The 'Engineering' of the 96 Elections Has Begun

The engineering of elections in Iran is a structural phenomenon, both negatively and positively, meaning that the government not only does not want an outsider to be elected and be surprised by a specific outcome, but also wants preferred individuals to be placed in seemingly elective institutions. The 96 presidential election is no exception, but each election is different in that various tactics and decisions are considered and implemented for engineering the elections. What are these tactics and decisions for the 96 elections? What actions have been taken so far to engineer the presidential election? The most important part of election engineering is the engineering of candidates. This engineering is not only done by disqualifying non-affiliated candidates (which will definitely happen) but also the affiliated candidates must demonstrate their utmost loyalty to the leader, the household, and the IRGC in a process that begins with obtaining permission from Khamenei or gauging his opinion. It is clear that if a presidential candidate runs without coordination with Khamenei, they will be disqualified by the Guardian Council. The experience of Rafsanjani in 92 is a good example in this regard: even if he had met with Khamenei or spoken to him, he would still have been told not to run. However, those who have a chance must first have Khamenei's approval. Khamenei's illegal warning to Ahmadinejad not to run is another aspect of candidate engineering. In the 96 elections, close associates of Rouhani and other candidates have spoken about their candidacy being approved by the Supreme Leader. Government institutions during the election period are both engineered and become tools of engineering. State radio and television and government advertising institutions act in favor of the candidate favored by the leadership apparatus and against candidates who have distances from the Supreme Leader. For months, negative propaganda against the government's record has continued in various programs of state radio and television. Voters are engineered with encouraging factors on the eve of each election. In some cities in Khuzestan province, flour from the Astan Quds Razavi has been distributed. Additionally, during the Nowruz holidays, up to 240,000 meals (far beyond the usual) have been distributed among the pilgrims of the eighth Shia Imam. It has been announced from the government side that the dividends of justice shares will be distributed in 96, although the exact timing has not been specified. The government distributed a food support basket worth 35 to 120 thousand tomans among 11 million people in the days leading up to the 96 New Year. Government institutions during the election period are both engineered and become tools of engineering. State radio and television and government advertising institutions act in favor of the candidate favored by the leadership apparatus and against candidates who have distances from the Supreme Leader. For months, negative propaganda against the government's record has continued in various programs of state radio and television. The arrest of 12 managers of Telegram networks in the final days of the year 1395 and the arrest of three journalists (Hengameh Shahidi, Morad Saghafi, and Ehsan Mazandarani) in the months leading up to the election is part of media engineering. Security institutions usually intensify warnings, threats, and arrests of journalists before any election. Many journalists are summoned to security and police institutions and are told how to act during the election period, and if they do not comply, they will be arrested. The election period in the Islamic Republic is a time of increased newspaper and publication closures. The note by Hesamuddin Ashna (an advisor to Rouhani) addressed to Zarghami (one of the potential candidates) after he explicitly spoke about buying channels and attracting the attention of their managers for premature advertising in favor of conservatives at the Jamna gathering is telling: "It seems that your reference to the possibility of buying websites, which was one of your discoveries during the parliamentary elections, is being carried out spontaneously and prematurely by your aligned brothers and peers. Apparently, effective actions have also been taken regarding managers of channels that are not for sale and influence; I just hope you have the manliness to relieve their families from worry with necessary recommendations." It is clear that those Telegram channels that do not serve conservative candidates with encouraging elements (opaque financial resources) will deal with the security forces. Manipulating public opinion is another part of the election engineering program. This manipulation is not done by the private sector but within the framework of public and state resources. Opponents of the government claim that government managers receive astronomical salaries (the Kayhan newspaper in the months leading up to the elections) but do not mention that managers of governmental institutions also receive the same salaries and are not accountable to anyone. Opponents of the government claim that government executive bodies are inefficient (Dastjerdi, spokesperson for the Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces, Tabnak 17 Farvardin 1396) but do not mention that institutions under the leadership, IRGC, and clergy, which today control a larger part of the economy and culture, also face the same problems. Elections in Iran are among the most opaque in the world regarding the source and manner of spending financial resources. In no election is it clear how much and how each candidate has spent and what individuals, institutions, or groups have assisted the candidates. Candidates usually do not disclose these resources to pretend they are not indebted and claim that their expenses are very low and that others have contributed without expectation, both of which claims are far from the truth. In the 96 elections, the costs and their sources are also unclear from the beginning. For example, it is unclear how much the "Popular Front of Islamic Revolution Forces" has spent to gather about three thousand people for two occasions in Tehran (transportation, hotel) and for renting the venue and catering and other arrangements, and where these costs have come from. However, given the closeness of all candidates of this front to security and military forces, it is not far from reality that these costs may have been covered by military and security institutions or their companies and contractors (the parliament has neither the means to investigate these institutions nor the power to do so). However, to avoid speculation by analysts, this front could provide this information to the public. Security and military institutions in Iran, with their unlimited financial resources, can engineer them without public knowledge and even without the knowledge of the three thousand people who attended the gathering. In the 96 elections, it can be expected that thousands of billions of tomans of "dirty money" (from smuggling and money laundering) and "clean money" (resources provided to clerics to clean up other funding sources) will be spent.