Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei commented on Ahmadinejad's criticisms of the judiciary, saying: "I remembered a story. A thug had fallen out of favor for a while and was suffering because no one paid attention to him. One day, he came to a relatively crowded square in the city and shouted and cursed like a frustrated person, asking why no one was acknowledging him, and some people stood by to see what he was saying. A wise man passed by, and his companions said we should stop to see what he says. The wise man said that this person is doing all this to be seen. Some people have become accustomed to lying. As the saying goes, their tongues have become loose, and they say whatever comes to their minds. Some individuals see themselves as much higher than everything and everyone and the law, and they have a selfishness and arrogance that makes them think whatever comes to their mind is absolute truth." (Tasnim, December 7, 2017) It is unprecedented for a member of the Islamic Republic to call another a thug, but it is not unprecedented for one to place themselves in the position of 'the wise man.' The unprecedented nature of officials discussing the phenomenon of thug behavior in the political space does not stem from the absence of this phenomenon but from its denial and being swept under the rug. This issue is swept under the rug by officials and propaganda apparatuses because part of the opposition has introduced them as belonging to the thug class in their analytical literature, and there is much evidence and grounds for this description, from the social class from which most members of the Revolutionary Committees, the IRGC, and the Basij have come, to the historical reliance of clerics on the thug class to advance their agendas. Clerics have always welcomed the joining of thugs, vagrants, and local bullies to revolutionary institutions because 1) they see this as a method for their reconstruction and the Islamization of society, 2) these individuals, due to their specific background, are more obedient and do not resist in the face of inhumane and illegal orders, and 3) they have a high capacity for cruelty under specific conditions. Given that Ahmadinejad has not significantly changed ideologically or behaviorally over the past three decades, from when he participated in the judiciary to fabricate cases against the press to when he appointed Ejei as Minister of Intelligence, and until 2017 when he speaks against this judiciary, one can ask Mr. Ejei whether he has recently been honored with the title of thug or if he has always been such. Is this 'loose-tongued, greedy, self-important thug who loves attention' newly born or has it been this way since the 1980s? How far do other officials of the Islamic Republic stand from him? What has happened that in a time when the Mahdi was introducing him for the presidency in the dreams of the clerics or was seen as the miracle of the third millennium, he has now turned into a 'fallen thug'? Ejei describes Ahmadinejad's thug nature with five characteristics: 1) attention-seeking, 2) lying, 3) loose-tongued, 4) self-righteousness, and 5) seeing oneself above the law and as absolute. Given that there is no consensus on the definition of a thug, I will consider Ejei's criteria for thugs and pose the question of which of the officials of the Islamic Republic lack these characteristics, which possess all of them, and which possess them to a greater degree of perfection. In this case, the use of the term that Mr. Ejei employed should not cause distress among the officials of the Islamic Republic nor should they consider its application an insult. The Supreme Thug Given these five characteristics, Ali Khamenei should be called the Supreme or Greatest Thug, as he embodies all five characteristics to a greater degree. He must constantly be seen in the media: at the top of radio and television news and on the front page of newspapers. If a newspaper does not do this, pressure is applied to change its editor (like the Hamshahri newspaper in the early weeks of its launch). Khamenei is a champion of lying and deceit. I have presented dozens of instances of these lies in the radio program 'A Small Correction' broadcasted by Radio Farda. Khamenei's language is loose-tongued. He constantly curses, slaps, scolds, and threatens individuals and governments that he perceives as enemies. Which leader in the world seeks to annihilate a nation-state? Khamenei always positions himself in the place of the infallibles and absolute truth. There has not been a single instance where he has apologized to the Iranian people for a public decision or policy (he and Khomeini have, of course, apologized for not committing more crimes or for crowding or delaying the audience of speeches, which is not truly an apology but rather victimhood, exaggeration, and false humility). Not only does he, but his loyalists also consider him above the law, unaccountable, and unmonitored. Khamenei has not answered a journalist's question for 28 years. The absolute guardianship of the jurist has been understood in this way. Military-Security Thugs The social background, behavior, demeanor, and rhetoric of the commanders of the