The Evolved Role of the Medicalian Government in Iran's Repression Strategy

The security atmosphere in Iran has noticeably intensified and expanded in recent months. What is the role of the government in the new approach of the regime to address internal issues and its repression strategy? According to a report by Volker Turk, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the number of executions carried out in Iran in 2024 has increased by 50% compared to the previous year; more than 900 people, and in the last week of the year alone (one week in Azar), about 40 people. Additionally, the issuance of death sentences for political and ideological activists in courts that do not adhere to fair trial standards has also increased. For example, one can refer to the death sentences of Sharif Mohammadi, Pakhshan Azizi, Mehdi Hasani, and Behrouz Ehsani. The scope of freedom of expression, including media, cyberspace, and the activities of activists, has also narrowed with the increase of red lines and threats from security institutions. Dozens of political prisoners in Iran are calling for the complete abolition of inhumane and regressive death penalties. The claim of lifting filtering, which has been implemented superficially and very limitedly, has also been assessed within the framework of the continuation and deepening of the blockage in the free flow of information. From the recent resolution of the Supreme Council of Cyberspace, which reportedly had 32 clauses according to the head of the Islamic Propaganda Organization, only one case, namely the lifting of the filtering of WhatsApp and Google Play, was in favor of media freedoms; the rest of the clauses apparently serve to consolidate current restrictions and create future limitations. Meanwhile, censorship and repression continue to be systematically applied against users who have not adhered to the government's red lines, and pressure on religious minorities and ethnic activists also persists. In the area of freedom of assembly and political parties, no significant changes have occurred, and independent and critical political groups continue to struggle with previous limitations. Civil and professional organizations are in a similar situation. The security atmosphere also continues to dominate universities and schools. A significant portion of the claim of the return of professors and students deprived of teaching and studying has also been reported to be false. Firstly, not all of their problems have been resolved, and secondly, the period of tolerance for many students had ended. Those who have returned have explicitly or implicitly committed to not causing problems for the government. However, security cases against political, civil activists, student activists, and professors are still ongoing. The judiciary and intelligence agencies have also recklessly threatened individuals who have challenged the policies and official narrative of the regime in regional and domestic policies. The Medicalian government has reportedly returned 'less than 10 percent' of expelled professors to the university. In the area of women and their dress, the achievements gained are the result of popular struggle and resistance. The Medicalian government has apparently resisted the implementation of the new hijab law, but this resistance is not principled and does not align with the demand to end compulsory hijab. Nevertheless, the regressive, repressive, and interventionist approach in the area of women's dress and types of recreation in the form of 'Noor Patrol' by the police and movements by Basij forces continues. This situation, which reflects the lack of self-confidence of the Islamic Republic and concern over a survival crisis, shows the fragility of the balance of power, and has a specific connection with the government of Masoud Medicalian. This connection does not mean that this government has initiated a security and repression-oriented threat perspective. This government is a legacy holder and does not have the main role in policymaking and execution. The institutions of the Guardian Jurist, the judiciary, and the Revolutionary Guards are the main foundations of the repression structure in Iran, but behind-the-scenes agreements and the groundwork laid for the formation of the Medicalian government and the macro strategies desired by this government have strengthened the repression apparatus and expanded its movements. The theoretical backing of the Medicalian government is the depoliticization and sidelining of politics, especially the political matter, and focusing on policy-making. In this approach, by sidelining structural problems, laws, legitimacy bases, and macro policies, efforts are made to solve problems solely by focusing on execution. Within this framework, propositions such as agreement with the top (absolute power structure), devaluation of political engagement, acceptance of political authority, promotion of surrender to tyranny, and the reduction of 'national consensus' to the uneven power-sharing of the beneficiaries of the Islamic Republic from an economic and political perspective, while trampling on political development, are proposed as solutions to open channels for political participation in a gradual and slow process, solve economic problems, and empower the government to address the issue. In the view of the proponents and supporters of the Medicalian government, who are mainly remnants of the redirected 'reformism' in the historical path of the 70s and 80s, there is no difference between democracy and authority. Plurality in government theories holds little credibility, and in the formation of the government, any content can be poured. Nevertheless, fundamentally, conflict and plurality in politics have no meaning, or can be resolved with advice and avoidance of conflict. However, behind these apparent claims, a look at the security composition and domestic policy of the Medicalian government, which is similar to the government of Ebrahim Raisi, and other signs reveal a kind of agreement. Accordingly, this government, in exchange for some tactical openings, shows a serious will to maintain the power structure, conceal the main sources of problems, create a false formulation of super-challenges, and praise Ali Khamenei as the leader of the Islamic Republic. From this perspective, in both theoretical and practical domains, it has turned to serious confrontation with structural-breaking tendencies and any approach that does not accept the agreement of the beneficiaries of the regime. In fact, it seems that Medicalian's qualification approval means cooperation with the institution of the Guardian Jurist in controlling the political arena to prevent political changes. Therefore, the capacity of the repression apparatus of the Islamic Republic has relatively increased compared to the Raisi government; because some forces that were previously passive or silent have now joined the ranks of the repressors. The number of those who believe in the unrestricted and maximal governance of Ali Khamenei has increased. Reformists and moderates supporting the Medicalian government, alongside its officials, in addition to creating mirages and neutralizing the capacity for societal change in barren paths, have increased the psychological power of the repression apparatus and have, in fact, become the software of repression. From this angle, the situation has changed compared to the time of the Raisi government and has become more complex. Now, part of the past critics, by promoting post-truth and achievement-making, claim the government's will for openings and movement towards moderation. The success of their project requires simultaneous confrontation with the radical elements of the principlists on one hand and the forces advocating democracy, political freedoms, and an independent civil society on the other. Thus, it can be said that the Masoud Medicalian government has relatively expanded the strategic depth of the repression apparatus in society.