The Heavy Burden of the Past: From Vietnam to Iran

Barack Obama is the third U.S. president to visit Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War in 1975, doing so in the last week of May. Before him, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush laid the groundwork for reconciliation between the two former enemies. In contrast, what was highlighted during Obama's visit as a significant innovation was his decision to end the ban on the sale of American weapons to Vietnam. It can be said that with this historic decision, the two countries discarded the last remnants of resentments from a great tragedy after forty-one years and advanced towards normalizing relations. Only those familiar with the bloody events of Vietnam in the 1960s and early 1970s can grasp the significance of this historic decision by Washington. Will American weapons, which were aimed at the deadly communist Vietnamese in the past, now be freely available to the long-time adversary in the context of normal international trade? In fact, over the forty-one years since the Vietnam War, the essence of political power has not changed in either Vietnam or the United States. The Vietnamese system relies on a Marxist-Leninist single party, while the United States remains the main bastion of political and economic liberalism in the world. What has completely transformed is the public atmosphere of international relations in which these two former enemies live. Washington and Hanoi have aligned themselves with the changes in the world based on common sense. They decided to look to the future without forgetting the past. The past of U.S.-Vietnam relations is not something to be forgotten. Over a twenty-year period, the communist regime of North Vietnam and the United States clashed in one of the most disastrous conflicts in contemporary history. The communists of North Vietnam, led by Ho Chi Minh, launched a widespread war against the regime in the south of the country with the aim of uniting Vietnam under the banner of Marxism-Leninism. The Americans, inspired by the experience of Korea, supported their local allies under the slogan of defending the south and preventing the advance of communism. The outcome of this conflict was a vast cemetery. Over one million communist soldiers and the same number of Vietnamese civilians were killed. The Americans suffered over 58,000 deaths and 305,000 injuries. The U.S. Air Force dropped more than seven million tons of bombs in Vietnam. Beyond the human toll, the psychological, natural, and material damages of this war were astronomical. Even after the military defeat of the U.S. and its final withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, the tragedy continued. Tens of thousands of affiliates of the previous regime were executed by the communists, one million of those affiliates were sent to forced labor camps, and one and a half million Vietnamese chose exile. By the end of this tragic period, Vietnam was among the poorest countries in the world, primarily relying on aid from Russia and China or international organizations to stay afloat. However, within less than a decade, this Southeast Asian country decided to move towards a free economy, inspired by China's experience, and aimed at attracting foreign investments and exporting goods to global markets. In 1995, Vietnam joined the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In 1999, signing a trade agreement with the U.S. created the groundwork for a real leap for the country. In 2007, Vietnam became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO). In 2015, Vietnam was one of the twelve countries that joined the Trans-Pacific Partnership, an agreement initiated by Washington, although it has yet to be ratified by the U.S. Congress. It should also be added that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese immigrants in the U.S., Europe, Australia, and Canada have become a strong bridge between their home country and their host countries under the umbrella of Vietnam's reconciliation with the West. In fact, the Vietnamese chose to prioritize the future over lamenting the events of forty or fifty years ago and organized their relations with their old enemy based on this option. Furthermore, Vietnam is deeply concerned about China's rise and its desire to exert dominance over other Asian countries, and based on this calculation, it has determined that the U.S. presence in the Pacific region must be strengthened. According to polls published in Western media in the last week of May, seventy-eight percent of Vietnamese have a favorable view of the U.S., and this ratio is significantly higher among those under twenty-nine. In comparison to what transpired in U.S.-Vietnam relations about half a century ago, what weight do the problems and confrontations in U.S.-Iran relations hold? Sixty-three years have passed since the events of August 19, and the Islamic Republic is not far from its fortieth anniversary. Why does the burden of the past in Tehran-Washington relations appear so heavy? Why should Iran sacrifice its strategic security and economic interests at the altar of resentment towards the U.S.? The big issue is that in the Islamic Republic, for a significant portion of its leaders, the concept of 'national interests' and its priority remains unknown. If this concept had found its place in Iran, the country would never have fallen into the terrifying quagmire of foreign sanctions. No one can claim that the leaders of Hanoi sold their souls to the U.S. or became infatuated with Washington over the years. Any first-year international relations student knows that a country, if it has rational leaders, does not base its relations with other countries on 'permanent love' or 'permanent hatred.' What should have a permanent aspect in relations between countries is national interests. It is said that since the Islamic Republic was founded on the basis of struggle and confrontation with the U.S., any conciliatory policy in relations between Tehran and Washington could lead to a fracture in its foundations. This statement seems very plausible. Nevertheless, one can ask why the communist regime of Vietnam was also formed in the struggle against France and then the U.S. So why did the Vietnamese not remain stuck in this 'initial dogma' and manage to reach an understanding with the West, especially the U.S., and even, in a way, come under the umbrella of U.S. support to counter the threat of Chinese hegemony? Why has the Tehran regime not been able to achieve this level of pragmatism? The big issue is that in the Islamic Republic, for a significant portion of its leaders, the concept of 'national interests' and its priority remains unknown. If this concept had found its place in Iran, the country would never have fallen into the terrifying quagmire of foreign sanctions. Today, following the signing of the JCPOA, sanctions related to the nuclear issue are gradually being lifted, and Iran's oil production and exports are approaching pre-sanction levels. However, economic actors both in Iran and internationally increasingly recognize the depth and significance of non-nuclear sanctions, especially those imposed by the U.S. regarding issues such as terrorism and human rights against Iran. Within a series of very complex legal texts, the tangled web of non-nuclear sanctions against Iran, particularly from the U.S., effectively prevents the resolution of the nuclear issue and the signing of the JCPOA from achieving the positive results that were expected. Today, Iranian economic circles bitterly realize that as long as the anti-American orientation remains the primary focus of Iran's foreign policy, there will be no favorable and noticeable change in Iran's relations with the international economic community. When Iranians face this deadlock, they remember the experience of Vietnam, which, despite the 'heavy burden of the past,' prioritized the future.