The Future of the JCPOA in Conversation with Wendy Sherman

In light of the developments that have occurred in Tehran-Washington relations since Donald Trump's presidency began, Radio Farda is conducting a series of interviews with analysts and political experts from various factions and mindsets in the U.S. In this interview, Radio Farda speaks with Wendy Sherman, former Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs and senior U.S. diplomat in the nuclear negotiations with Iran. Ms. Sherman, who is currently a senior researcher at the Belfer Center at Harvard University and a senior advisor at the Albright Stonebridge Group, responds to Radio Farda's questions about the ups and downs of the nuclear negotiations, the future of the JCPOA, and the new U.S. administration's approach towards Iran. Ms. Sherman, you were the chief U.S. negotiator during the nuclear talks. My first question is about the current situation. Are you concerned about the future of the agreement you reached with the P5+1 group and Iran? When we reached the agreement, we all agreed that it would be durable and sustainable only if it served the interests of all the countries involved. There may be changes in our government, the Iranian government, or other countries involved in the negotiations, so we tried to achieve the most durable agreement possible that not only served U.S. interests in preventing Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons but also established a lasting power. Regarding the U.S., although we heard during the presidential campaign that President Trump spoke of tearing up the agreement on the very first day, he did not do so. Weeks after his administration began, he must sign the sanctions waiver in April, which I hope he will do. Mr. Trump has stated that he is looking for a meticulous implementation of the agreement, which is something we all want to happen. So far, we have seen compliance from all parties; there have been a few technical flaws, which have been resolved in the Joint Commission. There is no doubt that we have ongoing concerns about Iran's activities in the region, which we believe are unhelpful, malicious, and undermine peace and stability in the region. The U.S. continues to impose sanctions that remain in place regarding state-sponsored terrorism, arms exports, and human rights violations, and I can imagine that these will be enforced carefully. Whether Congress will take further action due to Iran's actions in the region is still unclear. However, at the same time, there are pressures in Iran due to the upcoming presidential elections, and we will have to see if they can maintain the agreement or not. You mentioned many aspects, and I have separate questions about some of them. You refer to the meticulous implementation of the agreement. We hear a lot from critics of the agreement and also from officials of the new U.S. government about this term 'precise implementation' of the JCPOA. What do you think is the reason for this? Did the previous administration implement the agreement correctly or neglect certain areas? No, I do not think so. The Joint Commission has implemented the agreement carefully so far. We and all parties have done this diligently, and my expectation is that we will continue in this manner because it is essential for the sustainability of the agreement. During the time that has passed since the implementation of the JCPOA, for example, we saw in the Agency's reports that the heavy water issue had exceeded the permissible limit twice, and the Commission and the Agency raised it with Iran, and then the issue was resolved by exporting the excess heavy water. Do you think the new U.S. government will have a different approach regarding such incidents? I do not know the answer to that question. I think the Commission gave Iran time and worked with Iran to find a solution to the heavy water issue. Getting rid of heavy water or removing it from the country is not an easy task. As a result, this was a concern, but a solution was found. I do not think meticulous implementation means that we should not be looking for solutions. Clearly, there was a problem, and it needed time to resolve, and it was resolved. If this issue had not been resolved for compliance with the agreement's commitments, then action would have had to be taken. Another issue is Iran's missile program. In recent weeks since the new U.S. government took office, Iran conducted missile tests, and the U.S. warned Tehran, and then several individuals and companies were added to the U.S. sanctions lists. Throughout the period from July 2015 until today, when the agreement was reached and implemented, it has been prominent why there was no negotiation with Iran on the missile issue and why it was not included in the agreement, and only mentioned in UN Security Council Resolution 2231. What is your response? As you mentioned, the missile issue has been included in previous UN Security Council resolutions, and that is why we thought this is an area that should be addressed going forward. A country's missile program can be part of its conventional military development program, but we do not want these missiles to have the capability to carry nuclear weapons. The nuclear agreement (JCPOA) focused on closing all pathways for producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons, not on the delivery mechanisms. This agreement addresses all those pathways, and as you know, the Security Council resolution imposes restrictions on missile and arms development for Iran, and it must be implemented carefully. Certainly, the U.S. also has bilateral tools for that, and having a Security Council resolution in this regard is an international mandate for these actions, which is very important. However, Resolution 2231 has changes in its wording regarding missile restrictions and instead of prohibiting Iran, it has asked it to halt its activities for eight years. This has become a means for the Iranian side to interpret that there is no prohibition. Well, the truth is they are not reading this resolution correctly. It is true that some words have created space, but it is clear that there is a prohibition for the technology that would allow Iran to have missiles capable of carrying weapons. And there are necessary measures to ensure compliance with this issue. Ms. Sherman, my other question is about sanctions. When the negotiations were ongoing and then you reached an agreement, did you think that a year and some later, Iran would be so dissatisfied with the pace of lifting sanctions and returning to the global economy? You see, Iran has benefited from this agreement, but at that time, I also told my Iranian counterparts that nuclear sanctions are not the only sanctions that made trade with Iran impossible. Iran does not comply with many international norms regarding