The Meaning of the Funeral of Hashemi Rafsanjani

A large crowd attended the funeral of Hashemi Rafsanjani. Some foreign news agencies reported 'tens of thousands' while some domestic sources spoke of 'two and a half to three and a half million'. The crowd was not as large as that of Ayatollah Khomeini's funeral, as Khomeini was the charismatic leader of the revolution and the Islamic Republic, and throughout his rule, he was elevated to the heavens by a select few. Rafsanjani lived for thirty-seven years after the revolution and served as president for eight years. He was always subject to criticism and public vote—competing in elections against fellow regime insiders. From opponents of the Islamic Republic to reformists and leftists of the first decade of the revolution, he was always criticized. However, these criticisms were not significant. The criticism from conservatives—the traditional right of the first decade of the revolution—gradually increased during Rafsanjani's presidency. The main issue was that Ayatollah Khamenei and his radical and traditional followers chose Mahmoud Ahmadinejad over Rafsanjani in the 2005 elections. Organized efforts by the leadership office and the IRGC and Basij took place during that election. Everyone remembers that Mehdi Karroubi protested the election fraud, and Ayatollah Khamenei responded harshly. However, Rafsanjani, who knew where the flood originated, simply said, 'Since there is no motivation for addressing issues in the system, I leave it to God.' Khamenei and the conservatives were pleased, and Khamenei repeatedly stated that the 'dual sovereignty' of the reformist era had turned into a 'single sovereignty' during Ahmadinejad's time. Their takeover of all institutions and powers made them happy. They all united behind Ahmadinejad and began organized attacks against Rafsanjani. Ahmadinejad had told Khamenei before the 2009 elections that he intended to explode a bomb during the televised debates. With Khamenei's support, he directed his sharp attacks towards Rafsanjani, considering Karroubi, Mousavi, and Khatami as mere puppets of Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani wrote a harsh letter without a greeting to Khamenei, speaking of the beginning of crises. The 'Green Movement' emerged and expanded in protest against the election results. Rafsanjani, who himself—and more than all his family members—was positioned on this side against the other side, was completely removed from state media. He requested to respond to Ahmadinejad's statements on TV, but Khamenei's media not only denied him this opportunity but also became a tool in attacking Rafsanjani. For at least a decade, the entire royal apparatus—media, Friday prayer leaders, court clerics, etc.—systematically attacked Rafsanjani. The harsh words of Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, Ahmad Jannati, Mesbah Yazdi, IRGC and Basij commanders, Kayhan and its affiliates, are unforgettable. Safar Harandi repeatedly stated on behalf of all that 'We want the Rafsanjani of the 1980s, not the current Rafsanjani.' Rafsanjani was not only considered one of the leaders of the sedition but was also claimed to have pushed the leaders of the sedition forward and to be carrying out their plans (for example, see the article 'Rafsanjani is seeking to dismantle the Velayat-e Faqih, Khamenei threatens with house arrest' where the then Minister of Intelligence threatened him with arrest). Ayatollah Khamenei has personally responded harshly to Rafsanjani's statements on various occasions over the past decade. With such a volume of organized attacks from the 'royal system', one would expect only a handful to participate in his funeral. However, this did not happen. What did this ceremony mean, and what will Khamenei do with it? First, Khamenei is faced with the stark reality that his ideological and propaganda apparatus, with hundreds of billions in budget, is incapable of eliminating one of the highest-ranking figures in the system. This apparatus is so disreputable and ineffective that it could not even settle the fate of a person they claim has devoted all his love and life to Khamenei. Now consider Ayatollah Montazeri. Ayatollah Montazeri holds a special place even among the regime's opponents. His funeral was also large, but co-opting Ayatollah Montazeri was not possible, and the Sultan and his apparatus made every effort to ensure that a large crowd did not attend. The ceremony turned into radical slogans against Khamenei and in defense of the Green Movement. Second, perhaps no one has spoken against the leaders of the Green Movement as much as Ayatollah Khamenei. He used the terms 'sedition' and 'leaders of sedition' for the Green Movement and its leaders. The royal apparatus amplified his words and accusations a thousandfold and has turned them into the main food for the people since 2009. Since February 2011, Mousavi, Karroubi, and Rahnavard have been under house arrest. The same propaganda was used against Mohammad Khatami. They said he too