The Illusion of Minimal Achievements in Political Participation: The Case of the Tenth Islamic Republic Parliament

The faction known as reformists within the country—who have nearly lost all traces of reformism—along with their allies believe that political participation during the elections has had and continues to have achievements. It seems that certain groups have an ideological commitment to see a reformist faction in the country, despite its non-existence. Is their claim regarding the achievements of participation based on any foundation? If the achievements are not significant, why do they continue to make such statements? In this article, I will pursue this claim concerning the Tenth Parliament. The Endless Game Reformists compare their political participation in a system of repression, fraud, and lies to the activities of small countries in the United Nations. This comparison is flawed as it defends minimal changes as the goal of political participation, since political work in the Islamic Republic is a game without an end. Constant Presence in the Scene Supporters of change in Iran vote for lists that contain serious opponents of transformation just to remain in the scene. Hassan Rasouli, a reformist activist, justifies including non-reformist individuals in the reformist list for the parliamentary elections by saying: "The inclusion of Dr. Larijani and even Mr. Jalali and Mr. Ni'mati does not mean that we expect them to become members of the Hope faction; we had no hope for any of them. The charter that has been signed is given to those candidates who fit into one of these two categories based on their backgrounds and political approaches, meaning they were either reformist forces or supporters of the government. We absolutely did not give a charter to those principlists we supported... This policy had supporters and opponents at its time. The reason for this was that the strategy of reformists was to exit the inactivity repeated in the eighth and ninth parliaments." (Shargh, August 1, 2016) Who said political activists must constantly be present and their electoral lists must be complete and comprehensive? What happens if reformists remain silent for periods or provide lists according to their capabilities? It is not necessary to label this silence and withdrawal as a boycott, although a boycott is also one of the methods of fighting against dictatorial and totalitarian governments. Some Iranian reformists apparently believe that if they remain silent for a period, they will be forgotten, and to avoid being forgotten, they resort to any means. Victory or Increased Share of Reformists? They send a group to the parliament and government that are not fundamentally reformist and then introduce themselves as victorious by labeling them as reformists. They claimed to have gained a majority in parliament, but in the vote for the presidency of the parliament, their candidate received only 103 votes. Of the 13 committees of the Tenth Islamic Republic Parliament, only the presidency of two committees was assigned to them. Those claiming reformism increased from about 30 to 40 members in the ninth parliament to about 100 in the tenth, at the cost of voting in elections that the government considers an allegiance to the system. In terms of parliament members, many were family members of officials, such as the daughter of Safdar Hosseini (who spoke in support of her father in parliament) or the brother of one of Rouhani's team members, rather than those who have a specific reform agenda. In the formation of the board of directors for the second year of the Tenth Islamic Republic Parliament, members of the independents faction, who were on the Hope list and came to parliament, tried to remove Pezeshkian and Motahari from the board. Reformists call these members oath-breakers, while they had made no oath with the reformists, and the reformists had only included them in their list to declare victory and to lessen the loss of their candidate. Ultimately, they voted in a way that changed the board of the Tenth Islamic Republic Parliament from 7 members of the Velayati faction and 5 members of the Hope faction in the first year to 9 members of the Velayati faction and 3 members of the Hope faction in the second year. This does not indicate the advancement of groups waving the (unreal) reformist flag in the political space of the country. Those who claimed a parliament with a reformist majority must now answer how this parliament easily voted for candidates for membership as jurists in the Guardian Council, all of whom are followers of Ahmad Jannati. These members voted 206 for Abbasali Kadkhodai, 187 for Mohammadreza Alizadeh, and 142 for Fazlollah Mousavi for membership in the Guardian Council. (Fars, July 13, 2016) Kadkhodai's 206 votes mean that many members of the Hope faction also voted for him, while he has been completely following Jannati's policies in the Guardian Council. Kadkhodai had even failed to secure the necessary votes for entry into the Guardian Council in the previous parliament when fewer claimed to be reformists were present. In the election of the president and prosecutor of the Court of Audit, reformist groups also showed no presence. The claim of reformism by about one-third of the members of the Tenth Parliament does not correspond to their performance results. The Tenth Parliament, during its two-year activity, did not pass a single reformist proposal. The