The JCPOA Turns Two

Two years ago (July 13, 2015), representatives of Iran and the 1+5 countries reached an agreement after a series of intense discussions, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This day is referred to as the finalization day of the JCPOA, when Iran signed this multinational agreement and received concessions to halt its nuclear bomb production program. Iran's retreat in its nuclear program significantly differs from international patterns in this regard. T.V. Paul, a McGill University professor, raises an interesting question in the introduction of his book titled "Power vs. Restraint" regarding countries that have managed to develop nuclear capabilities. He asks, "Why do such countries choose to refrain from nuclearization instead of crossing the nuclear threshold and developing battlefield nuclear weapons?" The decisions of Germany and Japan to retreat from the path of nuclear weapons, or in other words, to avoid nuclearization, are understandable as both are significant economic powers and were involved in the tensions and fierce competition of superpowers during the post-World War II era and the Cold War. In this context, the neutral countries of Sweden and Switzerland are also noteworthy, as despite lacking direct nuclear protection and having hostile relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, they chose not to pursue nuclearization. Argentina and Brazil are two different examples discussed by T.V. Paul. These two countries were in competition with each other but lacked allies, and therefore, while competition between them posed a significant threat and they were vulnerable to major powers, both had also taken steps toward nuclearization but decided to retreat from that process. The cases of South Africa, South Korea, and Ukraine also have similarities and differences with the aforementioned examples. At the time of the book's publication, Iran was still in the process of developing its nuclear program, and thus T.V. Paul does not mention Iran. However, the Iranian case is almost unique. Iran went through an eight-year war without a clear victory or defeat and only began investing in nuclear capabilities after the war ended. Despite several decades of efforts that were often unsuccessful, it was only when it had acquired nuclear capability through the establishment of multiple centrifuge networks and the ability to produce highly enriched uranium that it decided to retreat and return to a pre-nuclearization stage. The JCPOA was an agreement for the international community aimed at Iran's retreat from becoming a nuclear military power in the region. Some regional countries, such as Israel, were willing to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities before Iran reached an irreversible stage of nuclearization. There was a possibility that the United States would also ally with the aggressor in such a war, and the positioning of other countries in the Middle East was also evident. Almost no country wanted Iran to become a nuclear pole. Iran's retreat—though Iranian leaders rarely refer to this matter—was a form of "restraint." As T.V. Paul notes in his book, this restraint was in response to the potential for a war that could engulf the region. However, if we set aside the power-restraint relationship, Iran's secondary motivation was to exit the deadlock of international isolation and restore the country's economic situation, which had been severely damaged during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency and was facing a plethora of international sanctions that could paralyze the country indefinitely. With these considerations, the agreement signed on July 13, 2015, just two years after Hassan Rouhani was elected as Iran's president, was one that, at least according to the calculations of all negotiating parties, served the interests of all, including Iran. The immediate result of this agreement was the lifting of all sanctions imposed on the country and its people due to the nuclear program. A great deal has been written about the details of the agreement, which is beyond the scope of this article, but the following points seem essential to mention: - The JCPOA was only about Iran's nuclear program, and Iran's acceptance of limitations was aimed at stopping the sanctions. Some sanctions were lifted immediately, but arms sanctions will gradually be lifted over five years after the implementation of the JCPOA. Therefore, Iran's retreat—though Iranian leaders rarely refer to this matter—was a form of "restraint." As T.V. Paul points out in his book, this restraint was in response to the potential for a war that could engulf the region. However, if we set aside the power-restraint relationship, Iran's secondary motivation was to exit the deadlock of international isolation and restore the country's economic situation, which had been severely damaged during Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's presidency and was facing a plethora of international sanctions that could paralyze the country indefinitely. - The JCPOA aimed to create a comprehensive layer of protection from the perspective of international law, and it was not only endorsed by all 1+5 countries but also received final approval from the United Nations Security Council. - On the finalization day of the JCPOA (July 13, 2015), the foreign ministers of the 1+5 countries and Iran gathered at the United Nations headquarters in Vienna and announced that they had reached an agreement on the final text of the JCPOA and intended to implement it. It was then that the Security Council granted legal status to the JCPOA by adopting a resolution. The JCPOA was the result of a team effort by President Hassan Rouhani's government. It seems that long before accepting the principle of negotiations, Rouhani had discussions with the leadership and his advisors and a group of other influential individuals regarding various aspects of the agreement with the West and managed to gain the leadership's favorable opinion regarding the principle of negotiation. Although the principle of negotiation with the United States had been initiated during Ahmadinejad's presidency, it was unsuccessful and was not managed by a skilled diplomatic team. The fact that a delegation had gone to Oman for preliminary work before Rouhani took office clearly indicates that the leadership's approval was involved. In fact, rapprochement with the West and resolving the nuclear issue was the political philosophy of Rouhani's government, and the selection of Mohammad Javad Zarif as foreign minister was also made for this purpose. Now, two years after the nuclear agreement and its implementation, new issues and problems have emerged that were not anticipated at the time of signing the agreement in its current form, or that each party had a special interpretation in mind that prevented them from foreseeing these levels of disagreements. For this reason, during these two years, whenever the government sought to use this agreement