should be imprisoned as one of the leaders of sedition. He did not go under house arrest, but he was banned from public speaking, traveling abroad, showing his image, mentioning his name, and even attending wedding and funeral ceremonies—including Rafsanjani's funeral. At Rafsanjani's funeral, groups in the crowd shouted slogans in defense of Mousavi, Karroubi, and Khatami. If there were freedom, if there were no danger of repression, imprisonment, and torture, this ceremony would have taken on a different character and appearance. Third, Khamenei saw today that he cannot eliminate reformists and moderates. They have a serious base among the people. They can be removed from power and even imprisoned, but they cannot be destroyed in the minds of the people with millions of hours of ideological propaganda, lies, slander, and insults. Hassan Rouhani can be disqualified or harshly attacked, but Hassan Rouhani has never been one of the reformists and has always been alongside Hashemi Rafsanjani. Rafsanjani supported him openly and clearly until his death, stating that he was the winner of the 2017 presidential election. Eliminating and destroying Hassan Rouhani means eliminating and destroying Hashemi Rafsanjani. The same Rafsanjani that today the most radical part of the royal system is trying hard to convince everyone that he was a serious supporter of the system, the revolution, and Khamenei. Fourth, when the Expediency Discernment Council was established, Ayatollah Khomeini appointed the then President Ali Khamenei as its head. After Ayatollah Khomeini's death and Khamenei's rise to leadership, he also appointed the then President Hashemi Rafsanjani as the head of the Expediency Discernment Council. After the end of Rafsanjani's eight-year presidency and the beginning of Mohammad Khatami's presidency, Rafsanjani remained as the head of the Expediency Discernment Council. According to Article 113 of the Constitution, 'After the Supreme Leader, the President is the highest official of the country and is responsible for executing the Constitution and presiding over the executive branch, except in matters directly related to the leadership.' The Expediency Discernment Council is structured in such a way that its president must have a long history of executive work. Thus, considering the history of the council's presidency, being 'the second person' and 'the executor of the Constitution' as president, Khamenei, for the sake of appearances, must appoint Hassan Rouhani as the head of the Expediency Discernment Council. However, he has been mobilizing the royal apparatus against Hassan Rouhani for months, and the radical part of the system hopes to eliminate Rouhani, so he does not want to assign such a responsibility to him. In recent months, he has constantly spoken of entrusting matters to revolutionary forces and sidelining the forces advocating negotiation and agreement. If he appoints someone else as head of the council, it will mean that he has not understood the meaning of Rafsanjani's funeral. Rouhani's presidency of the Expediency Discernment Council or appointing someone else for this responsibility will send two different messages from him regarding the elections of May 29, 2017. Fifth, ignoring the meaning of Rafsanjani's funeral by Khamenei and the royal apparatus does not mean their victory. The people of Iran have shown that they respond to the dictatorial system and the Sultan in their own specific ways. The spirit of Rafsanjani and his positions will be present in the upcoming presidential elections. Sixth, actors create history and its meaning with their actions. Analysts also give meaning to realities with their analyses. It is a major strategic error to confine Iran to conservatives, reformists, and moderates. The Islamic Republic has opponents who do not fit into any of these three categories. They were not present at today's ceremony. However, their absence and the failure to see them do not mean they do not exist. The royal apparatus has not been able to deny their existence despite all its efforts. For this reason, in several recent elections, Ayatollah Khamenei has repeatedly asked the opponents of the Islamic Republic to participate in the elections for the sake of Iran. If another meaning must be attributed to this ceremony, it is the recognition of the 'other' and the 'differences'. Recognizing them should not be limited to voting. They must be able to equally benefit from all opportunities and rights. If the Sultan and the royal system continue to turn a blind eye to realities, the realities will impose themselves on them. The dictatorial system and its repression do not allow the depths of Iranian society to be seen. However, this behavior threatens the existence of Iran and Iranians. The danger will only be removed when all Iranians—regardless of gender, ethnicity, and religion—are treated equally and discrimination is eliminated from the political structure and society. The longer Rafsanjani remains, the more he is driven toward this idea.