The Fruitless Commission of the JCPOA

After the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic stated in a meeting with members of the Assembly of Experts, in the presence of the President, that "it is not expedient to exclude the Parliament from this matter (the JCPOA)," news of the Parliament's movements regarding the JCPOA was published with greater dimensions. Events related to the JCPOA Commission were also highlighted more prominently in the national media and were republished by the propaganda arms of conservatives and authoritarian figures. This coincided with news regarding how members of the U.S. Congress were dealing with the JCPOA; a form of self-presentation against their counterpart institution in America. Although the gap between the actual status and effective function of the Parliament in Iran and the U.S. is well known. This all occurred while Ayatollah Khamenei's important statements in his meeting with the Assembly of Experts made it evident that the Parliament's involvement in the important issue of the nuclear agreement was ceremonial and performative. The Supreme Leader referred to "two important and noteworthy issues of the day": "one is the JCPOA issue" and "the other is the issue after the JCPOA"; he emphasized that "in my opinion, the issue after the JCPOA is more important than the JCPOA itself." This statement from the top of the political hierarchy was not given the attention it deserved by observers and media; however, it seems that Ayatollah Khamenei has almost determined the fate of the JCPOA for himself and is thinking about the consequences and events that will follow. He has repeatedly expressed this concern in his recent remarks, warning against the influence and exploitation of the enemy—especially the U.S.—after the nuclear agreement. In his meeting with the Assembly of Experts, the Supreme Leader mentioned "two important and noteworthy issues of the day": "one is the JCPOA issue" and "the other is the issue after the JCPOA"; he emphasized that "in my opinion, the issue after the JCPOA is more important than the JCPOA itself." Regardless of this important observation and the meaningful distinction made by the leadership of the system, he does not define a specific and precise position and status for the Parliament regarding the JCPOA. He states: "There is a discussion today regarding the Parliament; the legal and legal status and such matters should be examined by those who are knowledgeable about these issues and see what the legal requirements of this matter are and act accordingly; we will not intervene in that." However, he adds in a subtle remark, "In our opinion, it is not expedient to exclude the Parliament from this matter; because it is a matter that the country has been generally focused on for two years and has now reached certain results; the Parliament should be involved." But the main question is the one that Ayatollah Khamenei himself raises: "What should the Parliament do now?" The Supreme Leader is in suspension and doubt; or in other words, he cannot explicitly reveal the ceremonial and performative nature of the Parliament in the Islamic Republic. Thus, he adds: "I have no recommendations for the Islamic Consultative Assembly on how to act regarding this. First of all, what should the decision-making process be? Should it be in the form of approval or rejection, or should they decide in another way? I have no recommendations. We do not express what the Parliament should do or not do. We believe that it is ultimately good not to exclude the Parliament and that the representatives of the nation should decide." The first person of the Islamic Republic speaks of "rejection" or "approval" or "a third state," which is unclear what it is. Therefore, the important thing is the apparent engagement of the Parliament—especially the radical factions—with the JCPOA, covered by the media; while the main decision is made or will be made elsewhere: the central power hub. Ayatollah Khamenei has been sufficiently and adequately engaged with the JCPOA in recent months, and the recent agreement could not have been achieved without his silent approval. This is independent of the possible collaboration and affirmative project of him and some other influential figures in the government for reconciliation with the West on the nuclear energy issue—due to various reasons, including the heavy imposed sanctions. In this context, the JCPOA Commission is formed. A commission whose nearly all members come from the proposed list of two conservative and authoritarian factions in the Parliament: the Principlists and the Followers of the Wilayat. Most members of the JCPOA Commission are also radical figures and opponents of the government and the nuclear agreement, including Ismail Kowsari, Hossein Najabat, Mohammad Mahdi Zahedi, Alireza Zakani, Mehrdad Bazrpash, and Seyyed Mahmoud Nabavian. However, within the activities of the JCPOA Commission, and its invitation to well-known