The Instability of the JCPOA and Rouhani's Wobbly and Contradictory Steps

Hassan Rouhani considers achieving a comprehensive nuclear agreement with the 1+5 group as his greatest achievement, according to his statements. Although the JCPOA was the result of a broad agreement by the leadership and forces aligned with nuclear compromise, Rouhani and Javad Zarif played a significant role in implementing the nuclear agreement within the framework of the red lines drawn by the dominant power sector. Therefore, a realistic assessment dictates that the JCPOA should be considered a joint product of Khamenei and Rouhani, although the leadership prefers to place the apparent responsibility on Rouhani. Rouhani, for his specific reasons, welcomes the exclusive association of his name with the JCPOA. Objectively, an examination of the record of the moderate government confirms that the JCPOA is the most prominent among Rouhani's limited achievements. Thus, preserving the JCPOA is of great importance for Rouhani from both domestic and foreign perspectives against the threats posed by Trump and the aggressive policies of the U.S. administration. However, Rouhani's efforts to draft, achieve, and maintain the JCPOA do not mean that the government's performance in this regard has been free of weaknesses and shortcomings. It will be explained that Rouhani's wobbly steps and conservatism, along with the regional expansionist policy desired by the moderate government, have also contributed to the destabilization of the JCPOA. In other words, Rouhani's inability to generalize the JCPOA from a case-by-case compromise to a model in foreign policy and the formation of JCPOA 2 and 3 has paved the way for a decrease in the attractiveness of the JCPOA in the political arena of the U.S. Or at least, it can be said that it has provided an excuse for those who have opposed the JCPOA from the beginning but could not make any progress against the decision of former U.S. President Barack Obama and Democratic congressional representatives. Before entering the discussion, it is essential to note that the JCPOA was a fragile agreement from the outset. This fragility stemmed from the specific conditions of the two administrations of Obama and Rouhani in the political arenas of the U.S. and Iran, which ultimately, alongside a legal approach and the establishment of trust-building mechanisms, accepted certain degrees of risk based on trust in the goodwill of the other side. The success of the JCPOA required the continuation of this optimism with appropriate actions from both sides so that the spirit of understanding prevailing in the nuclear negotiations during the implementation of the JCPOA would also continue. Although the JCPOA was established by limiting negotiations to the nuclear domain, its groundwork extended beyond nuclear disputes to the problems of the Iranian government and the West, especially the U.S. It is not incorrect to say that Iran's nuclear capability was not in itself a point of contention, but rather the confrontational and antagonistic policies of the Islamic Republic ultimately created the conditions for Western rigidity. Obama and former Secretary of State John Kerry, relying on the interactive strategy favored by part of the political stream in the U.S. that assessed an agreement with the Islamic Republic as feasible, concluded that they should categorize the areas of disagreement with the Islamic Republic and, after prioritizing, manage the disputes with a carrot-and-stick policy while avoiding military options. Of course, Obama wanted to resolve all issues, but after facing constraints, he agreed to pursue the nuclear dispute, which constituted the most critical part of the disagreements from the U.S. perspective, in a separate framework. The JCPOA was concluded based on this perspective, which had serious opponents in U.S. politics. Initially, the JCPOA caused the Islamic Republic to move further away from the nuclear escape point, while also suspending banking restrictions, maritime transport, and the sale of Iranian oil. Additionally, blocked financial resources were released. However, its desirability for Iran in the future was to maintain unrestricted oil sales and banking transactions alongside facilitating foreign investment, while for the West, it was about reducing security tensions. Therefore, the survival of the JCPOA is more dependent on maintaining its spirit in meeting the economic and security expectations of both parties; otherwise, it has the status of a body without a soul. However, from that time, given the differences in interests and policies, it was evident that the success of the JCPOA in implementation required a reduction in tensions in other areas, and the JCPOA could not survive or maintain its desirability in an environment where disputes in other matters escalated. Although Rouhani repeatedly stated that the JCPOA, in his view, is a model approach and can be effective in all areas, this statement has never been realized and remained at the level of slogans. Rouhani showed a desire for expanded détente with the U.S. government but overlooked it due to his adherence to leadership and avoidance of practical confrontation. However, contrary to this differing perspective, the moderate government adopted a policy in regional and missile issues similar to that of the Guardian Council and Ahmadinejad's government, which clearly had a confrontational stance against the U.S. and escalated tensions in a direction contrary to the nuclear agreement. To understand this issue, it is necessary to briefly examine the background of the JCPOA in the political arena of the U.S. Just as the JCPOA had a secret phase in the Islamic Republic, it underwent a somewhat similar process in the U.S. From the late second term of George W. Bush's presidency and after the implementation of the Baker-Hamilton strategic document, U.S. policy shifted towards achieving a nuclear agreement with the Islamic Republic. During this period, the Rockefeller Foundation, with behind-the-scenes support from the Bush administration and especially Condoleezza Rice, initiated a project for détente with Iran, and during this project, connections were established between American officials and Iranian officials, including Javad Zarif, the then head of Iran's UN mission. Throughout these interactions, an image of Javad Zarif emerged, suggesting that part of the Iranian ruling elite was inclined towards interaction and détente with the U.S. government based on reciprocal reformist actions. This image, which appeared to be what John Kerry invested in, played a significant