The Impact of Nuclear Negotiations on Iran's Political Sphere

Tuesday, July 7, passed, and contrary to the predictions of many political observers, Iran and the 1+5 countries did not reach a comprehensive nuclear agreement in Vienna even by Saturday. Although U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated after the deadline that negotiations would not continue indefinitely, White House spokesman Josh Earnest reiterated in a press conference that the two sides had never been this close to an agreement. He quoted President Barack Obama as saying that as long as the U.S. negotiating team believes the talks are useful, they should continue. On Saturday, the U.S. Secretary of State announced on Twitter that he had met with his Iranian counterpart Mohammad Javad Zarif and Federica Mogherini, the EU's foreign policy chief, and that, according to him, there are still difficult issues that need to be resolved. In Tehran, the Shargh newspaper quoted Mohammad Javad Zarif as saying he hopes the negotiations will conclude by Monday. When asked what the most important remaining issues for negotiation are, he stated that reaching an agreement on significant topics is crucial. Such official positions from both sides have led most political observers to remain optimistic about the nearing end of negotiations and the possibility of Iran and the 1+5 countries reaching a comprehensive nuclear agreement. Consequently, since last week, other questions have arisen in Iranian political circles. One set of these questions pertains to the impact of the nuclear negotiations on the alignment of political factions within the Islamic Republic of Iran and the potential effects of the outcome of these negotiations on the arrangement of various factions of principlists, the relationship between moderates and reformists, and the improvement or regression of the position of independent political activists alongside civil and syndical organizations. These questions are addressed by three guests on this week's program: Ghasem Shole Saadi, a former member of the Iranian Parliament and expelled professor from the Faculty of Law and Political Science at Tehran University; Majid Tafreshi, a historian and international relations researcher in London; and Bijan Hakmat, a Republican political activist in Paris. Three similar questions are posed in three stages to the three guests this week. The first question is: What impact have the nuclear negotiations had and will they have on the functioning and agenda of the principlists? Will they cause a greater distance between the faction close to the Stability Front and the allies of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the faction known as the United Front from the other principlists identified with Ali Larijani, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, and Mohsen Rezaei, known as moderate or centrist principlists, or will they bring them closer together? Mr. Shole Saadi, you go first. Ghasem Shole Saadi: This type of analysis or question pertains to democratic governments where political groups, parties, and such organizations can influence decision-making, and as a result, one can measure these distances and proximities with a scale. In Iran, the power structure is different. The system is that of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist. The government does not even claim to be democratic. Therefore, the relationships that can be analyzed for democratic systems cannot be applied to Iran. In Iran, according to Article 110 of the Constitution, the macro policies of the country fall within the responsibility of the leader, and if the leader decides something, no one has the opportunity to influence that. In fact, when a crisis arises, everyone welcomes the opportunity to pass the ball to the leader so that he can make the decision. Especially in the cases you mentioned, the characteristic of all these is that they claim to be followers of the leader and adhere to his line. Part of this is naturally tied to military circles, the IRGC, etc., and all of them are ultimately subject to the opinion of Mr. Khamenei. Thus, you see that even someone who previously said during Ahmadinejad's time that they want to take the wheel from us and give us candy (Mr. Ali Larijani said this), is now a supporter of these negotiations. Even though you see that the concessions that are supposed to be given to the Iranian side are far less than what was possible in the previous period, we still see such a shift. Mr. Shole Saadi, one observation. However, there are those who are worried about these negotiations. In contrast to Mr. Larijani, who now feels more at ease. Ghasem Shole Saadi: Those who are worried must ultimately refer to Mr. Khamenei. For example, when Mr. Khamenei (as the person responsible for this matter according to Article 110 of the Constitution) announces that we want to make a heroic flexibility, I believe that the worries have no place to play a role. The problem here is that the negotiations are not held between two equal forces. Sanctions have had an effect. We even saw that yesterday the Friday prayers leader of Tehran said that, for example, half of the country's problems are related to these sanctions. If these problems did not exist, perhaps Mr. Khamenei would not have been willing to resort to heroic flexibility. Therefore, the reference point for those who are worried and the principlists ultimately leads to Mr. Khamenei himself. When Mr. Khamenei says let’s negotiate, let’s make a heroic flexibility, or let’s give concessions... even those things he has requested, like the number of centrifuges. Very well. Now let’s see what Mr. Tafreshi thinks about this. Mr. Tafreshi, do the two tendencies of moderates and those who are worried become more distinct from each other, or does it remain at this level, and perhaps they come closer together? Majid Tafreshi: I would like to mention a few points in relation to Mr. Shole Saadi's remarks. It is true that the powers of the leader according to the Constitution and Article 110 are legally defined and have a wide and deep scope. However, the issue is that these decisions are made in consultation with people like Qalibaf and Larijani. It is not done in a vacuum. In any case, there is an influence on the leader's opinions and decision-making. It is not the case that whatever he says is done without regard to the opinions of others. These opinions are influential in what is ultimately decided by Mr. Khamenei. The second problem that Mr. Shole Saadi pointed out is that the concessions Iran is receiving are less than what was available during Mr. Larijani's time. I do not agree with this at all. It is not correct at all. If attention is paid to the details of the negotiations, what Iran is receiving now is far greater. Regarding the three individuals you mentioned, Larijani, Qalibaf, and Rezaei, these are individuals whose intentions do not align. Larijani currently has a sort of half-hearted coalition with Mr. Rouhani, both during the cabinet formation and during the guidance of the parliament regarding nuclear issues; in any case, Mr. Larijani has cooperated. As you mentioned, he is among the moderate principlists who cooperate with the government. Mr. Qalibaf's