The Islamic Republic's Confrontation with Donald Trump's Second Administration: From Aspiration to Reality

The nature of Iran and America's confrontation during Donald Trump's second term has attracted significant attention in Iran, the U.S., and the Middle East, leading to numerous speculations. These perceptions are not only articulated by officials, think tanks, intelligence agencies, and media, but also by ordinary people in Iran and the Middle East who hope that the re-imposition of maximum pressure policies will lead to the downfall or the beginning of the decline of the Islamic Republic and its network of proxy forces; a notion not raised in Trump's campaign statements. He has repeatedly stated that he opposes military interventions and is not seeking to change authoritarian political regimes worldwide. This issue, along with doubts about the effectiveness of sanctions during Trump's election campaign and his business background, has led some within Iran's power structure to claim that an agreement with Trump is feasible and even easier than previously thought. However, examining the realities, historical precedents, and structural contexts reveals optimism from two opposing sides. The consensus within the U.S. political body and its dominant security and military apparatus has likely reduced the likelihood of repeating experiences such as the military occupation and overthrow of governments in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 21st century, if it has not entirely ruled it out. On the other hand, Donald Trump himself has serious objections to this approach. He has claimed multiple times that he was on the verge of an agreement with the Islamic Republic, which was thwarted by Biden's entry into the White House. Therefore, one can only assume that his relative strictness could weaken the Islamic Republic and accelerate its decline; an occurrence that is more influenced by internal political variables in Iran and the disruption of the balance of power between the government and the people. Achieving an agreement with Trump from the Islamic Republic's perspective also faces numerous obstacles, making it appear an impossible mission in the short term without a power struggle. Before these obstacles are outlined, it should be noted that Trump's unpredictability is a reality that could become a game-changer under certain conditions. At the same time, the history of the U.S. political system reminds us that there is a difference between the president and the political system. No president has been able to impose their will entirely on the government. Factors such as procedures, legal and objective structures, the dominant security and military establishment, complex bureaucracy, separation of powers, and issues governing foreign relations and global power equations have prevented the president from doing whatever they want. In the case of Iran, the structural constraints that emerged after the establishment of the Islamic Republic and the severance of relations between Iran and the U.S. are the most significant existing barriers, which are difficult to overcome except through ad hoc deals and tactical compromises. The cabinet that Trump has chosen is unprecedented in its intensity of support for Israel among U.S. administrations in the past century. The Secretaries of State and Defense and the National Security Advisor are calling for a decisive confrontation with the Islamic Republic, aligned with Israel. Donald Trump has been a major opponent of the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). He seeks a better deal than the JCPOA from the U.S. perspective. Trump is tougher than Joe Biden in supporting Israel's security and considering its concerns. He even suggested attacking Iran's nuclear facilities after Operation 'Promise of the Truth One'. Meanwhile, the JCPOA has lost its relevance, and even the Islamic Republic is seeking a new agreement. However, as Mohammad Javad Zarif has emphasized, from the Islamic Republic's perspective, the JCPOA should be the basis for any new agreement. Accordingly, considering the conditions outlined by Ali Larijani, the Islamic Republic apparently wants to change the timelines that are soon to expire in favor of Iran in the new agreement and have advanced centrifuges included in the permissible list. However, what the JCPOA envisioned from Trump's perspective is unclear. It can be speculated that if he does not seek a complete cancellation of enrichment, he will at least insist on the permanence of restrictions on nuclear fuel production; otherwise, opposition to the JCPOA becomes meaningless. Another barrier is Trump's and his associates' views on negotiations over other contentious issues, including the Islamic Republic's regional policy, missile program, and Israel's security. The Islamic Republic has so far resisted agreements on non-nuclear issues. The potential activation of the snapback mechanism is another serious challenge. Trump needs European cooperation for the complete demise of the JCPOA to maximize the impact of the maximum pressure campaign. On the other hand, tensions between Iran and Europe have increased. The European troika has taken