The Islamic Republic and the 'Strategic Deadlock' in the War with Israel

Targeting Hassan Nasrallah, the Secretary-General of Hezbollah Lebanon, in a deadly Israeli operation and destroying over thirty percent of the group's military equipment and ammunition depots has put the Islamic Republic of Iran in a bind. Ali Khamenei, the leader of the Islamic Republic, as the most influential figure in the decision-making structure of the regime, must now think about the heavy blow dealt to the structure of the 'Resistance Front' after more than two months of the unfulfilled promise of revenge for the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Khamenei, by issuing two messages and focusing on the continuation of building 'resistance' while avoiding specific statements from the government and limiting himself to vague calls for action against Israel, has shown that he at least does not intend to retaliate quickly. He may even refrain from taking action and, by assessing the situation, think about minimizing damages and reorganizing for future confrontations. It seems that Khamenei's priority and concern is to maintain the structure of the 'Resistance Front' and the ring of fire formed around Israel. In this context, the continuation of Hezbollah's missile attacks at the level prior to the killing of Sayyid Hassan Nasrallah and the avoidance of using long-range missiles with higher destructive capabilities towards Tel Aviv is understandable. However, Khamenei's main limitation is the high risk and potentially deadly nature of a full-scale war with Israel. Any direct attack from Iran on Israel that has high destructive power would be met with military responses from the United States and Britain, in addition to Israel. The European Union, even if it does not intervene militarily, will not withhold political and logistical support from Israel. However, the Islamic Republic of Iran can at most rely on political support from Russia and China, which does not affect the existing balance of power. Khamenei rightly knows that the advantage of the Islamic Republic and its network of proxy forces lies in asymmetric warfare. Moving towards direct war is an apocalyptic action that is only valuable for historical record, but in the field, it may not only lead to a humiliating defeat but could also result in the regime's collapse due to a chain of possible events, given the regime's lack of legitimacy. Right now, the deaths of Ismail Haniyeh, Hassan Nasrallah, and over two hundred senior and mid-level commanders of Hezbollah Lebanon have had a destabilizing effect on the Islamic Republic of Iran and weakened its power components. Israel is fully prepared for a total and direct war and has gained high intelligence capabilities within Iran. The leaders of the Islamic Republic are in a difficult and sensitive situation where they have no room for error. The security doctrine of the Islamic Republic has so far been based on avoiding direct confrontation with Israel and the United States. Moreover, retaliatory operations against Israel's aggressive actions have relied on the principle of creating credible deterrence without leading to a full-scale war. A calculating and cautious personality like Khamenei and his shocked officials do not have the capacity to accept the risks of this uncertain situation. Rational assessment also dictates restraint. Of course, the discussion of the 'war trap' has become so clichéd that it has lost its effectiveness. However, the reality is that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not have the capacity for a full-scale war, especially when its regional force backbone has suffered irreparable damage and Israel has decided to change the balance of power in its favor at any cost. In the current strategic vacuum in the world, there is no longer a dominant power to stop the Israeli government. Additionally, weakening the 'Resistance Front' and the Islamic Republic in the Middle East is desirable for the West and most Arab countries. Not reacting could encourage Israel to advance, but it may also return Israel to a defensive approach. However, reacting and attacking Israel would escalate the aggression of Israel and its allies to a level where stopping it would not be certain and could inflict much heavier damages on the Islamic Republic. Therefore, the Islamic Republic must somehow choose between two bad and worse options. The desirable and 'regrettable' option is out of its reach. The killing of Nasrallah presents costly options and difficult choices for Iran. However, the barrier to accepting the risk of an all-out war is not only the uncontrollable and destabilizing consequences and the high likelihood of defeat. Any government that wishes to enter a war must have the support of a large part of its people or at least not have the majority in an active opposing position. Currently, the Islamic Republic, unlike in the 1980s, not only lacks such support but a significant portion of society is waiting for its defeat. The severe economic crisis is another limitation for the Islamic Republic. Firing missiles into the sky of Iran will deal the final blows to Iran's dying economy. The destruction of oil, electricity, gas, and water facilities has the potential to turn the streets of Iranian cities into a battleground between the government and protesting citizens. The situation is not unlike the final years of the Tsarist Russia and the impact of the defeat in the war with Japan and the consequences of participation in World War I in strengthening revolutionary changes. Khamenei also has the experience of Saddam Hussein before him. If the new trend governing the Gaza war, which began with the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, continues, then the 'Storm of Al-Aqsa' operation, like Saddam's invasion of Kuwait, could lead to a completely opposite outcome. Even within the government, despite the support of most reformists for the regime's official policy condemning Nasrallah's killing and Israel's risky action, there is still no consensus regarding war. Alireza Alavitabar's article titled 'The Sorrow of Lebanon,' published on the 'Moshgh No' website, sheds light on this issue. In a passage from this article, he calls for avoiding going to war: 'War is the reality of our world; a completely undesirable reality. We must escape this reality as much as possible. Being strong and having deterrent capability is a necessary condition but not a sufficient one. If we do not reconstruct our foreign policy based on the experience of war, we will be forced to accept a situation that will be very unacceptable and even humiliating for us.' Therefore, at this juncture, it is unlikely that the Islamic Republic will make a decisive decision, and the possibility that a decisive confrontation will be deferred to an uncertain future remains, focusing on minimizing damages and saving Hezbollah Lebanon from collapse while passing through the emotional atmosphere created in the short term. It is also clear that at the level of rhetoric and psychological warfare, boasting and propaganda will continue inside and controlled and limited attacks from Yemen, Iraq, and Lebanon into Israel, but these tactics have also become rusty and lost their previous effectiveness.