entire intention and power is to reach political power and become president, by any means necessary. Of course, his military background allows him to continue. His connection with the IRGC allows him to continue. Now, returning to your point regarding those who are worried and those who are concerned about the nuclear negotiations, there are some realistic concerns within Iran. They are worried that Iran does not repeat Libya's experience. Meaning that just as inspections were allowed in Iraq and resulted in the Iraq war, the same does not happen to Iran. Or that Libya, which reconciled with the West, does not lead to a regime change project and serve as a prelude to a change of government. These concerns are legitimate. However, the majority of those who are worried are not like that. The majority are those who enter the matter with three different viewpoints, which, of course, agree with each other. The first group of those who are worried are ideological worriers. They believe that any kind of deal and agreement with the West, especially with the U.S. and the U.K., means the end of the revolution and the end of the teachings of the Islamic revolution and the struggle against imperialism and arrogance. They believe that this interaction with the West, especially if it leads to security and regional cooperation against ISIS and extremism and regional terrorism, signifies the end of the revolution, and this agreement and interaction should not be allowed under any circumstances. Another set of worries is political. These are people who believe that this is necessary and should happen, and they see no problem with the essence of the matter. Like Mr. Qalibaf and Mr. Rezaei and even Larijani. Deep down, they believe this is good, but Rouhani should not take this on. Just as it was during Mr. Khatami's time. In their view, Rouhani should fail in the negotiations and step aside so that they can come in and take the benefits and credit. Of course, more importantly than these, which previously were not significant, are the economic worriers. Those who are profiteers from sanctions and the normalization of relations between Iran and the world and the easing of people's hardships is against their economic interests. Those who have come to circumvent sanctions and violate sanctions and are now the landlords do not allow the natural path of Iran with the world to proceed. Therefore, a distinction will be seen among all these. Do you believe a prominent distinction will emerge? Majid Tafreshi: Yes, exactly. Mr. Hakmat, what is your opinion? Bijan Hakmat: I agree with most of what my friends have said. However, there is a plurality in Iranian society that, regardless of what its impact on major decisions may be, shows itself and manifests in a series of political actions. The success of these negotiations, if a success is achieved, could essentially be a step towards transforming a revolutionary government into a conventional government, albeit an authoritarian one. The beginning of this process, meaning the improvement of relations between Iran and the West, regardless of whether we cooperate on the ISIS issue or not and what policy we adopt in the Middle East, fundamentally questions the position of the Supreme Leader as the leader of an anti-imperialist revolution. Therefore, all the forces that have benefited from the deterioration of relations between Iran and the West and have accumulated wealth due to anti-imperialist slogans and have reached positions in this system, part of the IRGC and these worriers, will stand firmly against this process. Ayatollah Khamenei, who must maintain his position as the leader of the revolution, will have to prevent the progress and speed of this process. In my opinion, the moderates and reformists and the tendencies of Ali Larijani and Bahonar will accompany this process. Although these last ones will try to prevent the opening of the political space alongside the worriers. This, in my opinion, outlines the major lines that can be seen among these currents and tendencies as a result of the success of these negotiations. How this process unfolds in detail will depend on the policies of Rouhani's government after the expected success, which we hope will occur. These policies, if they are aimed at opening the political space, could pit the two fronts against each other. Let’s delve into this further in the second question. Mr. Shole Saadi, the nuclear negotiations up to this stage in the last two years have led many observers to believe that they have caused the moderates and reformists to unite. Will the end stage of the negotiations lead to the emergence of distinctions between these two tendencies over cultural, political, economic, and social issues, or will the principlists' alignment against these two tendencies still prevent the leaders of moderates and reformists from highlighting their distinctions? Ghasem Shole Saadi: First of all, let me make a small note that the most radical worrier, in my opinion, is Mr. Khamenei himself. He said in 2002 that anyone who talks about negotiating with the U.S. either has not learned the alphabet of honor or the alphabet of politics. But this very person, who has acted so radically, is now officially negotiating with the U.S. with their permission. In fact, I wrote a letter at that time and criticized this position. I was taken to prison and spent a year and a half in prison because I said this statement is problematic. You see, someone like Mr. Khamenei, who has been so radical, has now shown a tendency toward heroic flexibility, and his government is also acting on it. Therefore, these separations that you have in mind and the various factions you envision seem artificial to me. We did not have anyone more radical than Mr. Khamenei. Now the realities of society have been imposed on him, and he has to accept it. Whether this negotiation succeeds in bringing them closer or further apart, I believe it will overall bring them closer. We have had worse than this during the eight-year war. During the Sacred Defense, Mr. Khomeini suddenly said in 1988 that I drink the cup of poison and accept it. At that time, many were saying, now what will the brothers in the IRGC do, and the worriers will protest. We saw nothing happened. Nothing can happen. Because today, Iran's problems have been imposed on both the moderates and the radicals. If the government is considered a moderate government, it must ultimately fulfill its legal duties and meet the needs of society. When it has no money and these sanctions have broken its economy, it has no choice but to find a solution to get out of these sanctions. Likewise, Mr. Khamenei himself is ultimately the head of this country, whether he likes it or not. When he cannot fulfill his duties to the people, his position is also harmed. Therefore, I think if this agreement is reached, even though this agreement is not a win-win for Iran, Iran has to choose between bad and worse, not between good and bad. How will the situation of the reformists and moderates be? Do these two factions even exist? Will they come closer or further apart? This is my main question. Ghasem Shole Saadi: I believe they will come closer because the problems are widespread. They affect everyone.