The Fall of Assad; Difficult Days for Khamenei and the Hard Core of Power

The close relations of Assad's government with the Islamic Republic of Iran have turned into a problem for him and were among the factors leading to his downfall. The repercussions of this fall in Iran can have positive effects from different angles. The year 1403 (2024) has astonishingly and shockingly become the year of the nakedness and worn-out nature of the 'Resistance Axis and Strategic Depth' of the Islamic Republic. This garment did not come at a low cost, and the illusion of power stemming from it has constantly been present in Khamenei's mind and speech. He portrayed the 'field,' meaning direct or proxy military presence in the region, which was the source and creator of the 'Resistance Axis,' as an important factor in 'power equations in West Asia and challenging the capabilities and hegemony of the United States in the region.' After October 7, Khamenei fully supported Hamas's attack on Israel, introducing it as a 'historic turning point' in confronting the 'Zionist regime' and a factor in the 'technical knockout of Israel and the U.S. in the region.' However, this event was, in fact, the beginning of a fundamental blow and a severe decline in the power of the 'Resistance Front.' This 'front,' now after the severe blows inflicted on Hamas and Hezbollah, has further collapsed with Assad's fall. The two other pillars of the Islamic Republic's 'power,' which have consistently defined security in terms of hardware and enmity with Israel and the U.S. and other regional countries, namely the missile program and the nuclear program, are also facing challenges at both regional and international levels. The two-decade challenge over the nuclear program with the world has not only complicated the generous allocation of aid to the 'Resistance Front' but has also placed the country in one of the worst economic and developmental conditions in contemporary history, further destabilizing the foundations of the Islamic Republic's legitimacy. The Islamic Republic's active and intensive presence in the Syrian civil war, relying on Hezbollah and the Fatemiyoun and Zainabiyoun groups under the banner of 'defending the shrine' (the tomb of Zainab, the sister of the second Shia Imam), although initially saved Assad's regime from collapse and maintained Syria as an important piece in the 'Resistance Front' puzzle and beyond, as a bridge of communication for the Islamic Republic with Hezbollah in Lebanon, has gradually turned these forces into a problem for Syria due to attacks by Israel targeting Iranian-affiliated forces and their facilities in Syria. Parts of Syrian society have come to realize that their country has become a battleground between the Islamic Republic and Israel, and the presence of these forces has been more of a disruptor of security and peace than a creator of it, to the extent that in recent years discussions have become serious about Assad's regime disregarding Iran and not cooperating in Hamas and Hezbollah's confrontation with Israel in the days following October 7. What will be the fate of Syria after Bashar Assad? Bashar Assad initially denied that the winds of the so-called 'Arab Spring' would reach Syria. His claim was that 'the deep solidarity and continuity between the government and society' would prevent any danger to the regime. Therefore, when the first sparks of protest were ignited in the south of the country in 2011, instead of managing the crisis and re-evaluating governance methods and opening the channels of despotism and starting dialogue with moderate opponents, the government immediately resorted to violence, and gradually the field fell into the hands of violent and extremist forces, leading the country into civil war. In 2018, when Assad regained control over 70 percent of the country with military help from the Islamic Republic and Russia, he was still too intoxicated to open a serious dialogue with moderate opposition factions and place the crisis-stricken country on a path of governance based on the participation of more segments of society and their representatives. Tehran also had no demands from Assad in this regard, as any power-sharing in Damascus could introduce forces into the government structure that would not necessarily agree with the Islamic Republic's presence in the country and Tehran's perception of Syria as a crucial link in the 'Resistance Front.' The close ties with the Islamic Republic and Damascus's non-compliance with UN Resolution 2245 for dialogue with opponents and power-sharing led to harsher sanctions against Assad's government; sanctions that, alongside corruption and the government's lack of control over oil-rich areas in the east of the country, resulted in unprecedented economic misery and raised doubts and ambiguities about popular support for Assad in the areas under his control and among security and military forces. All these factors, alongside the military and political preparations of the opposition in Idlib and other areas, created a fragile situation for the Damascus government, a situation in which the Islamic Republic and Hezbollah, weakened by the events after October 7, and Russia, engaged in the war in Ukraine, were also not in a position to intervene in favor of Assad as they did in 2015. The lack of resistance and the rapid retreats of the army during the ten days of opposition attacks that led to Assad's fall were mainly due to these factors, although the connections of the opposition and the countries supporting them with the military and civilian agents of Assad's government and their encouragement to break away from the regime likely played some role in this matter. The ambiguous future of Syria; the ambiguous future of the Islamic Republic. Despite all the actions, statements, and positive declarations regarding the future of Syria and peace and stability from the opposition groups, there is no guarantee that this severely impoverished country, with its ethnic and religious diversity, a mass of six million refugees from the civil war, a lack of experience and culture of democracy, the dominance of groups among the opposition that have been associated with radical Islamism, and the conflict and confrontation of interests of neighboring countries in this country, will necessarily move towards peace, tranquility, and democracy or face serious challenges on this path. However, all of this does not diminish the blatant and irreparable failure of the regional policy based on 'the field and the Resistance Front and strategic depth' of the Islamic Republic. It can be imagined that the leader of the Islamic Republic and the hard core of the government, who did not expect the collapse of Assad's government to happen so quickly, are now in a state of great shock. Nevertheless, with the knowledge of Khamenei and his close circle, it is unlikely that after recovering from the shock, they will sit down to re-evaluate and learn from their failed regional policy and come to understand that security in the domestic arena is a soft matter, relating to the type of soft and flexible relationship of the government with the people and their various demands; demands that cannot be addressed with the tense and costly policies that the Islamic Republic has pursued in the region and the world over the past decades. However, the Supreme Leader and his close circle, facing a severe defeat in regional policy this year and the weakness resulting from this defeat, are in a position where they can increasingly become targets of attacks and criticism from critics and opponents inside and outside the government, and Khamenei's authority and the hard core of power are challenged more than ever. The 'shy eye doctor' who ended 54 years of the Assad family's rule. The situation has changed for Iranian society. The failure of Khamenei's policies, alongside the instability and doubt that this defeat will create among the loyalists of the Supreme Leader, provides a more suitable ground for intensifying challenges and pressures from within and outside the government on the hard core of power and offers new and unprecedented opportunities for democratization and freeing Iran from the burden of laws, structures, and approaches that have led the country to decline and backwardness for 45 years. The fall of Assad's government also ended one of the few notorious 'hereditary republics' in the region and further stripped this ugly stain from the hands of the opponents of the republic system and supporters of hereditary authoritarian systems, complicating matters even for those advocating the hereditary rule of the Supreme Leader in Iran. Beyond that, if the repercussions of Assad's fall and the unprecedented failure of the hard core of power's regional policy create significant morale and power for the entire political and social community to mobilize and pressure the government, leading in the short or medium term to freeing Iran from the 'burden of the Supreme Leader's rule' and guiding it towards a fully elected system based on the participation and free votes of the people, it would be doubly gratifying.