The Middle East and the Tension Between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Shadow of the JCPOA

What changes has the Iran nuclear agreement with six world powers brought to the mechanisms and relationships in the Middle East? Mohammad Bazi, in an interview with Radio Farda, addresses this question and shares his views on the tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the possibility of resolving them. Mohammad Bazi is an American-Lebanese journalist currently teaching at New York University and previously served as the Middle East bureau chief for Newsday. He is also a researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations in the U.S. and is writing a book about Iran and Saudi Arabia's proxy wars. Mr. Bazi, you have been monitoring Middle Eastern affairs. Do you think the Iran nuclear agreement with the P5+1 has changed the existing mechanisms in this region? Some issues continue as they were, but this agreement has changed some mechanisms in the region. One very clear change is the opposition of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states to this agreement. The Saudis led this group to encourage the Obama administration and European countries not to negotiate with Iran, doing everything in their power to steer Western powers away from this agreement. One of the issues we saw over the past year is how concerned the Saudis were about the potential return of Iran to the international community and the revenues from oil sales. These issues highlighted the geopolitical and broader regional rivalries between Saudi Arabia and Iran in recent years. Certainly, Iran's behavior in countries like Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq has fueled these concerns. When we talk about Saudi Arabia and its allies in the region, it cannot be denied that they have officially expressed their support for this agreement, both at gatherings in Washington and afterward. Yes, they have done this in words. However, it is clear that in practice, especially over the past six months, they have not taken any actions that would signify support. One sign we saw in this regard is the amount of money Saudi Arabia spent on lobbying and public relations in Washington to advance Riyadh's policies and against the nuclear agreement. As a result, they officially supported it, but their actions have been contrary. Since the beginning of this year, following the execution of Sheikh Nimr, a Shia cleric in Saudi Arabia, and the attack on Saudi diplomatic offices in Iran, along with the severing of relations by Saudi Arabia and a sudden increase in tensions over a few days, Saudi Arabia has shown little willingness to talk and negotiate with Iran, and of course, Iran's behavior has influenced this. However, this tension is manifesting itself in various ways and has even spilled over into recent negotiations regarding the Hajj, with tens of thousands of Iranians being unable to perform the pilgrimage. Do you expect this tension to escalate further? We have witnessed various forms of this increasing tension. We saw it in Syria, and it was also observable in Lebanon. For instance, two or three months after Riyadh severed relations with Tehran, Saudi Arabia decided to cut its $3 billion aid to the Lebanese army, citing Hezbollah's influence over the Lebanese government and Iran's influence over Hezbollah. This accusation effectively suggests that Lebanon is leaning towards Iran against the Saudis. In the long run, this increasing tension could harm Saudi Arabia more than the Iranian regime. For example, in the long term, they may have weakened their ally in Lebanon and created more space for Iran to maneuver in Lebanon. The next issue may not be a direct escalation of tension, but we saw that with the start of the Iraqi army's campaign in Fallujah, the nationalist discourse intensified in Saudi media and other Arab countries in the region, and the attacks in Fallujah and illegal actions by Shia militias in Iraq became more pronounced. So far, these militias have played a secondary role in Iraq, but this may change because the Iraqi army, despite what was expected, has not had much success in fighting ISIS, and the longer the battle continues, we may see the Popular Mobilization Forces or Hashd al-Shaabi taking on a larger role, which worries Sunnis in Iraq and the region as a whole. As a result, this tension takes on different forms in various locations in the region at different times. We are talking about a region where global powers, especially Western ones, have always played a role in its developments. Do you think the West, particularly the U.S. and the EU, are in a position to help reduce tensions in the Middle East, especially between Iran and Saudi Arabia? I believe the U.S. has less leverage to influence compared to previous years. Part of this is due to the deterioration of U.S.-Saudi relations in recent years and during the Obama administration, especially since Salman became the new king of Saudi Arabia over a year ago; this relationship has taken on a form that it had not for years. As a result, the U.S. has less influence. A comparative example is the relationship the U.S. had with Saudi Arabia during George W. Bush's presidency and the personal relationship Bush had with King Abdullah at that time. They had disagreements on certain issues and policies, especially regarding the U.S. invasion of Iraq, but there was a closeness between the two countries that does not exist today. The U.S. still has tools at its disposal. It continues to provide significant military equipment to Saudi Arabia, and the Saudis have greatly increased their military purchases in recent years. Since requests from Riyadh have increased, the Obama administration has sold more military equipment to Saudi Arabia than the total of the three or four previous administrations. This is, of course, a complex leverage for the U.S. to use, as it can significantly impact the economic