The Intersection of Khamenei and Rouhani at the Station of Duality, Denial, and Confusion

Alongside the intensification of currency tensions and the economic crisis, developments within the power bloc have also taken a different direction. Contrary to the electoral atmosphere of 2017, where the gap between the authority of the Supreme Leader and the Republic was active, Khamenei and Rouhani are moving towards increased convergence. The Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic stated in a meeting with members of the Assembly of Experts that 'the solution to the country's problems does not lie in abandoning the government and disavowing responsible institutions.' He also warned against parallelism with government actions and urged the military forces to 'guide the government towards utilizing expert opinions and solving problems while instilling hope in the people regarding their efforts.' It can be said with high confidence that given Rouhani and the moderate faction have lost favorable internal and external conditions, and there is significant dissatisfaction with the performance of the twelfth government among the public and aligned political forces, the support of the Supreme Leader has protected him from an early end to his presidency. Of course, Rouhani has paid the price for this by ignoring promises made to voters, increasing closeness to Khamenei, and shifting his discourse in favor of the direction of the Guardian's authority. It is not incorrect to say that the dual approach of Rouhani and Khamenei has placed them in a common position characterized by the denial of the catastrophic nature of the current situation and confusion in solving or controlling problems. While Khamenei recommends strengthening the government, he does not have close positions or particularly overarching views with it, placing his social base in an ambiguous situation that can only be justified by the theory of 'the Leader's constraints in publicly stating main positions.' The contradiction in Khamenei's positions is that he has repeatedly criticized the moderate government for hoping to solve problems through negotiations with the U.S. and 'looking to the enemy's hand.' He does not explain why a government that has violated alleged red lines in nuclear negotiations and signed an agreement called the JCPOA, which he considers a mistake and is currently incapable of controlling and solving problems, deserves support. Rouhani's repeated emphasis on the necessity of everyone standing behind the Leader and maneuvering around unity within the system in the face of the aggressive stance of the U.S. government also reflects a clear contradiction regarding how one can stand alongside 'sanction profiteers' and the 'government with a gun' to preserve the interests of the people and the country. These contradictions stem from the institutionalization of dual and insincere behavior among senior officials of the system, which, in a deeper analysis, reflects the practical consequences of the theory of the Guardian's authority. Therefore, Khamenei and Rouhani have each, for their reasons, come closer through the application of 'dual behavior' and currently both emphasize the necessity of maximum convergence and cohesion within the system, sharing the analysis that the country is in a state of economic war. Monitoring the trends and events clarifies that the leadership currently assesses the continuation of Rouhani's presidency as the best possible option. Various speculations can be made regarding the reasons for this assessment. However, the most important reason is Khamenei's helplessness and empty hands. Among the supporters of the Guardian's authority and the dominant power structure, there is no individual capable of changing the situation. Khamenei also has no plan for overcoming the crisis beyond slogans and general guidelines that lack executive capacity and merely reflect wishful thinking and a fanciful outlook. His main hope remains the passage of time, hoping that changes in the global and regional arenas will reduce pressures. It is noteworthy that Rouhani's presence somewhat acts as a buffer for Khamenei, allowing him to avoid direct responsibility for the country's executive issues and placing the main burden of problems on a government that is not the preferred or maximum option of the Guardian. In terms of propaganda, he also portrays himself as a pluralistic and trans-partisan leader who has always supported established and legal governments and does not interfere in their affairs. Thus, the existence of a president who is not a representative of the current situation facilitates the leadership's position as a perennial creditor of officials. In this view, it is argued that despite having criticisms, the leadership has left the government's hands free in managing affairs and, by emphasizing critical support, ultimately holds the government responsible for the economic situation of society. Additionally, the continuation of Rouhani's presidency, which has the support of reformists and critics of the current situation, will relatively reduce the costs of opposing the opening of the political space for the system. Rouhani, who has been restrained and turned his back on his apparent positions in the elections, is the most neutral option outside the inner circle for the Guardian. However, the success of Khamenei's summation in preserving and strengthening the later Rouhani, who has undergone a reverse trend compared to Ahmadinejad and resolved differences in favor of the Guardian's institution, is seriously questionable. Khamenei and Rouhani's framing of the country's problems is clearly based on denying the high level of crisis and relying on symbolic and performative actions. Regardless of structural problems, high external pressures, the accumulation of incompetencies and previous mismanagements, reduced financial and currency resources of the government, and the incorrect economic policies of Rouhani's government, psychological factors play a significant role in exacerbating the economic crisis. The country's economy being on the brink of collapse is not solely the result of objective events and real occurrences, but public expectations of the worsening situation and disbelief in the future are undeniable variables in this equation. This reality was prominently present in Khamenei's recent remarks about the importance of building trust. Lack of confidence in the future has led to increased demand for gold and dollars, which, due to insufficient supply, has made financial tensions uncontrollable. Managing psychological factors in the economy requires building trust, which seems impossible to achieve with Rouhani's continued presidency. Verbal therapy, making unfulfilled promises, and the chronic duality between words and actions have stripped a significant part of society of trust in Rouhani, and repairing that seems unrealistic. Rouhani and his poorly motivated ministers have heightened societal concerns to a peak. Rouhani's behavior and that of his unmotivated ministers do not correspond to the emergency conditions, and this understanding has permeated the community's mindset, with its tangible manifestation being the negative market reaction to Rouhani's policies and statements. Conspiracy-mindedness, command economy, and threats of punishment in the moderate government, along with a sudden shift in discourse from an open to a closed economy, are also ineffective. Of course, Khamenei himself is in a worse situation than Rouhani. The perception that his management and views are the main source of problems is increasingly growing in society and even within the system. The emphasis of some members of parliament on his satisfaction with entrusting some major decision-making to the people through referendums in this regard is enlightening. Almost all protests on various issues have seen widespread and sharp slogans against the leadership and his interventions. The new letter from Mehdi Karroubi has also reinforced the focus on the Guardian's views as the main issue for overcoming problems in the public sphere. The scope of this wave has become so broad that the leadership's supporters, including Ahmad Jannati, the Secretary of the Guardian Council and the Chairman of the Assembly of Experts, have warned against the conspiracy of attributing problems to the leadership and have projected it as stemming from foreign plots. Therefore, given the aforementioned considerations, it seems unlikely that the current convergence between Khamenei and Rouhani can restore the lost trust and end the tensions in Iran's economy. The intensification of external pressures in the coming months and the continuation of the current stalemate may force Khamenei to reconsider his support for Rouhani, but the lack of effective options is an obstacle to realizing this possibility, leading the leadership to still consider Rouhani's calm descent from the presidency as the best possible scenario.