reformist movement in Iran has become a channel for placing certain individuals in government and legislative positions without any reformist action. During the vote of confidence for Rouhani's ministers in 2017, 142 members of parliament registered as supporters to defend the programs of the proposed minister of energy, who was approved by Mohammad Khatami, but he received only 133 votes in the voting. This means that some supporters who wanted to speak in support of him did not even vote for him. The members of the Tenth Parliament have not been proponents of a reformist perspective in this case or in any other case. Zibakalam, a supporter of the reformist movement, says: "The performance of the Hope faction can be considered disappointing in many respects. However, it should be examined whether this disappointing performance of the faction relates to the members elected to parliament from the Hope list or to the leadership of the Hope faction, namely Dr. Aref, or on a larger scale, the leadership of reformism and reformists... One cannot ignore the fact that in this parliament, with a large presence of reformists who represent the nation, a reformist minister did not receive votes while principlist ministers did." (Tabnak, August 20, 2017) The group sent to parliament under the banner of reformism is mostly a group of political brokers who are entirely pursuing their personal interests and operate within the corrupt frameworks of the system. Saeed Hajarian, regarding the performance of the Hope faction and the uniform vote for most principlist ministers, says: "I did not follow it much, but promises must have been made to the representatives. The reality is that everyone has come to an agreement; the parliament with the government, the factions with the ministers, the speaker of parliament with the president, all have come to an agreement." (Tabnak, August 21, 2017) Why is there a need to invite individuals to participate in engineered elections for the accommodation of forces within the ruling caste? The Tenth Parliament, during its two-year activity, did not pass a single reformist proposal. The reformist movement in Iran has become a channel for placing certain individuals in government and legislative positions without any reformist action. Playing Multiple Conflicting Roles Religious reformists, when it comes to benefiting from their religious identity, become more sympathetic to Khamenei and the commanders of the IRGC and Shia authorities for a religious government, speaking as if the Islamic Republic were their child that Khamenei and his close ones later usurped (in this regard, they think somewhat correctly). However, they become the opposition to the regime in front of Westerners to benefit from the rewards and resources available to strengthen their economic conditions in these countries and to have a greater presence in Persian-language media funded by Western governments. At this point, they forget that for three decades, interviews with Western media were considered forbidden, and anyone who did so was driven out of their media in the country. However, religious reformists have also found another place to acquire resources, which is the regional rivals of the Islamic Republic. The Turkish lobby has previously been occupied by the corrupt managers and close associates of Ahmadinejad's government. When it comes to Israel, they express more enmity towards this country than Khamenei does, but when it comes to Saudi Arabia, Saudi Arabia becomes a regional power that must be worked with and enmities must be reduced. When it comes to populist propaganda, they fuel nationalist propaganda to avoid upsetting the IRGC commanders in their foreign interventions. Religious reformists have remained silent regarding the Islamic Republic's military intervention in Syria, which has resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Iranians and hundreds of Afghans and Pakistanis and costs Iran about 4 to 7 billion dollars annually (except for Karrubashti). Participation in Elections, Proving Madness Einstein defined insanity as doing the same thing repeatedly and expecting different results. The story of the participation of some people in Iran who are not part of the ruling caste and hope for reform of the government in the regime's elections indicates their insanity, as they have repeated the same action multiple times and hope to achieve a different result (i.e., reform of the regime) once. However, reformists who invite people to participate in elections and motivate them with illusions are not insane, as they receive rewards from the government and special privileges or previous benefits every time they do so. Lack of Transparency Reformists have never addressed the transparency of the political space and the abuse of power. Their information about the opposing faction is always kept confidential for political dealings and competitions so as not to be accused of disloyalty by the office and the IRGC. If they do provide any information, it is not about the leader's and office's corruptions but about the opposing faction, and even then, it is late. Karrubashti, after 11 years since the 2005 elections, has just remembered to ask, "Mr. Ahmadinejad should explain why he spent 160 million tomans from the municipal budget on the night of their victory in the presidential elections and distributed sweets to the people." (Telegram channel of the Hope Friends, August 1, 2016)