opponents of reconciliation (especially: Saeed Jalili, the former head of the Islamic Republic's negotiating team), some remarks and assessments clarify the position of this commission and expose its performative and ceremonial nature. In this regard, two noteworthy viewpoints are as follows: First, the statements of Ali Larijani, the Speaker of the Parliament—who is considered a significant supporter of the JCPOA—clarify that "the examination of the JCPOA is a subject that is being pursued and examined in a main commission and other commissions that are somehow related to the issue." This means that the JCPOA Commission will only provide advisory opinions. Larijani refers to the National Security and Foreign Policy Commission and some other commissions (such as economic and planning commissions) as other parts of the Parliament that are busy examining and analyzing the JCPOA. According to his report, the examination of the commissions will be completed in early October, creating an opportunity for the Parliament to express its opinion on the JCPOA issue. Another notable figure, Kazem Jalali, the head of the Parliament Research Center, who is also considered a supporter of the nuclear reconciliation, criticizes the JCPOA Commission for becoming "an instrument for electoral propaganda and political games." He also clarifies the mission of the special commission: "The main task of the JCPOA Commission assigned by the Parliament is to provide a report on the JCPOA and submit it to the Parliament's public session." It is noteworthy that even Zakani, the head of the JCPOA Commission, endorses this position and definition of the special commission. He states that "our discussion is not about rejection or approval or anything that is going to happen." On a broader level, he points out that the outlook for the Parliament's engagement with the JCPOA is predictable. In one of the commission's sessions, in the presence of Abbas Araghchi, the Deputy Foreign Minister and senior nuclear negotiator, Zakani states that the Parliament can "allow" the government to implement the agreement. He says: "In all agreements and treaties that come to the Parliament, we say we allow the government. Therefore, we are not legislating. It is entirely different. Hence, this notion that the legislative process is for binding is a mistaken notion. It has no legal basis." The JCPOA Commission has so far played the role of a platform for showcasing and expressing opposition and promoting the negative aspects of the JCPOA. The actions of the commission have been welcomed and aligned with the propaganda arms of the authoritarian and peace-seeking factions. Zakani, in response to Araghchi's surprised question, "So there is no approval?" says: "If we intend to approve, we are actually allowing the government. According to our regulations, we give the government permission to engage with that treaty, to become a party to it or not. Or if we have a condition, we can impose it there." Thus, Araghchi responds with pleasure: "Mr. Zakani's explanations, I think, were very enlightening in that the discussion regarding the JCPOA can be more than just approval or rejection. Other methods can certainly be considered. This is very important." He, of course, suggests that the Parliament should not treat the JCPOA as an international treaty, but rather "as a joint action plan, a set of voluntary actions to allow the government to implement." The entirety of these discussions, the prevailing atmosphere in the country, and the outcomes of the effective forces established in the government make the output of the Parliament and its approach to the JCPOA predictable; perhaps a product close to what Ahmad Tavakoli, a prominent representative of the Principlists in the Parliament, expresses: "The generalities should first be raised in the Parliament and then voted on; if it passes, which I guess it will, it will go to the commission where the assumption is that all items will be accepted. Anyone who has an objection to a clause of the JCPOA can express their opinion." The JCPOA Commission has so far played the role of a platform for showcasing and expressing opposition and promoting the negative aspects of the JCPOA. The actions of the commission have been welcomed and aligned with the propaganda arms of the authoritarian and peace-seeking factions. With less than six months until the upcoming parliamentary elections, opponents of the JCPOA are also thinking about mobilizing and rallying their target community. However, it seems that the efforts of the radical anti-dialogue factions in the JCPOA Commission will end without a favorable outcome for them. Although the far-right and totalitarian figures in the Islamic Republic have shown that they are not afraid of disrupting the game. Perhaps Rouhani is also aware of these movements and projects, as he responds sharply and explicitly, stating: "I will not allow a group of extremists to harm the hopes of this nation."