trade, including money laundering. You see, Iran has benefited from this agreement, but at that time, I also told my Iranian counterparts that nuclear sanctions are not the only sanctions that made trade with Iran impossible. Iran does not comply with many international norms regarding trade, including money laundering. This country also lacks a banking system that facilitates trade, and they do not have transparent trading methods. Iran has no good track record in global lists regarding ease of trade. I am active in this area, and before I became Deputy Secretary of State, I worked in commerce and I know that investors look at risk tolerance. Lifting sanctions removed a significant risk, but due to how banks operate, transparency, and the fact that Iran is the world's largest state sponsor of terrorism, there are still other risks. As a result, I told my counterparts that lifting nuclear sanctions solves one problem, but many other problems remain. Nevertheless, Iran has made progress in this area, but the pace has not been as fast as Iran wanted. In these months, we have seen Iran taking actions, for example, in money laundering and cooperating with FATF (Financial Action Task Force), did your Iranian counterpart react to this in your opinion? Well, I cannot refer to the details of my Iranian counterpart's discussions, and I can only recount my own remarks. But I think they are aware of this issue, and that is why Iran is trying to act in line with the prevailing principled approaches in trade. Of course, I must also emphasize that Iran's regional behavior is also a matter that carries risk for investors. You mentioned the region. One of the issues that critics of the agreement raise is that because America's regional allies were not present in the nuclear negotiations, Washington's relationship with them was affected by this issue, and now the new government must work harder to mend past rifts. What is your view on this? Well, you see, that it is very difficult for an agreement to encompass all the concerns of all parties. We consulted very closely with our partners and allies in the region, before and after each round of negotiations, and frankly, we consulted very closely with some of them. As a result, they were fully aware of the process. To be honest, at the outset, they did not want any regional issues to enter the negotiations because in that case, they wanted to be part of the negotiations, and they did not want the P5+1 and the European Union to make decisions about a region in which they were not present in the negotiations. From the very beginning, we told Iran that other sanctions (non-nuclear) would remain in place and would be enforced carefully. Many issues remain unresolved, and we committed to our allies that we must have a common strategy to confront Iran's actions in the region. President Obama brought all the countries in the region together to act on this issue; Secretary of State Kerry was heavily involved in this matter, and my expectation is that the current administration will continue this effort in the same way. At that time, I told these countries two things, and they understood that if Iran had nuclear weapons, their ability to exert power in the region and prevent our and our allies' actions in the region would be very serious. The second point is that we told Iran from the very beginning that other sanctions (non-nuclear) would remain in place and would be enforced carefully. Many issues remain unresolved, and we committed to our allies that we must have a common strategy to confront Iran's actions in the region. President Obama brought all the countries in the region together to act on this issue; Secretary of State Kerry was heavily involved in this matter, and my expectation is that the current administration will continue this effort in the same way. Another issue that is often discussed is the matter of Iranian-American citizens imprisoned in Iran. Four of these individuals were released on the day the agreement was implemented, which has been criticized by some because they say it was a kind of extortion by Iran. Of course, the U.S. State Department at the time stated that these two issues were not related. Why was there this timing, and considering past experiences, what do you think the U.S. government can do today for these dual-national prisoners? I was no longer Deputy Secretary of State on the day the JCPOA was implemented. But I want to take this opportunity to pay tribute to the U.S. team and all our allies in the P5+1 and the European Union who facilitated the implementation of the agreement. All of this happened at a time when some American citizens were also released from Iranian prisons; individuals who should not have been imprisoned from the very beginning. And all of this made the implementation day an exceptional day. We still have Americans in Iranian prisons, and of course, the biggest concern is the status of Robert Levinson; an American citizen who disappeared in Iran years ago, and his family suffers every day. One of my great regrets is that we did not succeed in finding him and bringing him home. At the same time, as the U.S. negotiator, I did two things. One was to negotiate the agreement to ensure that Iran does not have nuclear weapons, and at the same time, to have a parallel bilateral dialogue with Iran about the American prisoners in Iran, and at a point when we concluded that there was a willingness to resolve this issue, we asked Brett McGurk in the U.S. government to form an interagency group to meet with a similar Iranian group made up of members from various institutions to reach a solution that would allow us to free some Americans. This has been and remains very difficult. President Obama and John Kerry appointed Jim O'Brien as a special representative for such negotiations, and he worked around the world until the last day of the Obama administration to free all detained or imprisoned Americans or those who had been abducted. We hope that the Trump administration will continue this approach so that everyone can return home and also understand where Robert Levinson is so that we can bring him home. So you believe that the approach taken by the Obama administration should also be pursued by the current administration? Yes, I think it worked. This is a very complex, difficult, and sensitive task. We are committed to all American families that we will do everything we can to bring Americans home. Ms. Sherman, my other question is about the secretaries of state. You have interesting observations during an important time in the relations between the two secretaries of state from the U.S. and Iran. Do you think that in the new era, with the arrival of the new U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, the relationship and cooperation between the two foreign ministers of Iran and...