The Islamic Republic's 'Nuclear Doctrine Change': A Practical Threat or a Need Arising from Concern?

Recent threats from Islamic Republic officials, including Kamal Kharrazi, regarding a change in the Islamic Republic's nuclear doctrine stem more from a type of concern and a need to break sanctions than from any practical equivalence. For the Islamic Republic, achieving deterrence based on a nuclear bomb is fraught with numerous challenges and considerations, and if the threat were to materialize, this 'deterrence' is too flawed to provide reliable immunity. Since August 2002, when Iran's nuclear activities at the Natanz facility and the Arak heavy water plant were revealed, the policy of Islamic Republic officials, as stated by Rafsanjani, who pursued the idea of enabling nuclear bomb production two years after the revolution, has always been to deny any efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The revelation of the Fordow site, hidden in the mountains, has also been accompanied by this denial. Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly stated in his speeches that the 'claims of the West' regarding the goals of Iran's nuclear program are not true, and even in recent years, he has described the acquisition of nuclear weapons as inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the Islamic Republic and has deemed it 'haram' (forbidden). He has often stated that the use of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear bombs, is 'haram.' However, these statements have not prevented Iran from maintaining its enrichment capacity despite the ambiguity surrounding the industrial application of enriched uranium on a large scale, especially given that Russia supplies fuel for Iran's only nuclear power plant (Bushehr). Kharrazi stated: 'If Iran's existence is threatened, we will have to change our nuclear doctrine.' All Islamic Republic officials have also described uranium enrichment in Iran as a 'strategic commodity' that 'the West wants to take from us by offering candy and airplanes.' Ali Larijani, in 2005, criticized the temporary suspension of enrichment under the Saadabad agreement with European countries, stating, 'In the negotiations, we gave away pearls and received a lollipop in return.' It is also noteworthy that despite the prohibition of nuclear bombs in the rhetoric of Ayatollah Khomeini or in an ambiguous fatwa attributed to Ali Khamenei, from the very beginning, as Rafsanjani also mentioned, 'It never left our minds that if one day we were threatened and it became necessary, we would have the option to go towards the other side (building nuclear weapons).' Large-scale uranium enrichment, given Iran's lack of serious need for its industrial (peaceful) application, especially in a context where the Islamic Republic is in dispute with the U.S. and the destruction of its most important ally in the Middle East (Israel) has been one of the central slogans of the government in its regional approach for the past 45 years, has faced severe Western (and somewhat Eastern) sensitivity. In fact, the Iranian government's reaching the threshold of nuclearization or actual nuclearization itself changes the balance of power against Israel in the region, especially since the Islamic Republic has placed 'the destruction of Israel' at the forefront of its declared and operational regional policy. The exit from the JCPOA and the new conditions that have arisen. Severe sanctions against the Islamic Republic of Iran, approved by the UN Security Council, ultimately led to the JCPOA in 2015, which aimed to keep the Islamic Republic's nuclear program limited and impose stringent international oversight in exchange for lifting sanctions against Iran. The preamble of this agreement states: 'The parties to the agreement (Iran and the 5+1 group) expect that the full implementation of the JCPOA will positively contribute to regional and international peace and security. Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will it seek, develop, or acquire nuclear weapons.' Khamenei has consistently stated that negotiations with the U.S. are solely about the nuclear program and that there will be no other JCPOAs in opening relations between Iran and the West. The opposition of countries like Israel and Saudi Arabia to the JCPOA also contributed to the situation, and ultimately, with the rise of Trump, the groundwork was laid for the JCPOA not to expand and develop in the hoped-for direction but rather to be suspended by the U.S. The Trump administration took a year and a half to exit the JCPOA. However, the Islamic Republic, within the framework of its confrontational view against the U.S. and a certain reluctance to negotiate with Washington, did not agree to engage intensively with the Trump administration to steer the situation toward a crisis and to prevent Washington's exit from the JCPOA to any extent. Later, opportunities for negotiations between the two sides arose, which the Islamic Republic's leader and hardliners on the other side squandered. Six years after this exit, which was accompanied by the Islamic Republic's reduction of its JCPOA commitments, the Iranian government is now in a position where it has more ease in producing and stockpiling uranium close to nuclear bomb application and also possesses advanced centrifuges at its facilities that the JCPOA had prohibited. In other words, regardless of whether the nuclear breakout time for the Islamic Republic, meaning the time Tehran needs after a political decision to build a bomb to implement it, is two days, several weeks, or several months, the country is now in a situation that experts largely agree on describing it as 'on the brink of nuclearization.' The U.S. response to Kharrazi's threat: Iran will never acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, the promises and statements of Islamic Republic officials in the past couple of years that 'we have all the parts of the bomb, we just need to assemble them' or Kharrazi's new threat that 'if Iran's existence is threatened, we will change our nuclear doctrine,' although practically continuing the same approach and rhetoric that has been ongoing in Iran since 1981 regarding readiness to build a nuclear bomb, have a specific meaning in the current context. Aside from the Iraq's thwarted attack on Iran, which Tehran also played a certain role in encouraging Saddam with its regional and international policies, no military existential threat has ever been posed against a historical country called Iran. On the contrary, the Islamic Republic itself has posed an existential (to Israel) or security (to Arab countries) threat to regional countries with its slogans and approaches over the past 45 years. The concern created by Israel's counterattack. Kharrazi's words may be better deciphered by referring to a report from the newspaper Javan, affiliated with the IRGC. This newspaper wrote in its May 10 issue: '18 days of unprecedented tension between Iran and the Zionist regime [Israel] from the attack on the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus to the promised operation and five days after