The Limited Scope of Referendums in the Islamic Republic

In significant remarks, Hassan Rouhani, the President of Iran, emphasized the necessity of holding referendums in accordance with the constitution. During an economic conference, he pointed out that some institutions do not pay taxes and called for the use of referendums as a legal tool and opportunity. This represents a kind of promotional maneuver referring to social bases, announcing his and the moderate government's reliance on the potential and desires of the majority of society. The referendum Rouhani speaks of is noticeably different from the hypothetical or desirable referendums envisioned by democracy advocates in Iran. However, even for the type of referendum the moderate president has in mind, there are considerable obstacles and problems. As he himself states in this speech: 'Some aspects of internal politics are very, very strong; stronger than you think.' This repeated emphasis indicates the resistance of power centers against any reform, oversight, or accountability. Rouhani, a legal expert with extensive experience in policymaking in the Islamic Republic, knows well that in the established political regime, relying on seemingly democratic electoral processes without the favorable opinion of the system's top figure and the core of power does not lead to his intended goals. The president criticizes the government for not utilizing a tool for public participation in their destiny (i.e., the possibility of a referendum) over the past 36 years. Does he not know why a regime that claims to be popular avoids direct reference to the votes of citizens? The referendum Rouhani refers to is the one mentioned in Article 59 of the constitution. According to this article: 'In very important economic, political, social, and cultural matters, the legislative power may be exercised through a referendum and direct reference to the votes of the people.' Furthermore, based on this article, 'the request for a public vote must be approved by two-thirds of the total representatives of the parliament.' Article 110 of the constitution, which pertains to 'the duties and powers of the leader,' also states that issuing a 'referendum decree' is among the rights of the leader of the Islamic Republic. However, the constitution also mentions another type of referendum that Rouhani did not refer to: the referendum for constitutional revision. According to Article 177, added to the constitution in the 1989 amendment and revision, the leadership proposes matters for amendment or completion of the constitution to the Council for Constitutional Revision after consulting with the Expediency Discernment Council. The council's decisions must be approved and signed by the leader of the Islamic Republic and then must be ratified through a public vote by an absolute majority of participants in the referendum. The Council for Constitutional Revision includes the following members: members of the Guardian Council, heads of the three branches of government, permanent members of the Expediency Discernment Council, five members of the Assembly of Experts, ten selected by the leader, three from the cabinet, three from the judiciary, ten from parliament, and three academics. It is noteworthy that according to Article 177, 'the content of the principle concerning the Islamic nature of the regime and the basis of all laws and regulations based on Islamic criteria and the foundations of faith and the goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the republican nature of the government and the leadership of the community and the administration of the country based on public opinion and the official religion and sect of Iran is unchangeable.' The refusal of constitutional referendums in the Islamic Republic is clearly at odds with the demands of the majority of the Iranian people today. According to Article 177, it is the leadership that suggests important matters for change to the Council for Constitutional Revision, the leadership has significant control over the composition of this council; the leadership finalizes and signs the council's decisions; and it is also the leader who issues the referendum decree. Moreover, some issues (such as the government based on absolute clerical authority) are not subject to change or revision. This situation, predictably, is in stark contrast to the desires of democracy advocates in Iran. They seek the separation of religious and state institutions, the elimination of the dominance of absolute clerical authority, and the holding of free, fair, and just elections, among other similar issues; and it is evident that all of this, at least in legal terms and within the framework of the constitution, faces a tall and thick barrier arising from Articles 177 and 110. At a level lower than that which pertains to structural and foundational changes, and in the area where the constitution is not expected to change, and the government is only to consider referendums within the framework of the established political authority, it is still very unlikely that a referendum will be held on a subject or issue that is a matter of concern and desire for the majority of society. The improbability of referendums on important issues is supported by numerous reasons; among them are the following: - As mentioned, according to Article 110, issuing a referendum decree is within the powers of the leadership. The top of the political system will not agree to a referendum on a fundamental issue that threatens the established order. In a regime reliant on the absolute clerical authority, there is no need for direct reference to the people and no priority for determining a fundamental issue based on the majority's desires. - According to Article 99 of the constitution, the Guardian Council also oversees referendums. The political behavior and record of this governmental body, as well as how its composition is determined, eliminate any possibility of the Guardian Council aligning with a referendum on a fundamental issue. The six clerics of the Guardian Council are appointed and dismissed by the system's leadership, and the selection of six legal experts is finalized after being proposed by the judiciary head appointed by the leadership and voted on by parliament representatives filtered by the Guardian Council. - The parliament in Iran does not arise from the direct and unmediated election of the people. Candidates are initially selected by the Guardian Council, under strict supervision. Currently, the authoritarians hold significant power in parliament. Two-thirds of such a parliament will not consider important issues suitable for a referendum and public opinion without coordination with the core of power. - Holding a referendum requires healthy information and various data accessible to all citizens, as well as free and secure dialogue and exchange of views in the public sphere. The lack of freedom and security for independent media, the government ownership of the main official media, and the complete attachment of state television and radio to the core of power negate this assumption. - The central power not only does not tolerate constitutional opposition but also has banned some of the most important reformist parties from activity. In such a situation, talking about a referendum on important issues trivializes the term in the Islamic Republic. There is a not-so-short list of topics that, in the current political situation in Iran, cannot be referred to the people; topics that are important to the majority of Iranians but from which the government does not seek public opinion and imposes its political-ideological will on society through threats, intimidation, violence, and various forms of repression. Among these issues, the following can be mentioned: - Hijab and citizens' attire; the majority of society desires freedom of hijab, but the religious government imposes its vote and will. - Direct negotiations with the U.S. and relations with the West (especially the United States); the majority of citizens are dissatisfied with the existing relations between Tehran and Washington, which have dragged on for over three decades; however, those in power pursue their agenda, disregarding public sentiment. - The Guardian Council's supervisory authority; the majority of Iranians protest against the political-ideological filtration and authoritarian perspective of the Guardian Council, which is manifested in its oversight; however, the government sees no need for a referendum. - Nuclear energy; the majority of society disagrees with the military and security-oriented approach of the government, but the rulers continue their path without relying on a referendum. - The freedom of political prisoners, especially the leaders of the Green Movement; a topic that the core of power has no desire to resolve through a referendum. - Execution and retribution; an important judicial ruling that could potentially become a thing of the past in Iran through open dialogue among citizens and experts, directly referring to public opinion in a democratic process; however, the government imposes its will and preferences. This list and the discussed topics could be expanded. Everything mentioned here, as well as in the previously discussed headings, provides evidence that the ceiling for holding referendums as a democratic tool in the authoritarian regime in Iran is far lower than what public opinion seeks and demands.