IRGC, the police force, and the security forces of the Islamic Republic all reflect the five characteristics that Ejei identifies as signs of thug behavior. There is hardly a day that they do not threaten the Iranian people, neighboring countries, and other nations like thugs in the alley. The latest was the threat from Salami regarding European countries with the increase in missile range. The IRGC commanders understand the concept of international waters regarding their military ships, but when they reach the Persian Gulf, they say that the ships of great powers must move away from there, and they constantly pursue this goal by harassing military and civilian ships. Inside the country, all Basij bases constantly harass Iranian citizens just like thugs in the alley. The taking of dual nationals as hostages has always been a policy of the Islamic Republic. Judicial Thugs The Deputy Chief of the Judiciary, who holds thug recognition sessions, is someone who threw a sugar bowl at individuals who disagreed with him in the Press Supervisory Board meetings and bit the head of the Director General of Domestic Press, Eisa Saharkhiz. Torture and abuse of prisoners by interrogators and prison officials is common in the judiciary. The texts of judicial rulings from judges like Mortezaei, Salavati, and Moghiseh clearly reflect the thug culture prevalent in the judiciary. The only thing that matters to these judges is the law. The judges and prosecutors of the Islamic Republic always speak to ordinary people in the language of force, not the language of logic. Police Thugs The police force trains its personnel not based on respect for citizens and their rights but based on bullying and displays of power. Few can be found in Iran who have not faced such behavior (sometimes for receiving bribes). I have briefly reported a few instances of the organized violence of the centralized police force of the Islamic Republic, which operates under the supervision of a non-elected official and based on Sharia and Islamist ideology, against ordinary individuals. It is impossible for anyone to step into a police station in Iran without facing a commanding tone. This has not even been heard from the most loyal supporters of the regime. Thugs, the Swiss Army Knife of the Regime Municipalities hire individuals known for their bullying and thug behavior to clear the streets. The use of thugs is an inseparable part of the organizational behavior of the institutions of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei considers these forces as revolutionary and loyal forces that have preserved the regime. These forces are used to suppress students, women, journalists, artists, and to cancel concerts. Wherever the official institutions are ineffective, thugs come into play. Marked thugs (with velvet hats and silk handkerchiefs) officially participate in political gatherings of Islamist parties and groups and in rallies after Friday prayers. Unmarked thugs are all members of official organizations of the Islamic Republic. Only those thugs who do not kneel before the clergy and the Revolutionary Guards are pursued, and they are paraded around neighborhoods with a pot around their necks. The predominant behavior of plainclothes forces in Iran is considered thug behavior as defined by Mohseni Ejei. The Thug-Breeding Government The security, military, judicial, and religious bureaucratic forces in the country have, due to behavioral similarities, rallied under the banner of Ahmadinejad and his allies and maintained him as the head of the executive branch for eight years. Khamenei saw himself closer to Ahmadinejad than to Rafsanjani, who also displayed a degree of thug behavior in his speeches and decisions in the 1980s and 1990s (such as appointing Fallahian as Minister of Intelligence and ordering the arrest of critics of his economic policies for 'losing face'). Today, just look at the phenomenon of the political activity of former officials: Khatami is banned from being pictured, banned from leaving the country, and banned from attending sessions, while Mousavi and Karroubi are under house arrest, and Ahmadinejad appears every day. How much presence does Khatami, a relatively polite man, have in the political space compared to Ahmadinejad, who, according to Ejei, is a loose-tongued thug?
The Government of 'Thugs'
Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei criticized Ahmadinejad, labeling him a 'thug' for his attention-seeking and deceptive behavior. The article discusses the prevalence of thug-like behavior among Iranian officials, suggesting that this culture is deeply embedded in the political and judicial systems of the Islamic Republic. The significance lies in the reflection of the current political climate and the challenges faced by the regime.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei criticizes Ahmadinejad, calling him a thug amidst political tensions in Iran.
- Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei announce Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The public confrontation between high-ranking officials indicates deep divisions within Iran's political landscape.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%