initial steps to activate the snapback mechanism, considering the expiration of Resolution 2231 in October 2025. The Islamic Republic has also responded to the expansion of sensitive nuclear activities. Abbas Araghchi has even threatened that if the UN sanctions, which were suspended based on Resolution 2231, are reimposed due to European actions, some in Iran may move towards producing nuclear weapons. Iran's nuclear activities have expanded to the extent that the nuclear breakout point has become irrelevant. Reports indicate that Iran can produce high-enriched uranium for a medium-sized nuclear bomb in less than a month. There is still no clear picture regarding other technical and military capabilities required, but trends within the government clearly support the production of nuclear weapons. Despite all this, the Islamic Republic's vulnerability to severe punitive actions from Trump is not similar to the spring of 1397 (2018). In these six years, the geopolitical and political equations in the region and Iran have changed. When Trump exited the JCPOA and imposed heavy unilateral sanctions, Iran had a normal position in selling fossil fuels and global trade. However, now that the Biden administration has continued the maximum pressure policy with slight adjustments, it seems that a kind of adaptation to these special conditions has emerged. In fact, the pressure of sanctions has approached its ceiling and has little capacity for further escalation. On the other hand, Iran's oil sales to China have significantly increased after signing a comprehensive 25-year agreement, making it particularly difficult to halt this, especially considering Trump's plan to increase pressure on China. China has a special advantage in purchasing Iranian oil due to receiving discounts. Of course, there may be situations where the Chinese might forgo this advantage in negotiations with the U.S., but other scenarios may also arise where China aligns more closely with the second Trump administration's aggressive stance against the Islamic Republic. In terms of political, security, and economic equations, the region does not have the same conditions as before. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have established a sustainable and tangible de-escalation with the Islamic Republic. During Trump's first term, tensions between Iran and these two Arab countries were at their peak. However, this situation is fragile, and there is no guarantee that these countries will collaborate with Trump in the maximum pressure policy as they did previously. The Abraham Accords, which Trump considers the deal of the century, is no longer a significant issue. Trump's cabinet is focused on strengthening Israel's position and normalizing it in the Middle East. The main goal of Operation 'Storm of Al-Aqsa' and the Islamic Republic's support for it was to disrupt the process of expanding relations between Israel and Arab countries. The current conditions differ from the past, and the conflict with Israel and the efforts to support Palestinian rights, at least at the level of apparent positions, are the primary concern of Arab countries. Saudi Arabia has so far conditioned the normalization of relations on the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. This factor may limit Trump's ability to rally regional support against the Islamic Republic. The significant gap between the Islamic Republic and Trump's second administration over the 'Resistance Front' is another serious challenge. Maintaining the 'Resistance Front' is a fundamental issue for the Islamic Republic and both its factions, and they perceive its dissolution as an existential threat. The 'Resistance Front', particularly Hamas and Hezbollah, has weakened compared to the past, but they have not been completely defeated, nor is there any reason to consider their existence as concluded. They continue to engage militarily with Israel, and the possibility of their rebuilding in the future is not ruled out. The Islamic Republic's efforts at this juncture focus on preserving them and minimizing the inflicted damages while planning for their restoration and enhancement in the future. Trump will re-enter the White House at a time when deterrence equations in the Middle East have changed, and the Islamic Republic has crossed the taboo of direct engagement with Israel. This factor could encourage the use of hard power leverage between the two sides. Therefore, the obstacles and challenges outlined suggest that the prospect of an agreement between the Islamic Republic and Donald Trump in the short term is overly optimistic. The significant distance between the positions and goals of both sides may make a power struggle inevitable. The Islamic Republic's position being weaker than before, both externally and internally, does not mean that they will willingly submit to Trump. Conducting secret negotiations and mediations does not necessarily equate to success in overcoming obstacles, especially since negotiation for negotiation's sake has always been one of the Islamic Republic's levers for buying time. The outlook ahead is more likely to herald an intensification of confrontation until further notice.