The Illusion of 'Change and Reform' Has Come to Regret

Five major developments have led to the 'I Regret' campaign on social media, reflecting complaints about the performance of Rouhani's government: 1) The formation of Rouhani's cabinet, where reformists had little presence, and figures like Jahangiri have been sidelined; reformists are dissatisfied with the failures of the government being attributed to them; 2) The clear alignment of Rouhani's government with the repression and terror apparatus both domestically and abroad, especially against Trump's actions; Rouhani's government has never distanced itself from the repression and terror apparatus but remained silent on this matter; Trump's actions have broken this silence; 3) The government's inability to change the social, cultural, and political atmosphere contrary to its promises; no events have occurred in the house arrest situation, no openings for cultural and artistic figures, and military pressures on the people have not decreased (the IRGC patrols have expanded into neighborhoods and alleys); the issue of women's presence in stadiums is currently closed; 4) The removal of subsidies for about 34 million people, the tripling to sextupling of exit fees from the country, and the wave of inflation promised by the 97 budget; and 5) The bankruptcy of credit institutions closely tied to religious and military bureaucracy, which today cannot pay depositors' funds. For those who knew both Rouhani and his security colleagues (half of the cabinet), were aware of the country's trends, and have followed the behaviors of the Islamic Republic over the past four decades, the 'I Regret' campaign seems more like a tasteless joke, as nothing new has occurred in the country in the months following the renewed allegiance to Rouhani to cause this wave of regret. None of the five issues are new or surprising: 1) Rouhani's government was only supposed to play a political brokerage role for the nuclear agreement, and reformists clung to it to prove their loyalty. Rouhani also did not give significant weight to reformists in his first cabinet; 2) A government that does not align with Khamenei's repression and terror apparatus cannot come to power, and if it does, it will face crises and permanent shrouded protests to the extent that it distances itself from the repression and terror apparatus; 3) Changing the cultural, social, and political atmosphere was never a priority for Rouhani's government; if it had been, it would have shown itself in the first four years; 4) Periodic inflation is a result of economic policies and the expansionist tendencies of the Islamic Republic that have continued since February 11, 1979. However, in terms of timing, it usually occurs after elections; and 5) Credit institutions were already in a precarious situation before the 96 elections, and their bankruptcy was a topic in society. (Fararu, June 13, 2017) The result of the 96 elections was intended to disappoint everyone from the beginning of the campaigns, and today the despair of a group of voters for Rouhani has been achieved. The evaporation of an illusion The officials of the Islamic Republic have always been clear in expressing their intentions, and it is part of the audience that wants to hear or understand them differently at times. The officials of the Islamic Republic want to drag the world under the boots of the IRGC and the cloaks of the clergy, and they have referred to this goal with titles such as the global Islamic government, the leader of the Muslims of the world, global management, and the export of revolution. The Islamic Republic has never archived this goal at any point, and even during the years of war when Saddam's missiles were reaching Tehran, it shouted this (the path to Jerusalem passes through Karbala). In social, political, and cultural areas, the government has not taken a single step back, and the project of Islamic totalitarianism continues with full force. Only after forty years are religious minorities officially banned from membership in councils (the Guardian Council rejected the parliament's resolution contrary to this), ten times the radioactive materials are found in the body of a former president who distanced himself from the leader, televised confessions and hostage-taking of citizens from other countries continue, and the representative of the leader of the Islamic Republic officially sends a message to the Houthis to attack oil tankers after launching missiles toward Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. These behaviors have continued for forty years, and there has never been even a pause in the arson abroad and the repression and violation of rights at home. Those who invited people to participate in the elections and normalized the Islamic Republic know all these matters and apparently have no problem with the foundations of the regime. Rouhani's Reaction Hassan Rouhani and his government faced severe criticism a few months after the elections from some of his supporters and former opponents (to the extent of the slogan 'Death to Rouhani' in the streets of Tehran), but these oppositions will be fruitless because this government has turned to fully playing in the orchestra of military and security organizations (see Zarif's laudatory remarks about Qassem Soleimani or Zarif and Rouhani's anti-American and anti-Israeli remarks that were not made during the JCPOA negotiations) and relies on them. Rouhani's rare remarks about citizens' rights in the first meeting on this topic are merely to appease reformists for their continued painful and involuntary support of his government. Of course, in creating and expanding the wave of 'I regret,' the government's propaganda apparatus, especially state radio and television, plays a significant role because the office and the IRGC want to keep Rouhani's government under their control until the end of its term. This government in the remaining three years must be a weak government without a specific operational plan to yield more to their demands. Such an event has occurred and will continue. Voters for Rouhani—those who have regretted so far or will regret in the future—did not realize that Rouhani's government has no determination for change. Rouhani, after unprecedented allocations of public budgets to religious bureaucracy (which is only part of these institutions' budgets), asks the people to