The Fate of Billions of Dollars of Iran in Syria

The accusation against the Damascus regime regarding the use of chemical bombs against the village of Khan Sheikhoun in Idlib province, Syria, and the U.S. missile response have created new transformations in the Middle East region and, at the same time, are seen as signs of a significant shift in Donald Trump's foreign policy towards this region and the world. Here, the discussion is not about analyzing this event and its geopolitical consequences. The aim is to examine the increasing economic dependency that has arisen between Iran and Syria, or more precisely, the massive investment of the Islamic Republic in a country that ranks among the highest in the world in terms of 'risk tolerance,' and recent developments have intensified its dangers. The bloody Syrian crisis will end at some point, although no one knows what the future political system of this country will look like or how its territorial configuration will evolve. Despite all these uncertainties, it is evident that the survival of the current Ba'ath regime led by Bashar al-Assad is at least very unlikely, if not impossible. The persistence of the Damascus dictator on the throne of power seems more improbable than ever because Western powers, especially the United States, have returned to a fundamental opposition against him, even more stubbornly than before, after a brief period of doubt about the possibility of maintaining Bashar al-Assad until the end of 'ISIS.' Among the two main supporters of the Damascus regime, Russia and Iran, it seems very unlikely that the former would be willing to tie its future relations with the West entirely to the fate of Bashar al-Assad. A more probable scenario is Moscow negotiating over the future political system in Damascus and using this leverage in future discussions about Syria with the Americans and Europeans. It could be said that Moscow will try to gain concessions in other strategic areas in exchange for 'moving past Assad.' In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran continues its 'one-legged chicken' policy, gambling all its interests on the survival of the head of an inherited Ba'ath regime. Beyond the significant geopolitical implications of this choice, especially regarding Iran's position in the Middle East, the economic dimensions of this great gamble should not be overlooked. While no economic actor, either in the region or globally, is willing to play a role in Syria, the Islamic Republic has poured billions of dollars into this country as financial aid or investment. Here, citing several foreign (including 'Le Monde' and 'Reuters') and domestic media, we refer to instances of Iran's financial assistance to Syria and also the massive investments of the public and semi-public sectors of the Islamic Republic in this country: - Since 2013, the Central Bank of the Islamic Republic has provided several lines of credit worth five billion six hundred million dollars to its Syrian counterpart, which is mainly used for importing oil from Iran by the Damascus regime. These lines of credit allow the Syrian government to compensate for the fall in its oil exports due to the EU's sanctions on these exports and the capture of the country's oil fields by the opposition. - The 'Iran Khodro' site in Syria, under the title 'Siamco,' has begun producing new products, including Dena, Rana, and Suren. This site was supposed to introduce one thousand units to the Syrian market in 2016 and two thousand units in 2017. This report was announced by senior officials of 'Iran Khodro,' and the author of this note has no information about its realization or non-realization. - In early last year, Imad Khamis, the Syrian Prime Minister, announced during his official visit to Tehran that the third mobile phone license in this country had been granted to an Iranian consortium involving the 'Mobin Economic Development Group' affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. The French newspaper 'Le Monde' writes that in 2010, the 'Mobin Economic Development Group' participated in a tender for this license but was sidelined due to its inability to compete with the French company 'Orange' and the Emirati company 'Etisalat.' This means that the subsequent receipt of the mobile phone license in Syria by the group affiliated with the IRGC was due to the dire conditions of this country following the civil war and the withdrawal of other competing forces. - The Islamic Republic government is accused by several organizations opposed to Bashar al-Assad of having established a feudal system in relation to Syria, similar to the relationships that Western powers established with their former colonies or the calamity that Syria inflicted on Lebanon during its domination over that country. 'Le Monde' states that in January 2017, the Islamic Republic seized the 'Sharkiya' mines, which are the most important phosphate mines in Syria, as well as 6,000 hectares of agricultural land in this country. Iran's investments in Syria are also likely to share the fate of large sums that were provided during Ahmadinejad's presidency as aid or low-interest loans in a somewhat aimless manner to countries whose names a very large part of the Iranian population has never heard: a $330 million aid to Pakistan, a $1.5 billion low-interest loan to Sri Lanka, a $350 million aid for constructing a port in Nicaragua, building a clinic in Bolivia, constructing an airport in the 100,000-population country of Saint Vincent in the Caribbean, or housing construction in Venezuela and the aids and loans given to Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Gambia... A significant portion of these loans went up in smoke, including claims from some poor African and Latin American countries that took oil from Iran and did not pay back... Thus, in the shadow of the horrific internal war in Syria and the active participation of the Islamic Republic in it, a type of economic relationship is forming between Tehran and Damascus that is in no way beneficial to Iran's sustainable interests in the region. The expansion of trade and investment relations, if conducted within the framework of constructive cooperation among Middle Eastern countries, would be a great opportunity for joint development and regional convergence. A dynamic economy-equipped Iran would undoubtedly find a significant part of its markets in neighboring countries. But what is happening today in the relations between Iran and Syria bears no resemblance to convergence and will even be recorded as a very bitter memory in the history of the two countries' relations. We reiterate that the current economic relations between Tehran and Damascus have only emerged in close connection with the Islamic Republic's comprehensive support for the Assad family and are therefore as unstable as Bashar's survival in power. Without a change of power in Damascus, exiting the bloody crisis in Syria will almost certainly be impossible. Is it right for billions of dollars of Iranian investment in Syria to be tied to such a bleak future?