencing factor that will make the implementation of the JCPOA in the upcoming transitional months, as far as Western commitments and voluntary actions are concerned, more difficult than before is the insistence on the Islamic Republic's tension-inducing foreign policy in the region; an area that has generally fallen under the authority of the ruling military and where Rouhani's government plays a more observant and worried role.