that, namely the Israeli operation on April 20 against Iran, changed many things and will change even more. One of the things that may change is the direction of Iran's nuclear program.' The Islamic Republic has declared the April 14 attack on Israel as very successful and a sign of Iran's power and ability to counter threats. So, if there is anything that Tehran can cite as an existential threat against itself during those 18 days of tension, it is Israel's counterattack on the Isfahan airbase, which is responsible for protecting nuclear facilities in that region. Although the Islamic Republic described this attack as insignificant, many interpreted it as Israel's message that 'when it is easy to hit the defensive facilities that the Islamic Republic has created for its nuclear facilities, hitting the nuclear facilities themselves will be much easier.' Reports about 'replacing' the damaged radar at the Isfahan base with a new radar. What strengthens the centrality of this Israeli attack in changing the tone and position of Islamic Republic officials is the statement by Ahmad Haq Talab, commander of the IRGC's protection and security of nuclear centers, who said shortly before Kharrazi's recent interview with Al Jazeera: 'If the fake Zionist regime (Israel) wants to use the threat of attacking our nuclear centers to pressure Iran, a reconsideration of the Islamic Republic's nuclear doctrine and policies and a departure from past declared considerations is possible and conceivable.' Israeli threats and sabotage against the Islamic Republic's nuclear facilities have continued over the years, but apparently, the concern and surprise from the April 20 attack on the Isfahan airbase were so significant that now they are threatening to change Iran's 'nuclear doctrine' in response. It is also possible that Kharrazi's message can be interpreted as a direct invitation to the U.S. to continue negotiations and also increase fear and concern in European countries about the onset of a nuclear arms race in the region, resulting in pressure on Washington to negotiate with Tehran as soon as possible; negotiations that are vital for the Islamic Republic despite all denials, and the lifting of heavy sanctions against Iran and the normalization of relations even with regional countries is contingent upon the revival of the JCPOA under new conditions and perhaps a new text. Kharrazi expresses this desire and plea with elements of threat in his interview with Al Jazeera: 'We believe diplomacy is the best way, and we are ready to negotiate. Return to the JCPOA, and that will be an opportunity to discuss the issue of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.' Consequences and dilemmas of changing the nuclear doctrine. Kharrazi, as the head of the most powerful advisory body to the leader of the Islamic Republic in foreign policy, may know from experience that threatening and relying on power to bring opposing parties to the negotiating table and revitalize and strengthen relations, as long as there are no signs of genuine readiness for a shift in the Islamic Republic's policies, is ineffective and can even create repulsion. He himself recently expressed this reality in a surprising statement at a conference in Tehran: 'It is surprising that some countries normalized their relations with Israel under U.S. pressure, but are not ready to strengthen their relationship with Iran. If their criterion is power, Iran is also powerful. Iran demonstrated its power in the promised operation.' Although Saudi Arabia has not yet normalized its relations with Israel, Kharrazi particularly refers to the series of efforts underway to establish relations between Riyadh and Tel Aviv alongside the normalization of relations between the UAE and Bahrain with Israel. This is while the unbalanced and tense relations of the Islamic Republic with parts of the world have caused Riyadh, despite the revival of relations with Tehran over a year ago, to remain cautious, and aside from some agreements regarding pilgrimage issues, no significant progress has been made in the relations between the two countries; neither have flights between the two countries returned to normal, nor have any economic and security projects advanced, and indeed, trade relations between the two countries have shown a decrease over the past year. The reality is that the Islamic Republic's step towards building a nuclear bomb is accompanied by challenges and considerations that do not make the task easy. The information gaps within the Islamic Republic and the mobilization against such an approach in the region are likely to manifest in various forms of sabotage and open and covert attacks. Iran's attack on Israel; when deterrence turns against itself. The problems of building projectiles capable of carrying bombs and also producing a number of bombs that can genuinely induce deterrence are also contributing factors. The fact that Iran's 'friendly' countries like Russia and China oppose both the increase in the membership of the world's nuclear club and the concerns of other important and friendly countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Israel, regarding the production of nuclear weapons by Iran, is also not a small problem for Tehran, especially since Iran's actions could seriously put other countries in the region on the path to acquiring nuclear weapons. Moreover, the nuclear bomb is more about intimidation than attack. Meanwhile, the Islamic Republic has recently attacked another nuclear country and faced a more sensitive counterattack without the involvement of nuclear weapons. These interactions show that the deterrence of nuclear weapons is also relative, just as it has not created absolute deterrence in the conflict between India and Pakistan. The situation is somewhat reminiscent of the strategic depth that the Islamic Republic has constructed for itself in the region; a strategic depth that was supposed to create 'deterrence against the Zionist enemy' but has instead turned against it and led to more Israeli attacks and operations. The elements of real deterrence according to Kharrazi. In today's world, there is a consensus that the strongest and most effective deterrent power of countries is internal cohesion and public satisfaction, the absence of a rift between the government and the people, economic power, and a significant position in the international economy; elements in which the Islamic Republic has a bad or fragile situation in all of them. Kharrazi himself reminded the importance of soft power just a year ago at the 'Geometry of the New Global Order' conference, stating that military power alone does not achieve anything: 'The reason for the collapse of the Soviet Union, which was a military rival to the U.S., was the decline of its economic, political, and media power... China did not confront the U.S. until it reached high levels in economic, scientific, technological, and media power, but today, as it is considered a rival to the U.S. in economy, science, technology, and soft power, it has confronted the U.S. and forced it to ban the social media network TikTok.'