role in the final approval of the U.S. government during the nuclear negotiations. Hassan Rouhani's phone conversation with Obama, despite Khamenei's opposition, added to Obama's optimism and acceptance of the risks of engagement. The ambiguous and highly interpretable provisions regarding missiles in the JCPOA stemmed from this optimism. If the Iranian side had been represented by hardliners instead of Zarif and Rouhani, it is unlikely that Obama and Kerry would have accepted the current provisions of the JCPOA. However, after the approval of the JCPOA, conditions in Iran progressed in such a way that Khamenei was able to manage the threats of temporary reconciliation with the U.S. and prevent the JCPOA from becoming a turning point in post-revolutionary Iran-U.S. relations. Just as he did not authorize discussions in other areas of disagreement during the JCPOA, after the negotiations, he raised the issue of the 'danger of infiltration' and limited communication channels solely to the JCPOA. At the same time, he fueled the public expectation that all sanctions should be lifted in exchange for nuclear concessions and temporary acceptance of limitations. In the absence of negotiations regarding issues such as the Middle East, human rights, terrorism, and missile capabilities, there was no basis for lifting other sanctions. The lack of agreement on other contentious issues led American lawmakers from both parties to maintain non-nuclear sanctions and renew nuclear sanctions by replacing temporary suspension with cancellation, and Obama did not object. Within this strategic consideration in the U.S., sanctions in other areas were also imposed during Obama's presidency. The Treasury Department of the Obama administration added some individuals and Iranian companies to the sanctions list less than a week after the JCPOA. Protests against Iran's missile maneuvers were also raised during Obama's administration. However, the Islamic Republic continued its confrontational policies against the U.S. in the region and advanced its missile program in provocative frameworks after the JCPOA. Regardless of the correctness or incorrectness of the U.S. opposition to Iran's missile program, the increase in tensions in this area has had undeniable impacts on the JCPOA. It is true that the JCPOA is a separate agreement, but it did not come into being in a vacuum. The successful implementation of the JCPOA requires balance in other areas of disagreement. In conditions where conflicts in the Middle East and military programs have continued in a tangible and increasing manner, it is natural for the JCPOA to also become unstable. The result of this policy by the Islamic Republic has reinforced the views of those advocating for strictness in the U.S. and marginalized proponents of engagement. It is true that Donald Trump and his security and military officials have radical and excessive demands, but reducing sensitivities in the U.S. to them is incorrect and unrealistic. In assessing the negative impacts of the strengthening of the Islamic Republic in the Middle East and the rise of Shiite Islamic fundamentalism on U.S. national security, almost all powerful political currents in the U.S. agree, and their differences are tactical. The high votes of congressional representatives for the so-called KATSA law support this claim. Even if the Obama administration were still in power, it would have moved towards deterrent and punitive actions in missile and regional influence areas while maintaining the JCPOA, which would have negative impacts on the JCPOA. The entire U.S. ruling body does not accept that the JCPOA becomes a basis for strengthening the Islamic Republic's confrontational strategy against the U.S. in the Middle East. This issue precisely illustrates Rouhani's role in the destabilization of the JCPOA. During the 2013 and 2017 election campaigns, he repeatedly claimed to seek détente with the West. In 2013, he stated that he was looking for a middle path beyond war and surrender to resolve problems with the U.S., which he described as the 'leader of the world.' However, his performance during his presidency did not align with this claim. He was able to advance an interactive and win-win approach regarding the JCPOA only under conditions where the path had already been laid out by the leadership's agreement, and he merely had to manage obstacles and resolve some execution issues. However, after the JCPOA, he succumbed to the confrontational will of the Guardian Council. Although he repeatedly stated that the JCPOA, in his view, is a model approach and can be effective in all areas, this statement has never been realized and remained at the level of slogans. Rouhani showed a desire for expanded détente with the U.S. government but overlooked it due to his adherence to leadership and avoidance of practical confrontation. However, contrary to this differing perspective, the moderate government adopted a policy in regional and missile issues similar to that of the Guardian Council and Ahmadinejad's government, which clearly had a confrontational stance against the U.S. and escalated tensions in a direction contrary to the nuclear agreement. This contradiction, which even at the superficial level did not issue different signals from the moderate government, strengthened the view in the U.S. that considers Hassan Rouhani untrustworthy due to his background. In addition to this perspective, which evaluates Rouhani's statements about buying time in the agreement with the European troika to advance nuclear capabilities as a backing for its assessment, another view was strengthened that, despite goodwill towards moderates and reformists, they are seen as lacking effective capacity to resolve or reduce disputes. Such an atmosphere, independent of Trump and his hardline views, has diminished the attractiveness of the JCPOA in the political arena of the U.S. and increased concerns, especially within the dominant security-military stream in the U.S. The provocations and movements of the Israeli and Saudi governments have also intensified this trend. Therefore, it can be concluded that although the Islamic Republic's adherence to the provisions of the JCPOA, based on the assessment of the International Atomic Energy Agency, renders the cancellation or dilution of U.S. commitments unjustifiable, the confrontational approach of the Guardian Council and Rouhani and Zarif's inability to expand the negotiation and win-win approach in all areas of disagreement and accept its requirements, such as nuclear concessions, are significant factors in the destabilization of the JCPOA.