The Endless Challenge of House Arrest and the Future of Rouhani's Government

The discussion of the Green Movement and the protests of 2009 remains so vibrant in the speeches of political, security, military, and propaganda officials of the Islamic Republic that it seems there is no end in sight. Those who claimed that tens of millions took to the streets on December 30 and declared the Green Movement dead are still talking about it. One of the government's dilemmas is how to deal with those who have been under house arrest for years without even nominal and show trials. Officials and members of the ruling elite in the Islamic Republic have four different views on how to deal with the leaders of the Green Movement or the 'leaders of sedition' as government officials refer to them: 1. Execution. A group of clerics and military personnel believe in executing the leaders of the Green Movement. For example, Ahmad Jannati says: 'If they were to be tried, no just and knowledgeable judge would issue anything but a death sentence for them.' (Kayhan, October 17, 2014) Mesbah Yazdi also considers their religious ruling to be execution, which has been changed to house arrest by a government decree: 'The government decree of house arrest for Mir Hossein Mousavi, Zahra Rahnavard, and Mehdi Karroubi was issued by Ayatollah Khamenei, and this decree has prevented their execution.' (9 Dey Weekly, January 2015) They consider the actions of the Green Movement leaders as 'baghi' (rebellion against the government) and them as 'baghi.' 2. Prohibition from political activity. The reason for this prohibition is that there is a possibility of them becoming leaders of protests: 'The issue of house arrest was to prevent crime, and the judiciary performed this duty and pursued the crime in the matter of these gentlemen's house arrest, not at the level of pursuing crime.' (Imam Friday of Mashhad, October 27, 2014) Saeed Jalili, former Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, also introduced the reason for house arrest as the possibility of protests in the context of the Arab Spring: 'House arrest has nothing to do with sedition; sedition happened in 2009, but house arrest came after that. Those who are referred to as the leaders of sedition are individuals who were placed under house arrest a year later because we saw that these individuals were forming a new sedition.' (Khabar Online, November 30, 2014) With this perspective, the house arrest of individuals, which has no place in the laws of the Islamic Republic, is justified: 'The house arrest of some candidates from 2009 is considered a precautionary measure and not a judicial one.' (Attorney General of the country, ISNA, December 29, 2014) This group believes in the continuation of house arrest until the opposition to the government from some reformists becomes irrelevant and considers it a solution for ensuring the survival of the government. 3. Acceptance of their repentance if it occurs. Mohammadi Kermani, the interim Friday prayer leader of Tehran, addresses Mousavi and Karroubi: 'If you confess to your oppression, the people are noble, and the leader of the revolution is also a gentleman, and he will accept your excuse.' (December 20, 2014) Acceptance of repentance means that the leaders of the Green Movement have returned to the tent of the guardianship and can operate within this tent. However, the problem is that the leader of the Islamic Republic and a significant portion of the military forces do not believe in their repentance even if it happens. Mohammad Khatami has repeatedly confessed to the mistakes of the reformists but faces many restrictions in daily activities. 4. Freedom in exchange for loyalty to the system and a commitment to silence behind the scenes. Expressing commitment to the 'system' (which in the political lexicon of the Islamic Republic means the leader of the Islamic Republic) is exactly what Mohammad Khatami has openly done over the past five years and has had no effect on his acceptance by the government. This is because Khatami has not remained silent. The promise that Rouhani made to lift the house arrest of the leaders of the Green Movement was mainly aimed at pursuing secret negotiations and a kind of reconciliation that has not yet been successful. Rouhani's government officials have not yet found a way to convince both sides to reach this solution. Why, despite the consensus among supporters and loyalists of Khamenei in suppressing the Green Movement, do they have different views on the issue of house arrest and how to emerge from this legal dilemma and underlying political crisis? Three reasons can be cited for this difference in approach: 1. Different perceptions of the system's power. Some loyal officials to Khamenei view forgiveness and acceptance of repentance as a sign of the system's (Khamenei's) power, while others see revenge as a sign of power; 2. The external dimension of the house arrest issue. Some of Khamenei's allies believe that the continuation of house arrest is a display of power against foreigners in the context of nuclear negotiations, while others believe that showing flexibility and lifting house arrest could signify the security of officials in front of foreign governments and showcase their power; 3. Preserving the system's dignity. Some believe that the continuation of house arrest preserves the system's dignity because the system has labeled Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard as leaders of sedition and compared them to Talha and Zubair. However, others believe that lifting the house arrest keeps reformists within the framework of the system and will buy more dignity for the system. It is not clear which viewpoint will ultimately prevail, but currently, the view of continuing house arrest dominates other perspectives. This view has been under severe pressure since Rouhani's government came to power because it has lost some of its supporters, and forces close to the government, some of whom are hardliners, seek a way to resolve the issue at a low cost for the 'system.' These are the groups that have remained silent on this issue, and the Stability Front has labeled them as 'silent seditionists,' and Khamenei has called them 'people without insight.' The future of Rouhani's government and the issue of house arrest The issue of lifting house arrest is currently not a priority for Rouhani's government, but Rouhani's government needs to lift the house arrest of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard to gain the votes of reformists in the second round (2017) and to secure a majority for pragmatists and reformists in the parliamentary elections (2016). It is highly likely that Rouhani's government has set this issue aside for after achieving success in nuclear negotiations to enter this arena with greater power. Rouhani and his government members know well that they cannot escape the pressure of public opinion for the release of these individuals, considering Rouhani's promises during the election period. The Greens know that the final decision-maker is Ali Khamenei, but on the other side of the story, they also know that the pressure from Rouhani's government and the statements of security officials regarding the non-security risk of freeing the leaders of the Green Movement can be effective.