politically, fundamentalists and those affiliated with the leadership's power circle claimed that without the leadership's guidance, the JCPOA would not have been achieved. However, whenever disagreements about the country's future and the necessity of expanding the JCPOA in other international and regional areas arose, or whenever the president sought to present the JCPOA as a successful model and consequently negotiate with the United States, he faced opposition from the same circles and layers affiliated with fundamentalists and sanction profiteers, who likened the JCPOA to the Treaty of Turkmenchay, under which the Qajar dynasty ceded Yerevan and Nakhchivan to the Tsarist Russian government and granted the Russians consular jurisdiction in Iran, along with five million tomans as war compensation and several other concessions. Ali Akbar Salehi, head of the Atomic Energy Organization and one of those who played a vital role in the negotiations with the 1+5, has stated that Iran's concessions were greater than what the system's officials had desired. He believes that the National Security Council wanted to maintain 4,000 centrifuges, while the negotiators managed to secure the preservation of 6,000 centrifuges. Salehi, speaking at a conference in Mashhad on the occasion of the two-year anniversary of the agreement, also referred to the achievements after the nuclear agreement in the oil industry, stating that the country's oil production had increased from one million barrels to three million nine hundred thousand barrels, and daily oil exports had reached two million five hundred thousand barrels. Now, two years after the nuclear agreement and its implementation, new issues and problems have emerged that were not anticipated at the time of signing the agreement in its current form, or that each party had a special interpretation in mind that prevented them from foreseeing these levels of disagreements. The European Union quickly established a relationship with Iran in terms of limited political interaction and extensive trade exchanges. Russia and China each defined their cooperation paths, separate from European and American relations with Iran, and began to implement and exploit them. The United States, during President Obama's administration, expected that with the favorable atmosphere created, Iran would be able to overcome its internal problems and take a bolder step toward normalizing relations. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry held great respect for his communication with Iran's foreign minister and hoped that this relationship would lead to broader communication. However, these calculations did not materialize; on the contrary, Iran attempted to use its relationship with the European Union as leverage against the United States. The relationship progressed slowly, and the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States brought new obstacles to the last hopes for establishing relations or even taking steps in that direction. Since the beginning of Trump's presidency in January 2017, discussions about breaking the JCPOA have arisen daily, and although they ultimately concluded that the JCPOA is a binding international document and the withdrawal of one of the signatories would face legal consequences, the Iranian government at times tried to repair this relationship by negotiating and contracting with American companies to purchase commercial aircraft. However, following every small step the Rouhani government took, opponents and fundamentalists affiliated with the leadership, who are present in other institutions, took destructive actions to prevent the president from implementing his plans. Ballistic missile tests with the slogan of destroying Israel, America's primary ally in the Middle East, confrontations with the American fleet in the Persian Gulf, and similar actions overshadowed any possibility of easing relations, while on the other hand, factions in the U.S. Congress rose up against this and occasionally fueled hostility by passing new (non-nuclear) sanctions. The latest instance is a proposal that, if finalized, would equate the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps with terrorist groups. Different opinions about the United States—despite the electoral slogans and post-election statements made by President Trump regarding the cancellation of the JCPOA—indicate that the U.S. does not seem willing or able to take effective action in this regard, as the JCPOA is a multilateral agreement and all signatory governments are committed to it. Of course, according to Iranian Foreign Ministry officials, including Hamid Baidi-Najad, a member of the nuclear negotiating team and Iran's current ambassador to London (ISNA, July 13), "The U.S. has not explicitly violated its fundamental commitments so far." Mohammad Javad Zarif, Iran's foreign minister, has a different view of the U.S. He stated in an interview with Fareed Zakaria on CNN (July 14, 2017) that President Trump's recent remarks in Europe contradicted the principles of the agreement and claimed that in these discussions, the U.S. president encouraged other European countries to withdraw from trade with Iran, and these statements represent a "violation, not of the spirit of the JCPOA but of its text." He also stated in proving the U.S.'s non-compliance with the nuclear agreement: "The International Atomic Energy Agency has stated seven times since the implementation of the JCPOA that Iran has fully complied with its commitments under the nuclear agreement. Unfortunately, such a statement cannot be made regarding the United States." The confirmation of the proper implementation of the JCPOA by the U.S. government—one of the clauses of the nuclear agreement requires the U.S. State Department to submit a report on the proper implementation of the JCPOA to the U.S. Congress every 90 days. Three months ago, Rex Tillerson, in his first report, emphasized that "the agreement is not perfect but is the best option for controlling Iran's nuclear activities," confirming its proper implementation. On the evening of Tuesday, July 17, President Trump reluctantly reaffirmed that Iran has remained compliant with the nuclear agreement's provisions (JCPOA). This confirmation of Iran's compliance with the JCPOA occurred while officials affiliated with the administration announced that new sanctions related to Iran's support for terrorism and other destabilizing regional activities were on the way. They also stated that they would negotiate with European officials to develop a more comprehensive strategy to increase pressure on Tehran. On the morning of Tuesday, before President Trump's decision was announced, the White House spokesperson stated, "The president has clearly stated that this is a very bad deal—bad for the United States." It seems that President Trump's decision to confirm Iran's compliance with the JCPOA for another 90 days was made to address the question of whether the U.S. would join or definitively exit the JCPOA.