The Islamic Republic and Diplomatic Failure at the Organization of Islamic Cooperation

The 13th summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) must undoubtedly be considered one of the darkest days for the Islamic Republic in the realm of diplomacy. Previously, the Islamic Republic had received condemnations or punitive resolutions from many international bodies, including the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, which led to claims that these organizations were influenced by the hegemonic system (the United States). With this claim, the issuance of sharp resolutions by those organizations was attributed not to its own reckless behaviors but rather to a conspiracy by the hegemonic system. However, receiving sharp warnings from the OIC, of which Iran (during Mohammad Reza Shah's time) was a founding member, is truly a significant blow to the prestige of a regime that sometimes considers itself the 'Motherland' of the Islamic world and goes so far as to describe Ayatollah Khamenei as the 'Leader of the Muslims of the World.' The bitterness of the final statement is evident as Hassan Rouhani, as the President of Iran, and Mohammad Javad Zarif, as the Foreign Minister, refrained from attending the closing session during the approval of the statement at the summit. But why? The reprimand of the Islamic Republic at this summit involved the OIC explicitly naming the Islamic Republic of Iran and issuing sharp warnings to Tehran that have no precedent during Iran's membership in this organization. These warnings are as follows: Paragraph 30 of the statement states: This organization emphasizes cooperation between Islamic countries and the Islamic Republic of Iran... and calls for Iran to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of those countries and to respect their sovereignty and territorial integrity... and calls for Iran to abstain from using force and threats against them. [This paragraph implicitly positions Iran against all other Muslim countries and indicates that Tehran uses force and threats with the intent of undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of other Muslim countries.] Paragraph 31 of the statement condemns the attacks on Saudi diplomatic missions in Mashhad and Tehran and considers them a clear violation of the Vienna Convention... [By including this paragraph in the statement, all Islamic countries have condemned the perverse tradition that began with the violation of the Vienna Convention by attacking the U.S. embassy and culminated in the attack on the Saudi embassy.] Paragraph 32, referring to Tehran's objections to the execution of Sheikh Nimr, states: This organization rejects Iran's provocative statements regarding the judicial rulings against perpetrators of 'terrorist acts' in Saudi Arabia and considers such statements a clear interference in Saudi internal affairs and contrary to the UN Charter, the OIC Charter, and all international conventions. [The approval of this paragraph by members clearly considers Sheikh Nimr a terrorist and Tehran a supporter of terrorism. The adoption of this paragraph positions Saudi Arabia and all member states on one side and the Islamic Republic on the other, meaning support for terrorism. It is predictable that Riyadh, armed with such a statement, has paved the way for condemning Tehran as a supporter of terrorism in other forums.] Paragraph 33 states: This organization condemns Iran's interference in the internal affairs of regional countries, including Bahrain, Yemen, Syria, and Somalia, as well as its continued support for terrorism. [It is predictable that this paragraph, emphasizing both interference in the internal affairs of regional countries and support for terrorism, has been included in the statement to facilitate measures that regional and global countries must prepare against a country supporting terrorism.] Confrontation with Tehran's Foreign Policy Regardless of the aforementioned points that the statement directly refers to the Islamic Republic, the statement addresses other issues that are clearly in opposition to the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic. These issues include: a) Syria: Paragraph 49 states: This organization expresses its deep concern over the continued violence and bloodshed in Syria... and emphasizes finding a political solution under the auspices of the United Nations based on the Geneva statement regarding a political transition to build a new Syria... where power is in the hands of Syrians. [Given Ali Akbar Velayati's statements, Khamenei's advisor, that Bashar al-Assad is a red line for the Islamic Republic, this paragraph clearly calls for a new Syria, meaning a Syria without Assad. The consensus of Islamic countries on this paragraph places the Islamic Republic in a minority position in support of Assad's regime. It should not be forgotten that at the initiative of Saudi Arabia and with the consensus of all members, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation previously suspended Syria's membership due to Bashar al-Assad's crimes. Including this paragraph means that all Muslim countries endorse a political transition away from the regime of Bashar al-Assad, whose membership has been suspended.] b) Yemen: Paragraph 72 states: This organization emphasizes its ongoing support for the legitimate government of Mansour Hadi, the President of Yemen, and his efforts to establish political-economic security and stability in Yemen... [It is clear that this paragraph is in direct opposition to Tehran's foreign policy in supporting the Houthis and is an explicit support for