oversee the budget (how, when the parliament and government are merely the signing machine for these budgets, and these institutions do not even provide a single sheet of paper on how to spend them); he complains that 'based on table 17 of the budget, agencies took money from us, and when we asked where this money is spent, they said it is none of your business' (ISNA, December 19, 2017), but this allocation of budgets continues; he promises transparency while all three financial and economic empires in the Islamic Republic (state companies, institutions under the leadership's supervision, and the IRGC) operate completely in the dark, and no one except the country's high officials knows the amount and type of their income and expenditure and operations. Rouhani introduces free access to information as one of the citizens' rights while the exact figures for unemployment, inflation, poverty, and statistics on prisoners, crimes, and corruption in the country are still unclear to experts, and both opponents and supporters of the Islamic Republic doubt the presented statistics. Rouhani's government’s Ministry of Science stars students, and Rouhani opposes it; this government's Ministry of Communications is involved in all surveillance and spying activities, but Rouhani tells government agencies, 'You do not have the right to spy on people's private matters' (same source); more than six million websites are filtered in Iran, but Rouhani says, 'The Minister of Communications promises not to press the filter button on cyberspace' (same source); many schools in major cities are closed due to air pollution, and on those same days, the head of the government says: 'A healthy environment is one of the citizens' rights.' (same source) Reforming matters in this regime is impossible because from the perspective of the clergy and the IRGC, its survival is at stake; the Islamic Republic has disillusioned all those who have tried for four decades to make the slightest reform in the situation. The Escape Tactic Rouhani's remarks will not stop the wave against him initiated by various factions, and the leader of the Islamic Republic does not seem dissatisfied with it (otherwise, he would have voiced it like other cases). Rouhani's non-governmental supporters do not realize that he, like Rafsanjani, Khatami, and Ahmadinejad, is a disposable handkerchief that the clergy and military take out of the packaging and immediately throw into the trash after use. Rouhani, to evade responsibility and counter the wave of regrets, passes the ball to those who voted for him: 'If citizens' rights are not properly implemented, young people should protest... Rouhani needs your vote, opinion, support, and criticism at all hours of the twelfth government. You should be the questioners, and it is our duty to respond... People must oversee our work.' (same source) He knows better than anyone that public oversight in a country where freedom of expression, media, gatherings, and organizations do not exist is impossible. A government that does not provide information to individuals and imprisons informants naturally leaves no room for oversight. Iranian youth have protested many times and have seen the very high costs of protesting. Living in distorted value spaces This way of acting reflects the reality in the Islamic Republic that the boundary between truth and falsehood, reality and myth, efficiency and failure, and trustworthiness and betrayal has been erased in Iran. In this atmosphere, all values and norms have been bent and distorted in favor of power and political propaganda, and everything can be played with, and every standard can be bent and broken. Officials live in worlds beyond our four-dimensional world (three dimensions of space and one dimension of time) and constantly move back and forth between their tangible world and their illusory world. Because they succeeded in 1979 in changing or disrupting the real world of the people with their imaginary world, they believe they have this magical power forever and can use it wherever they want. They try to make their worlds seem real to others by relying on power and wealth. During the elections, those who had different expectations from what is currently happening were under the influence of the opium of these political magicians. This melancholic condition is also prevalent in parts of society to the extent that the head of the football federation and the head of a city's stadium (Sirjan) try to break the spell of the opposing team by pouring urine into their goal (Khabar Online, December 17, 2017); Islamist websites constantly report on the healing of patients at the tombs of imams and their descendants; the head of the country's environmental protection organization, like a fortune teller, asks people to pray for the wind to come so that pollution decreases (ISNA, December 19, 2017); the leader of the Islamic Republic and his supporters (the latest being Mostafa Kavehbi from the reformist group) promise the prophetic and predictive destruction of Israel in the next 25 years (interestingly, this 25 years does not decrease over time); and despite corruption, waste, and rising crime, officials continually promise a utopian society. The high capacity for disillusioning the regime Of course, in creating and expanding the wave of 'I regret,' the government's propaganda apparatus, especially state radio and television, plays a significant role because the office and the IRGC want to keep Rouhani's government under their control until the end of its term. This government in the remaining three years must be a weak government without a specific operational plan to yield more to their demands. Such an event has occurred and will continue. Voters for Rouhani—those who have regretted so far or will regret in the future—did not realize that Rouhani's government has no determination for change (even if all voters remain active and present after the election day) because if it had, it should have shown a face of it from 2013 to 2017; of course, there are also those who are not regretful, meaning those who did not expect any change or reform from the beginning. Reforming matters in this regime is impossible because from the perspective of the clergy and the IRGC, its survival is at stake; the Islamic Republic has disillusioned all those who have tried for four decades to make the slightest reform in the situation.