In a television program during Government Week, the Minister of Intelligence stated: "We kiss the lips of those who criticize." Mahmoud Alavi has made a significant claim. Although there has been a noticeable difference in the behavior of the Ministry of Intelligence between Rouhani's government and Ahmadinejad's, the gap between Alavi's new claim and the actions of the Minister of Intelligence and the electoral slogans of the President compared to the existing reality is considerable. Over the past three years, the summons and threats against political activists, civil society actors, labor activists, and journalists have continued noticeably, with the Ministry of Intelligence under the moderate government acting as a factor to restrict civil society (some evidence is provided in the footnote). In the political sphere, a wide range of activists and members of political groups have been summoned and threatened in the past three years: members of the Participation Front, the Organization of Iranian People's Mojahedin, the Freedom Movement of Iran, the Council of National-Religious Activists, the National Front of Iran, and the Iranian Writers' Association are among them. The Ministry of Intelligence emphasizes that these summons aim to prevent political activists and civil society actors from engaging in organizational and group activities, with the assumption behind all these summons being "the actions of political activists against the security of the system." In a significant example, Hossein Rafiei, a university professor and national-religious activist, has been repeatedly summoned by the Ministry of Intelligence under Rouhani's government and was ultimately arrested and sent to Evin Prison. In a letter to Rouhani in July 2014, Dr. Rafiei wrote: "In the ministry under your command, a sword is in the hands of a drunken man, and after 35 years, the Ministry of Intelligence has not been able to train a professional, expert, and religious operational team to inspect the homes of citizens." Three years after Rouhani's government took office, parties and "non-affiliated" activists remain deprived and banned from organizational activities. It is not only the IRGC's intelligence organization that acts as a harsh and repressive tool for achieving political closure. The Ministry of Intelligence under Rouhani has not only failed to assist civil society as expected by a significant portion of Rouhani's voters, but has also acted multiple times as a tool for the continuation of repression, control, and restriction of civil society. In June 2015, Ana, Rafiei's daughter, also wrote a letter to the President, referring to her and her father's vote for Rouhani in the 2013 elections: "For the past two years, my father has fully defended your government's nuclear negotiations. He has tried to advance this peaceful goal with scientific and analytical publications. However, your Ministry of Intelligence forces have not let him rest for a moment. They constantly threatened and restricted him. In July 2014, they violently raided our home as if they had identified a highly dangerous spy. They turned the whole house upside down... Tell me, where is my hope?" Summons to prevent 'falling into the enemy's trap.' In May 2015, the Minister of Intelligence announced: "Today, summons are conducted with complete respect in a suitable environment, and while explaining, the individual is asked not to fall into the enemy's trap." Regardless of how the Ministry of Intelligence agents interact with those summoned, and to what extent these summons entail threats and violence, and what the content of these sessions is; Alavi's statements are clearly contrary to the Criminal Procedure Code, as the Ministry of Intelligence does not have the legal authority to summon individuals. Current laws in the Islamic Republic consider the right to summon citizens solely within the jurisdiction of judges; however, the Ministry of Intelligence still claims the right to independent judicial action – and of course, to threaten and exert direct and indirect violence. Meanwhile, in Alavi's proposed programs for the Ministry of Intelligence, there was an emphasis on "returning the ministry to its inherent and legal duties, based on the principles of the Constitution and the law establishing the ministry." The gap between claim and reality. Although Alavi speaks of a 'kiss' on the 'lips of critics,' the gap between reality and the Minister of Intelligence's eloquent and delicate words is sufficiently tangible from the perspective of informed sources. This bitter reality – despite its difference from the situation before Rouhani's government took office – has been evident to many political and civil activists. In one instance, Abolfazl Ghadyani, a Green Movement activist, criticized the behavior of Rouhani's Ministry of Intelligence in July 2015, writing: "These days, the experts of Mr. Alavi's ministry have delved into the archives of files and resumed dealing with those political and civil activists whom the tenth coup government could not handle." Ghadyani criticized Rouhani for his 'breach of promise,' referring to the President's electoral promise to 'eliminate the security atmosphere from the country,' writing: "In his government of hope, even a change in perspective in the security domains under his command has not occurred, let alone a change in behavior." From slogans to action. In his proposed programs for the Ministry of Intelligence, Alavi spoke of "creating interaction with elites, academics, parties, mass media, and legal groups and avoiding creating a security atmosphere," as well as "supporting a space for criticism and observation of citizens' rights," and similar themes and topics. In an optimistic view, the Minister of Intelligence has still not been able to dominate senior managers and especially the expert and operational body of the ministry. The legacy of the government arising from Ahmadinejad's electoral coup is not only evident in the economic sphere. The Ministry of Intelligence also continues to carry the cadres and experts left over from eight years of disastrous government. Three years after Rouhani's government took office, parties and 'non-affiliated' activists remain deprived and banned from organizational activities. It is not only the IRGC's intelligence organization that acts as a harsh and repressive tool for achieving political closure. The Ministry of Intelligence under Rouhani has not only failed to assist civil society as expected by a significant portion of Rouhani's voters, but has also acted multiple times as a tool for the continuation of repression, control, and restriction of civil society. The 'kiss' for 'affiliated' individuals. It seems that the 'kiss' the Minister of Intelligence speaks of and sends to the 'lips' of critics is limited to 'critics and opponents associated with the government' and 'affiliated' individuals who stand on the side of conservatism and are opposed to the government. A recent response from the Ministry of Intelligence to Kayhan Shariati serves as new evidence. In a critique of a report published in Kayhan, the Ministry of Intelligence's public relations wrote in a soft, polite, and kind letter to the editor of Kayhan: "Given the commitment that your esteemed publication has defined for itself in following the leadership, the publication of such an article has caused surprise among the unknown soldiers of Imam Zaman and has led to serious complaints from the servants of the people in the security field. We hope you will take measures to rectify this unkind action and prevent its recurrence." Pressure groups and 'Hezbollah youth' supported by the regime's leadership can also be pointed out in this context. Those whose hands are free to attack concerts and speeches of reformists and embassies and other similar field and media actions, and the response from the Ministry of Intelligence is the same 'kiss' that Alavi mentions. For nearly four decades (since the establishment of the Islamic Republic), except for short periods, critics and opponents have not only not been treated with patience, tolerance, and wise engagement by the security and intelligence institutions of the government (including the Ministry of Intelligence), and have not seen a 'kiss,' but have continuously been exposed to threats, repression, and direct and indirect violence. There is no expectation from authoritarian regimes that see their non-democratic survival in suppressing critics, opponents, and dissenters.
The Information Minister's 'Kiss' on the Lips of Critics
Iran's Minister of Intelligence, Mahmoud Alavi, claimed in a recent television appearance that the ministry 'kisses the lips of critics,' contrasting sharply with ongoing repression and threats against political activists and civil society. Despite promises of reform, the ministry continues to act as a tool for suppression rather than support for civil society. This highlights the significant gap between governmental rhetoric and actual practices regarding dissent in Iran.
👥 Key Players
⚡ Actions
📰 What Happened
Iran's Intelligence Minister claims to embrace critics, contradicting ongoing repression of dissent.
- Mahmoud Alavi announce political activists, civil society actors
- Ministry of Intelligence summon political activists, labor activists, journalists
- Ministry of Intelligence arrest Hossein Rafiei
💡 Why It Matters
📚 Background
The gap between rhetoric and reality in Iran's treatment of dissent remains significant.
📝 Key Evidence
🏷️ Entities Mentioned
Translated from the original and edited for English readers. View original source →
Translation confidence: 85%