The Iranian Winter Movement

Iranians once again followed their long-standing tradition of expressing protests that fundamentally have no other outlets, gathering and marching in over thirty cities, and sometimes resorting to violence. The government, in its usual manner, suppressed the 'disturbance' with beatings and killings, resulting in over 22 deaths and the arrest of 3,700 individuals. Numerous analyses have been published regarding this movement and its causes, and what is universally agreed upon is that the powerful clerics of Mashhad, namely Raisi and Alamolhoda, inadvertently sparked this movement. Due to the readiness of the conditions, a nearly nationwide movement swept across Iran. The grounds for dissatisfaction are the same as those that have been repeatedly mentioned, which can generally be categorized into a few groups: those who blame the lack of accountability and transparency of the leadership and its affiliated institutions, pointing to unresponsiveness, injustice, corruption, extravagance, and mismanagement, especially in international and regional affairs. However, these realities have been constant over the past three to four decades, and no new reasons have emerged to draw people to the streets, although they can always serve as a source of discontent. Some writers consider the disillusionment of the people, especially the youth, with Rouhani's government significant. Their argument is based on the fact that millions participated in the elections and particularly had much higher expectations from the JCPOA. However, this argument is not easily provable. Field research on how much young people expected from Rouhani and how much of that was met has not been conducted anywhere, and aside from that, the majority of reformist voters primarily voted for Rouhani to prevent the election of Ibrahim Raisi, who was favored by the leader. The fear and misery of the Ahmadinejad era were still fresh in memory. The disclosure of costs exceeding eight hundred million dollars for religious institutions and unemployment insurance for clerics, alongside the government's intention to reduce the number of subsidy recipients and increase gasoline prices, has also been mentioned as causes of this movement. This is true, and in similar cases where governments have eliminated subsidies for essential consumer goods like bread, similar uprisings have occurred in Jordan, Egypt, Venezuela, etc. However, these uprisings have been short-lived and limited in scope, and moreover, they occurred after the elimination of subsidies, not before, as in Iran. The environmental crisis has also been considered a reason for the recent movement. Writers believe that protests in Iran are akin to similar protests and movements in Nigeria, Somalia, Syria, and similar countries that occurred after environmental crises and major droughts of agricultural lands. The problem with this comparison is that the demonstrations in Iran actually began and gained momentum in the western and northwestern provinces of the country, which have been less affected by water shortages than other provinces like Sistan and Baluchestan, South Khorasan, and Kerman. However, in support of this theory, it can be said that provinces like Chaharmahal and Bakhtiari, despite their relative abundance of water, widely participated in this year's movement, but they are protesting the transfer of their province's water to central cities of Iran, which has caused half of the province's springs to dry up. Therefore, environmental problems and concerns can be considered relatively involved in the recent protests. The trigger for the recent movement was likely pulled when the publication of the budget list for officials and religious institutions showed how millions of dollars are spent on institutions that have no return other than the expansion of the ruling ideology. From the perspective of the majority of people, this is seen as a waste of public funds and came at a time when the bankruptcy of financial institutions and the depletion of pension funds had severely worried many people. Ahmadinejad's disclosures and other factional disputes coincided with news of the cut or reduction of subsidies, the increase in gasoline prices, and uncontrollable inflation that had raised the price of each egg to 1,400 tomans (which the government immediately reduced to 450 tomans on the first day of protests). As a result, when the right-wing faction foolishly began staged demonstrations, waves of public discontent swept through society. It should be noted that similar protests with smaller scales had already occurred in Isfahan and other cities, indicating that the people's patience was running out. However, what is less often noted is that people protest under conditions where they feel a kind of relative security. During the Green Movement, people entered the struggle with a half-hearted sense of security because they likely believed their demands were legitimate and within the bounds of government regulations. In the recent movement, what may have contributed to a sense of relative security was perhaps the encouragement