The 'Infiltration Stream'; A New Pretext for Repression

Following the repeated use of the term 'infiltration' by Ayatollah Khamenei, and after the arrest of several journalists by the IRGC's intelligence organization, it appears that a broader project has been defined by the supreme leader and the aligned security-military apparatus around him, which has manifested in his recent statements: 'infiltration as a stream.' The head of the political system is trying to control the political-social situation, stating: 'More dangerous than case-by-case infiltration is stream infiltration. Stream infiltration means networking within the nation... The main tools are two things; one is money, and the other is sexual attraction. They attract individuals, gather them together; present a false and fabricated goal and draw effective individuals, those who can influence society, towards their desired direction. What is that desired direction? It involves changing beliefs, changing ideals, changing perspectives, changing lifestyles; making the person who has been infiltrated think the same way that the American thinks... to recognize things as that senior CIA officer recognizes them; consequently, wanting the same thing that he wants...' In a tangible way, and in the joint game of the leader of the Islamic Republic and the IRGC's intelligence organization, a new strategy for imposing further restrictions and repressing Iranian civil society has emerged, relying on the words 'infiltration' and 'infiltration stream.' What is the leader's fear? What is his goal? Ayatollah Khamenei is aware of his lack of legitimacy and democratic authority. He and his security-military companions are trying to prevent the political-social processes from deviating from the desired path of the core of power, especially in the political-social atmosphere after the 2013 presidential election and the rise of Rouhani's moderate government, and particularly in the new situation of the Islamic Republic following the JCPOA and the agreement with the West (specifically the United States) regarding nuclear energy. The supreme leader is fearful of the increasing relations and deepening ties between Tehran and Washington, and the social-political and cultural consequences of that. From this perspective, he states regarding the consequences of stream infiltration: 'What happens? Ideals will change, values will change, demands will change, beliefs will change.' This expression of fear regarding the widening gap between the nation and the government, especially considering the leader's awareness of the desire for change and the wave of latent dissatisfaction with the established situation, is significantly meaningful. The continued imprisonment of the leaders of the Green Movement serves as an important testament to this claim and assessment. On another level, the majority of society pursues its own desires and lifestyle distinct from the government's ideology; a situation that is not pleasing to the supreme leader and is explicitly reflected in his reference to the concept of 'lifestyle.' Online social networks and communication technology, which are expanding and influencing outside the will of the core of power, define and represent another aspect of the leader's fears. One facet of this concern is reflected in Ayatollah Khamenei's reference to the effect of 'sexual attractions' in 'stream infiltration' and the operation of social networks. This situation reveals a significant gap between the ideological desires of the central power and the social realities and aspirations of certain social layers. In another arena, the leader of the Islamic Republic is fearful of the revival of civil society, the increase of social networks, and the deepening of group ties and greater mobilization of political populations and civil centers (which had been inactive and unresponsive for several years after the 2009 electoral coup). The central power has learned enough from the Green Movement and is concerned about the formation of social movements. The birth of the National Unity Party, the establishment of protest gatherings by courageous activists and human rights supporters, the mobilization of women activists to change the male face of the parliament, the dynamism of the press and the more critical and explicit storytelling of journalists, the holding of speaking sessions with sidelined political activists, and other similar and aligned cases, along with the increase of online social networks and the influence of media, are all significant events and evidence that intensify the leader's security perspective. Moreover, the two important elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts have also created a new and intensified motivation for the central power, which has directed a new round of restrictions, threats, and repression towards civil society activists. The recent statements by the leader of the Islamic Republic will further encourage the Guardian Council's supervisory bodies, as well as the Ministry of Intelligence, the Revolutionary Court, and the judiciary to report negatively on non-aligned candidates. It is evident that the Guardian Council's supervisory blade will ultimately prevent the 'infiltration stream' from entering the list of candidates for the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Assembly of Experts. In his statements, Ayatollah Khamenei claims: 'Factions should not accuse each other; one says, 'Sir, you said your intention was this,' the other says, 'No, you said your intention was this.' Very well, whatever the intention was, the reality should not be forgotten; the enemy is designing for infiltration.' He superficially expresses a 'cross-factional' perspective aimed at securing the system's interests; however, it is clear how his arms and executors in the security and judicial apparatus, the Guardian Council, and the state media will behave and what path they will take and how they will understand the leader's 'intention.' In a very tangible way, after the JCPOA and in the new social-political conditions, the core of power is trying to restrain Rouhani's government in cultural and domestic policy areas and also prevent effective action by civil society activists and the formation of social movements. Authoritarianism has manifested this confrontation at various temporal cuts, in each period, in a different way. Now, with three months remaining until the two elections for the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, Ayatollah Khamenei and the aligned security-military stream are trying to impose a new round of restrictions to control political and social processes as much as possible. The likely outcome of the recent statements by the supreme leader will be a list that includes: restrictions and disruptions in holding meetings and electoral sessions of reformists, mass disqualification of non-affiliated candidates in the elections, threats against journalists and political activists and civil society activists, intensified censorship and restrictions in media spaces, pressure on citizens' lifestyles and their active presence in online social networks, and efforts to limit Rouhani's government in its interactions with the West (especially the United States). It is evident that this outcome is the desired situation of the core of power; however, the game is not entirely in their hands. Neither does Rouhani's government have full control over the package (as political and economic realities, especially in relation to the world, have their own requirements and consequences); nor is it feasible to completely block media and online social networks; nor will citizens (especially the majority who are critical and dissatisfied) easily abandon their pursuit of their lifestyle; and nor do the political-social evidence indicate passivity and avoidance of any action among Iranian activists. Thus, until further notice (the realization of a democratic and free situation), the leader of the Islamic Republic and the aligned security-military stream are inevitably ruling in fear and concern.