The Level and Depth of Changes in the IRGC; There Are News in the City

Since last year, various sections of the high and mid-level ranks of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) have undergone changes by orders from Ali Khamenei and sometimes the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC. In the four decades of the Islamic Republic's existence, such speed and level of changes in military positions have rarely been seen, indicating that there are significant developments beneath the surface. Senior Levels: On September 1, Ali Khamenei issued separate orders appointing Alireza Tangsiri as the 'Commander of the IRGC Navy' and Ali Fadavi as the 'Deputy Coordinator of the IRGC.' This deputy position is highly sensitive in coordinating various sections of the IRGC with military, internal, and security applications, which is why the Supreme Leader asked Fadavi to strive for 'comprehensive preparedness in safeguarding the Islamic Revolution and preserving its achievements.' Fadavi is a trusted IRGC member of Ali Khamenei and was among the commanders who detained several American sailors near Iranian waters in January 2016, for which he received the 'Victory Medal' from Khamenei. Two months prior, Brigadier General Jamal al-Din Abroumand was appointed by Mohammad Ali Jafari, the Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, as the 'Deputy Commander of the IRGC' at the 'Soft War Headquarters of the IRGC.' Abroumand had previously been the 'Deputy Coordinator of the IRGC,' but after him, Brigadier General Hossein Salami, the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the IRGC, temporarily took over as 'Acting Deputy Coordinator of the IRGC' until last September. Last April, Brigadier General Mohammad Hossein Sepehr was appointed by Mohammad Ali Jafari as the 'Deputy Head of the Basij Organization' replacing Ali Fazli. Sepehr had previously been the deputy of Ali Saidi (the representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC) but had spent more time in the IRGC in the western part of the country, especially in Kermanshah. It seems that due to the increasing security problems of the regime in the western part of the country (including street protests and border insecurities), such an individual was appointed to this position. Therefore, Mohammad Ali Jafari stated during Sepehr's introduction that 'in the fortieth year of the revolution, the enemies have exerted all their efforts to harm the revolution, and of course, there are issues within the country that we must resolve.' Previously, Ali Saidi, a hardline cleric and representative of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, was replaced by another hardline cleric, Abdullah Hajizadeh, who was immediately appointed by Ali Khamenei as the 'Head of the Ideological-Political Office of the Commander-in-Chief.' The 'Representation of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC' has become an important position in the political-security structure of the IRGC and the Leader's office in recent years, especially during Ali Saidi's tenure, where the most radical positions close to Ali Khamenei were articulated in Saidi's speeches. From this perspective, it seems that Abdullah Hajizadeh is a candidate who has been groomed for years for this position through roles such as 'Representative of the Supreme Leader at Imam Hussein University,' 'Head of the Religious Relations Office of the Leader's Office,' and 'Commander of the Qom IRGC,' having a rich record in praising Ali Khamenei and threatening domestic and foreign opponents: 'We must thank the blessing of the Supreme Leader'; 'A society without guardianship is dead'; 'Candidates are executors of the regime's policies, not policymakers'; 'We are today ready to conquer Jerusalem and destroy the Zionist regime.' Provincial Levels: In addition to the above, we have witnessed significant changes and relocations at the mid and provincial levels of the IRGC. For instance, by order of Mohammad Ali Jafari in December of last year, Mohammad Taghi Shahcheraghi, the former commander of the IRGC in Semnan and Mazandaran provinces, was appointed as the 'Commander of the Tehran IRGC,' known as 'IRGC Seyyed al-Shuhada,' replacing Ali Nasiri. He remained in this position until last October when he was replaced by Brigadier General Hassan Hassan-Zadeh. Just a few months prior, Mohammad Reza Yazdi was appointed as the commander of the Greater Tehran IRGC, known as 'Mohammad Rasulullah,' replacing Mohsen Kazemini. This IRGC is specifically responsible for the security issues of Tehran, particularly organizing and leading the Basij forces, IRGC, and plainclothes agents to suppress street protests. These changes in the Tehran IRGC occurred immediately after the armed attack on the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and it seems that Ali Khamenei's dissatisfaction with the security institutions and senior IRGC commanders was the reason for the rapid changes in Tehran's security IRGC. Meanwhile, a significant structural change also took place within the IRGC, separating the command of the Tehran IRGC from the deputy command of