Riyadh, which has come to Hadi's aid through military operations. In other words, while the OIC has condemned Tehran's support for Assad's government, it implicitly supports Riyadh's support for Hadi's government. In this context, while paragraph 73 condemns those – including Tehran – who obstruct political operations in Yemen, paragraph 76 appreciates the humanitarian aid of the Khaadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifayn Center to Yemen. Throughout the statement, there is no mention of Saudi military attacks on Yemen.] c) Support for Riyadh in the fight against terrorism: Referring to paragraph 32, which labels Sheikh Nimr a terrorist, paragraph 102 states: This organization endorses the efforts of Saudi Arabia and member states in the fight against terrorism and expresses its support for the military coalition of Muslim countries against terrorism... [It is noteworthy that the mentioned military coalition is one of the initiatives that Riyadh has employed to keep like-minded countries under its umbrella against terrorism. By adding this paragraph, the OIC has shown its support for Saudi Arabia's initiative. Meanwhile, Riyadh can intensify its actions against figures like Sheikh Nimr, who are supported by Tehran, with the backing of the OIC. Bahrain, Kuwait, and Nigeria can similarly apply this approach against Sheikh Ali Salman, Sheikh Hussein Maatuq, and Sheikh Ibrahim Zakzaky (all Shiite leaders supported by Tehran).] d) Hezbollah Lebanon, a terrorist organization: The statement, continuing its support for Saudi anti-terrorism actions mentioned in paragraph 102, explicitly names Hezbollah in paragraph 105, stating: The OIC condemns the terrorist actions of Hezbollah in Syria, Bahrain, Kuwait, Yemen, and its support for terrorist groups that threaten the security and stability of OIC member states. [It is clear that this paragraph considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization and, moreover, regards its actions as dangerous for all members, not just some. Importantly, the statement in paragraph 106 considers ISIS one of the terrorist organizations, thus equating Hezbollah with ISIS. Given the sensitivity surrounding the fight against ISIS, equating Hezbollah with ISIS clarifies future decisions regarding Hezbollah.] e) Lebanon: In paragraph 12, the statement acknowledges the political impasse in Lebanon and supports political dialogue among political currents to overcome this situation, expressing gratitude for the ongoing support of other countries, especially Saudi Arabia. [Thus, while the statement in paragraph 105 considers Hezbollah a terrorist organization, it implicitly does not regard this armed group as a political current entitled to participate in Lebanon's political process. Given Lebanon's political weight in the Islamic Republic's foreign policy, it is clear that this paragraph aims to limit Tehran's role and highlight Riyadh's role in Lebanon.] Conclusion: Given the above description, Hassan Rouhani's absence from the summit during the approval of such a statement, which clearly reprimands Tehran, condemns Hezbollah, and praises Riyadh, becomes evident. The approval of such paragraphs is a clear testament to the failure of the Islamic Republic's 'organizational diplomacy' even within the OIC. This comes at a time when, following the 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic invested heavily in finding a central or at least effective role in the Islamic world to leverage the existing capacities and capabilities in the Islamic world to its advantage. Ironically, in this strategy, it was sometimes successful. The vote of the organization in support of Ayatollah Khomeini's fatwa declaring Salman Rushdie's blood permissible and hosting the 13th summit of the Islamic Conference in Tehran during Mohammad Khatami's presidency are examples of successful diplomacy that the Islamic Republic utilized to benefit from the capacities of this organization. At the Tehran summit, King Abdullah (when he was the crown prince of Saudi Arabia) participated, marking the beginning of Tehran-Riyadh relations. Now, with the heavy burden that has fallen on the Islamic Republic following the 13th OIC summit, Tehran faces three significant questions: First, why has the Islamic Republic become isolated even among 'Muslim brothers'? What is the reason for this failure in organizational diplomacy even within the OIC? If all this onslaught from within the OIC against Tehran is due to Saudi influence, then where has all the Islamic Republic's investment in the Islamic world gone? And why, as the current president of the Non-Aligned Movement, is the Islamic Republic unable to utilize the movement's capacities to its advantage? The second and more important question is, if the Islamic Republic is so isolated among its Muslim brothers, how isolated is it on the international stage? The third and most crucial question is whether it is time to reconsider the reckless policies for which Ayatollah Khamenei bears direct responsibility. How does he consider his regime the 'Motherland of the Islamic world' and sends messages for the Hajj congress every year while his followers regard him as the 'Wali Amr of the Muslims of the world,' yet he is so isolated even in the Islamic world? In the author's assessment, the Islamic Republic, under the leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei, has lost many areas of foreign policy, and ironically, the JCPOA will accelerate this trend. In the realm of domestic politics, Mehdi Karroubi's letter condemning the 'tyrannical rule' speaks volumes about the internal situation.