from the right-wing faction for protests. Secondly, the government of Hassan Rouhani had also announced unprecedented measures, such as not arresting 'improperly veiled' women. Executions had also generally decreased, which was a result of changes in the law regarding the punishment for possessing minimum amounts of drugs. A review of another bill to relieve married women of needing their husband's signature to leave the country also seems to be in progress. These actions, although minor, have immeasurable effects in a society under a more or less 'totalitarian' regime, and these small nudges can have vast implications. The recent movement is a desperate uprising of citizens who are banging their heads against the machine of tyranny. The awareness of the youth will not leave them at ease, and as the climate dries up, the ranks of the dispossessed and looters will also join the rebellious movements. Those who have the ability to emigrate to other countries will do so: according to statistics from the Chamber of Commerce, more than three and a half million people are preparing to emigrate from the country. However, this avenue is also narrowing as host countries become stricter. The dual foundation of the regime is gradually losing its appeal, and the number of voters may gradually decrease, and the people's indifference may pave the way for the emergence of a more modern form of tyranny akin to a military regime. The recent winter movement in Iran is more than anything a product of the contradictions between the two factions in Iran regarding corruption, economic disorder, and the concerns of the people, especially the youth, about the future of Iran, as well as their growing awareness of the mismanagement and tribalism of the clerics. The U.S. policy, in a sense, played a role in this matter, which is the gradual bankruptcy of Iran that, hand in hand with the mismanagement and corruption of the regime's elders, has led to chaos in Iran's economy and ultimately a loss of hope for creating millions of jobs for university-educated youth. However, the dynamism of this movement is entirely internal, and there is honestly no need for foreign sabotage. On the other hand, the foreign government that indirectly influences the rebellious movements in Iran is not the U.S., but Saudi Arabia. As mentioned, the adjustment of repressive policies towards women was one of the trigger factors for this movement. This policy was certainly adopted in competition with the adjustments to the repression of women in Saudi Arabia. Prince Mohammed bin Salman's reforms aimed at supporting women and youth to create modern social foundations for the future monarchy and push back traditionalists are the main motivation for those reforms. The Islamic Republic, as a Shiite counterpart to Saudi Arabia, cannot remain indifferent and will be forced to adopt similar policies. Recent resolutions aimed at reducing the prosecution and imprisonment of improperly veiled women are of this nature. However, while Saudi Arabia has managed to remain unscathed from the aftershocks of radical social reforms to date—perhaps due to the hope of the youth for real reforms and the people's disillusionment with the Saudi government's Wahhabi policies—Iran does not enjoy such fortune due to ineffective policies that have led to a relative loss of hope among the youth for reform. On the other hand, social reform, if not accompanied by similar growth in the economy and politics, will not elicit the desired reaction from the government. Therefore, as much as competition in the military sphere weakens Iran's economic foundation, competition in the realm of social reform can harbor other dangers. Accordingly, the likelihood of other movements arising in Iran is not small, and if the recent youth movement occurred eight and a half years after the Green Movement, it can be assumed that subsequent uprisings may occur at shorter intervals. These uprisings and the inflexible and uncreative policies of the Islamic Republic do not bode well for the future. The recent movement is a desperate uprising of citizens who are banging their heads against the machine of tyranny. The awareness of the youth will not leave them at ease, and as the climate dries up, the ranks of the dispossessed and looters will also join the rebellious movements. Those who have the ability to emigrate to other countries will do so: according to statistics from the Chamber of Commerce, more than three and a half million people are preparing to emigrate from the country. However, this avenue is also narrowing as host countries become stricter. The dual foundation of the regime is gradually losing its appeal, and the number of voters may gradually decrease, and the people's indifference may pave the way for the emergence of a more modern form of tyranny akin to a military regime. Similar conditions after August 19, 1953, bore the seeds of urban guerrilla movements in Iran. Of course, the appeal of urban guerrilla movements has ended, but we can observe elements of it in the burning of mosques and acts of sabotage before and during the recent protests.