the IRGC at the Tharallah Headquarters; the command of the Tehran IRGC was issued in the name of Mohammad Reza Yazdi, while the Tharallah Headquarters was issued in the name of Ismail Kowsari. Kowsari is considered one of the most security-oriented commanders of the IRGC and was a member of the eighth and ninth Majlis (Parliament). Last October, while political struggles 'within the regime' over the incident at the Fayzieh School in Qom and the open threat to assassinate Hassan Rouhani continued, the command of the Imam Sadiq Brigade in Qom and then the command of the Ali ibn Abi Talib IRGC in Qom were quietly changed. Interestingly, the commander of the Qom IRGC came from Tehran; Brigadier General Mohammad Taghi Shahcheraghi, a specialist in provincial IRGCs who had been the commander of the Tehran IRGC just days before. Alongside all these changes, the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters was also not immune to changes; last October, Mohammad Saeed, a 50-year-old IRGC member who joined the IRGC at the age of 19, was appointed as the new commander of this headquarters, replacing Abadollah Abdollahi. The former and current commanders of the Qom IRGC. Conclusion: From the Strait of Hormuz to Street Protests These extensive changes at the mid and senior levels of the IRGC are not without meaning: First, it can generally be said that closed political systems like the Islamic Republic are always fearful of the emergence of a military coup capacity and try to prevent the formation of a military caste, and the most basic solution for this purpose is to change positions, geographical and organizational boundaries. Second, it can be specifically analyzed that Ali Khamenei and the visible and hidden security officials of the regime have fundamentally entrusted the security control of the country to the IRGC; therefore, after every security problem, such as the attack on the Islamic Consultative Assembly or the Fayzieh School incident, the responsible security IRGC members in these areas (in Tehran and Qom) were immediately dismissed or changed. Third, some of these changes occurred in positions that had been held by these individuals for many years. Ali Fazli was removed after nine years from the Basij, Ali Saidi after twelve years from the representation of the Supreme Leader in the IRGC, Ali Nasiri after six years from the command of the Tehran IRGC, Mohsen Kazemini after six years from the command of the Greater Tehran IRGC, and Abadollah Abdollahi after six years from the command of the Khatam al-Anbiya Headquarters. These five individuals collectively spent 39 years in five extremely sensitive positions in the IRGC, which significantly corresponds to the lifespan of the Islamic Republic itself. Thus, it seems that the regime, due to reasons such as international sanctions, the United States' exit from the JCPOA, and President Trump's seriousness in confronting the Iranian government, alongside the increasing scope and decreasing time frame of public protests within Iran and the ever-increasing fragility of the Iranian economy, has felt the danger of collapse more than ever. This serious threat and the possibility of a new wave of street protests, especially after the economic pressures resulting from the new round of sanctions, have led the regime to employ fresher, more radical, more obedient, and, of course, more security-intelligence experienced forces in the security sections of the IRGC. In any case, the threat of the Islamic Republic to close the Strait of Hormuz requires hardline commanders like Alireza Tangsiri in the position of 'Commander of the IRGC Navy,' who, in their anti-American and anti-Western stance, even assure readiness for suicide attacks against American interests, swearing: 'By God, if the time comes, there are those who will blow themselves up against American ships.' Fourth, all of this does not mean that Ali Khamenei does not trust the IRGC; he has not forgotten that it was the IRGC and Basij that ruthlessly suppressed social movements like the Green Movement and saved the regime from the abyss of collapse; these (as Mahmoud Ahmadinejad put it) 'smuggling brothers' continue to secure the regime's financial interests through visible and hidden economic gateways, including invisible ports and 'Payam Airport,' circumventing sanctions; and it is the Quds Force of the IRGC that has kept the regime's strategic allies, such as the Syrian dictator, in power. Therefore, among all available options, Ali Khamenei continues to gift the closest positions to himself to the IRGC, as Ali Fadavi, this old IRGC member, was appointed by Ali Khamenei as the 'Head of the Inspection Office of the Leader's Office' last November. Fifth, the IRGC is going through significant days; the increase in public protests, new and broader activities of opposition groups, and the regime's economic collapse, alongside a series of international pressures, have effectively made the IRGC one of the most important and perhaps 'the main' force guaranteeing the regime's survival. This 'guarantee,' of course, means more repression domestically and increased insecurity in the region.