interests of the U.S. and its private contractors who pursue such contracts. It is not the case that the U.S. would completely halt arms sales, as then other countries like France would seize the opportunity. As a result, there is a kind of deadlock. Because the Saudis, like others in the region and the West, are waiting for the results of the U.S. presidential election to be clear. Exactly my question as well. As we approach the end of the current administration, do you think the election of a new president in the U.S. will lead to a significant change in this country's policies in the Middle East? The Saudis and others, as well as the Iranian regime, are waiting for the outcome of this election. Today, it seems we will witness a competition between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump. I believe many world leaders would prefer Clinton to win this competition because Trump is very unpredictable, and his foreign policy is not very clear. If the expectation is for Clinton to win, in a way, the Saudis hope for a better relationship with Clinton's administration compared to Obama's. Perhaps the Saudis think that the Clinton administration will have a stronger will to engage in Middle Eastern issues, especially in places like Syria. The Saudis currently consider the U.S. approach in Syria as an important parameter for assessing Washington's will regarding Middle Eastern issues. I think the Saudis evaluate Obama's approach toward Iran as very soft because he and Kerry both wanted to reach an agreement with Iran. And the Saudis believe that Clinton will likely take a tougher stance on Iran and will not spend as much energy on issues surrounding the agreement. By the time the new president enters the White House, a year and a half will have passed since the agreement, and it is not necessarily something Clinton would want to change. Of course, if Trump is elected and has talked for months about the agreement, saying he will tear it up, much of what he says is to attract public opinion in the U.S. before the elections. The agreement is in effect, and Europe is a significant part of it, and Trump will not be able to dismantle this agreement because it is not solely America's issue. The power of international sanctions that forced Iran to negotiate was due to international support for them. Nevertheless, Trump could increase the level of imbalance and uncertainty in the region, and my impression is that the leadership of Iran and Saudi Arabia, for various reasons, will not be satisfied with this situation. However, in the next six months, everyone in the region is waiting for the outcome of this election. There is a feeling that since the end of the Obama administration is approaching, it can no longer do much. But does the chaotic situation in the Middle East, especially the actions of the Islamic State group and the war in Syria, not create an urgency for the international community to act more quickly rather than waiting for an election? We have heard everyone in the region verbally express their commitment to fighting terrorism and ISIS. We have witnessed some actions in Iraq and Syria, and the Obama administration has become increasingly involved in Iraq. More resources have been allocated to train the Iraqi army and assist in planning its battles, including the battle of Fallujah, which the U.S. was not entirely in favor of and preferred to focus on the battle of Mosul. As a result, the U.S. government is conducting actions such as airstrikes in Syria and Iraq and has collaborated with Kurdish forces in Syria. Other actors are also taking actions; for example, Saudi Arabia, which usually did not engage directly, is certainly involved in military conflict in Yemen and has not sent troops for direct combat for decades, and is acting in Syria by supporting some armed groups opposing Assad. However, there are limitations to these actions, which I believe the Saudis are gradually realizing. Because they do not have the capacity to engage in Yemen and Syria simultaneously, a significant part of their attention has been directed toward the war in Yemen. And do you think Yemen is the main priority for Riyadh? Yes. Yemen is Saudi Arabia's neighboring country. For a long time, many Saudi officials viewed Yemen as an extension of their domestic policies. They wanted to ensure that they had significant influence in Yemen and had maintained this influence for a long time, including distributing money among government figures and tribes. Mr. Bazi, we talked about Western relations with the Middle East. My last question for you is about Russia's relationship with the Middle East. These days, we hear about an alliance between Iran and Russia regarding Syria. How do you see this alliance—do you consider it a temporary issue or a deep and strategic alliance? This is a good and at the same time difficult question. In Syria, I believe this alliance is becoming a reality, although there are also disagreements between the two countries; Iran is committed to keeping Bashar al-Assad in power. For a while, Russia pretended not to be personally committed to Assad, but most of Moscow's actions so far have helped Assad remain in power. The Russians may not speak about Assad being a red line like the Iranians do, but certainly, Russia's actions have been inclined toward helping Assad, and they have succeeded in this regard. About a year ago, Assad publicly spoke about the retreat of his forces and the effort to maintain control over the areas they held, and now in recent weeks, his rhetoric has become more hostile and aimed at trying to regain every inch of Syrian territory, showing a kind of confidence that is owed to the help of the Iranians and Russians. For this reason, I believe that in Syria, the interests of Iran and Russia are well aligned. In other areas, this may be less so, but we will have to see what outcome they derive from Syria, as it could help strengthen other matters.