The relationship between the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Hassan Rouhani during his presidency has gone through various phases. While Rouhani has recently aligned more closely with the positions of the IRGC commanders in foreign policy, it seems that the expectations of the IRGC commanders exceed his current actions and stances. Recently, Aziz Jafari, the commander of the IRGC, expressed in a heartfelt letter: "The unprecedented and widespread support from the revolution's sympathizers in the past week should not prevent your revolutionary actions in controlling prices and preventing the skyrocketing increase in the value of currency and gold in the current economic war with enemies. Why do you not address the inadequacies and mismanagements in the economic sector of the government with the anger and fury we see in you during electoral competitions or with your opponents? Taking important decisions in today's difficult conditions to counter the economic pressures from enemies requires revolutionary determination and decisiveness in dealing with the inactivity and weaknesses of some managers so that the people can have hope in the management of your government."
These statements represent a clear intervention by a senior IRGC official in the executive branch, calling for the replacement of economic officials. While these remarks may be justified as aligning with the demands of the people and the necessity of replacing weak managers to control the escalating economic crisis, this position from a senior military official, given its sharp and sarcastic tone, implies intervention. It seems Jafari's reference is to Mohammad Baqer Nobakht and Rouhani's close circle, who are increasingly criticized for the country's economic collapse. Even some hardline conservatives view the current economic crisis as fabricated and analyze the moderate government's plan to impose a second nuclear deal (JCPOA 2) as a conspiracy, a perspective unlikely to be rooted in reality.
It appears that the IRGC is pursuing two simultaneous objectives with this action. On one hand, it aligns with the growing public opposition to the weak performance of the moderate government's economic team, and on the other hand, it increases pressure for the complete removal of Rouhani's government from transformative potentials and full convergence. Unconfirmed reports strengthen the hypothesis that the dominant power faction is seeking to replace part of the cabinet with aligned forces from the conservative spectrum.
Jafari explicitly states that the continuation of the IRGC's support for Rouhani's positions requires greater alignment with the expectations of the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist and the so-called loyalist forces. Therefore, the regime's tolerance threshold for accepting Rouhani's current management of executive affairs has noticeably decreased. A similar approach has emerged in society, and according to some polls, Rouhani has experienced the most significant drop in popularity among presidents and currently holds low acceptance. The very weak performance of Rouhani's ministers, particularly the erroneous decision to set the exchange rate by decree and the high level of corruption, has brought trust in the current cabinet composition to its lowest level. The parliament is also seeking to intensify pressure on the government for extensive changes, partly due to representatives feeling cornered in their constituencies. Among reformists, protests and criticisms of Rouhani's performance are increasingly heard, to the point that Ali Shakouri-Rad criticized Eshaq Jahangiri for not leaving Rouhani's second government. Thus, there is a strong demand for at least the replacement of economic ministers.
From the beginning, the lack of coherence in the government and the mosaic work in determining and implementing Rouhani's economic policies made him vulnerable. This problem was exacerbated by giving more space to his close circle in the Moderation and Development Party (Mohammad Baqer Nobakht - Mahmoud Vaezi) in the twelfth government. Ali Tayebnia, the former Minister of Economy, became a victim of the undue interventions of Rouhani's inner circle. Eshaq Jahangiri has also not had a significant presence in decision-making. The increasing tensions in the currency market and the intensification of the structural and chronic economic crisis have made the problems of Rouhani's cabinet more apparent than ever. In fact, the impact of internal weakness has been no less than external pressure.
In response to the significant increase in dissatisfaction, Rouhani has only agreed to change the head of the Central Bank. In recent weeks, he has resisted sidelining Nobakht from the presidency of the Organization and Planning to the extent that he did not accept his resignation. The likelihood of continued resistance seems weak given the expansion of criticisms, but if Rouhani continues to sacrifice bureaucracy for the sake of preserving his close associates and party considerations, then the regime-people gap in rejecting him will reach unity.
The increasing convergence with the Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist by Rouhani and the shift from confrontation with the IRGC to de-escalation and unity since July 2017 does not guarantee that Rouhani will continue to enjoy high support from the regime and can make a smooth exit from the presidency while remaining respected among the regime's elites. The regime's expectations from Rouhani are to distance himself further from reformists and return to his earlier persona, which has a direction different from the majority of the people.
However, society, especially the forces demanding change, are angry and bewildered by Rouhani's dual behavior and perceived betrayal of the trust placed in him through his discursive and political shifts, fearing for Iran's future. His weak performance and factionalism are strongly protested by them, although they have a different approach from the regime and the IRGC commanders. Thus, Rouhani finds himself in a difficult situation where the possibility of establishing a balance between the two sides and even a seesaw behavior has been stripped from him.
Jafari's writing sends a clear message to Rouhani that maintaining the IRGC's support in the face of declining social base requires paying a higher price. In fact, the IRGC commander expects that the desired views in managing the country's economy will be more considered.
Overall, it seems that just as the specific political and social conditions of the country in 2013 unexpectedly led a small group of moderates to the Pasteur structure and dominance in the elected institutions of the regime, the current change in conditions is similarly placing them on a path toward exit and collapse at a rapid pace.
In this atmosphere, it is unlikely that Rouhani will be able to maintain the upper position of his close circle in the executive branch. However, he has the fortune that the people, driven to the streets by poverty, unemployment, hardship, recession, corruption, and discrimination, have defined their main conflict as being with the Supreme Leader, the IRGC, and the clergy in general.