The Late Insight of the Leader Regarding Ahmadinejad's Role

It has been 12 years since Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's sudden emergence in Iran's political sphere in 2005. Many now admit that Ahmadinejad's rise has imposed long-term costs on the Islamic Republic. This is apart from the irreparable damages inflicted on the country. In the early years of his presidency, Ayatollah Khamenei referred to him as the 'scientific president.' When his eight years in office came to an end, the leader congratulated him for his efforts with a 'God strengthen you.' However, as the 2016 election season began heating up and the same scientific president was contemplating a return to power, the leader stated that the candidacy of 'such a faithful brother' was neither in his interest nor in the country's interest, as it would lead to a 'polarized' society. Interestingly, Ahmadinejad found a clue in this point: the leader's comfort until then depended on the society not becoming polarized. Therefore, if society became polarized, the leader's comfort would be disrupted, and it would then be time to extract concessions from him. The fact that the leader assessed Ahmadinejad's potential candidacy as polarizing indicates that the leader must have gained a 'foresight' that this president and his faithful brother are no longer suitable for managing the country. However, this foresight had been evident to many from the very first months, if not before Ahmadinejad's name emerged in the country's political sphere. Yet, it took the leader 12 damaging years to realize this. Thus, he only gave his scientific president a single seat in the Expediency Discernment Council and nothing more. However, having just one seat in the Expediency Council was not enough to satisfy Ahmadinejad, who refuses to accept being sidelined. He believes his share from the regime's resources is more than just one seat to maintain both his status and his role. He knows well that the less his share of power, the greater the risk of addressing his violations. Thus, despite the leader's prohibition, he once again sought the presidency. He disregarded the leader's prohibition; he played with the electoral legitimacy that the leader considers the foundation of the regime. He announced that he would not accept any of the candidates approved by the Guardian Council. On election day, he went to one of the polling stations with a commotion but voted for himself. As he had correctly assessed, having one seat in the Expediency Council did not prevent the pursuit of his and his team's violations. Cases against his closest associates, including Baghaei and Javanfekr, were initiated. Confidential news about his definitive conviction in seven cases gradually surfaced. However, as the judicial process against his associates tightened, he intensified his attacks on the head of the judiciary and the Larijani family. Although he could not polarize the elections, he has now succeeded in polarizing society. The polarization is between Ahmadinejad and the corrupt Larijani family. The leader's faithful brother, just as he had previously criticized the 'smuggling brothers of the IRGC,' now praises the 'Larijani brothers' in hopes of covering up his own corruption by attacking the corrupt circles of the regime. In this context, he harshly criticized the legislative and judicial branches, headed by the Larijani brothers, in an open letter to the leader. In his letter, he wrote that 'public dissatisfaction with the state of the country and the judiciary is unprecedented, and the people's cries of injustice and improper relations have reached the heavens.' In a clear indication that there is no one to address grievances in the Islamic Republic, he went on a sit-in at the shrine of Abdul Azim. Continuing his media stunts, he gave the head of the judiciary a 48-hour deadline and, at the end of that period, deemed the appointed head of the judiciary 'unqualified,' 'illegitimate,' and 'usurper' due to his 'repeated violations of the constitution,' demanding that Larijani resign due to his lack of qualifications. Previously, he had accused Larijani of the murder of Sattar Beheshti, claiming he had shouted at him. In response, Sadegh Larijani labeled Ahmadinejad and his associates as the instigators of a 'new sedition.' He went so far as to describe Ahmadinejad's actions as rooted in 'the planning and actions of Western intelligence and security services' and implicitly aligned Ahmadinejad with foreign intelligence services. It is clear that what the leader did not desire has now come to fruition: the polarization between Ahmadinejad's faction and the Larijani faction. Khamenei: Ahmadinejad should not 'stretch it out.' As noted, in the past year (since the 2016 elections), there has hardly been a month or even a week without shocking news from Ahmadinejad's faction appearing in Iranian media. His goal with this daily media sensationalism is to deepen the polarized state of society. He has previously employed this tactic with Rafsanjani, Nategh Nouri, Mousavi, and Karroubi, and under the leader's protection, he has reaped the benefits of the leader's branches one by one. Why should he not succeed this time? He has seen that the leader commanded everyone not to 'stretch out' the 3,000 billion tomans embezzlement case to avoid tarnishing the reputation of the scientific president! In the same vein, why should he not expect the leader to cover up his cases today? If the Islamic Republic were a powerful regime, the judiciary would have dealt with Ahmadinejad directly. However, since everything in this regime ultimately leads back to the leader's office, he has shaped the polarized atmosphere so much that he has attacked the corrupt head of the judiciary and the leader's appointee to the point that it forced the leader to react. In the leader's latest statements, the scientific president has turned into the mouthpiece of the enemy, his behavior has become oppositional, his religion has become political, and his actions have become irreligious... It seems the leader has gained insight to admonish Ahmadinejad this time not to 'stretch it out,' but will that happen? The game Ahmadinejad has started is a matter of life and death. If Baghaei has been sentenced to 63 years in prison, what will happen to Ahmadinejad? When the head of the judiciary has labeled him the 'instigator of a new sedition' and considered the 'loss of trust' in the judiciary as rooted 'in the actions of Western intelligence services,' and the judiciary's spokesperson has described Ahmadinejad as a 'fallen thug,' yet now he sees the leader's admonition directed at him and not the judiciary, he has realized that this is a point of no return. A slight retreat means conceding in this life-and-death game. What will the regime do to a 'fallen thug' when it has treated Montazeri, Karroubi, Mousavi, and Rafsanjani in such a manner? Inevitably, inciting public opinion (the people exhausted by poverty) by recounting the corruption of the Larijani family is a way for him to regain credibility for himself, even if the leader is unwilling to see society polarized.