The Middle East in the Past Year; Syria

It has been almost five years since the unrest began in Syria in March 2011. What started as a demand for the people's rights quickly faced the brutal repression of Bashar al-Assad's regime and became a breeding ground for armed groups. Internal conflicts and clashes between the Assad-loyal army and these groups throughout 2015 expanded the war across Syria, raising the death toll to over 250,000 and resulting in more than 4 million refugees. Meanwhile, over 7 million civilians have been forced to leave their homes due to the war conditions, with many living in ruins, urban shelters, or camps outside the cities. In the last days of 2014, Turkey announced that it might begin training moderate Syrian groups in the spring of 2015. Shortly after, a video circulated on social media showing some armed groups merging and adopting new names. All evidence suggests that 2015 would be a bloody year, and indeed, the world witnessed this prediction come true. Today, various estimates exist regarding the number of armed groups opposing Bashar al-Assad in Syria. According to some estimates, there are about a thousand armed groups in Syria, collectively possessing around one hundred thousand armed individuals. However, it should not be forgotten that these groups are highly fragmented and even internally divided, often turning against each other when the opportunity arises. Some of these groups may only control a street or a neighborhood, and since the time for negotiating and clustering around an alternative to Assad's rule has not yet arrived, their presence does not pose a significant problem for other groups and may even strengthen others, as they all ostensibly fight against government forces. It is evident that in a situation where there is a discussion of share-seeking and clustering, these groups can turn against each other. Bashar al-Assad's government is well aware of this reality and takes steps to divide or hire some of these groups to act as pro-government militias alongside the Syrian army. According to estimates from the Center for American Progress, the major armed groups in Syria, excluding the group known as the 'Islamic State,' include: - The Free Syrian Army with approximately 50,000 armed personnel, - The Syrian Freedom Front with about 37,000 armed personnel, - The Syrian Islamic Front (also known as Jaish al-Islam) with a capacity of around 13,000 armed personnel (the leader of this group, Zahran Alloush, was killed on Friday, December 25, during a bombing by the Syrian army in the suburbs of Damascus), - The al-Nusra Front with approximately 6,000 armed personnel - An armed coalition brigade consisting of about 9 to 10 different brigades and an unspecified number of forces - Independent battalions (with unspecified capacity). Every year, about half a million people from Syria's 18 million population reach military service age. More than half of this population is eligible for military and defensive service. Under normal conditions, the country can maintain at least one million people in military service with a two-year service period; in peacetime, this number, along with reserve forces from previous periods and professional forces employed by the army, can theoretically reach one million seven hundred and fifty thousand. Therefore, against one hundred thousand of Assad's opposing forces, there are at least ten times more human resources available. However, in a war-torn country, calculations are not so straightforward, and loyalties to the regime do not operate on mathematical logic. A vast portion of Syrian territory is controlled by anti-Assad forces, and even if the population in those areas does not cooperate with the armed opponents, they statistically fall outside this multi-million calculation. A significant number of young people who are unwilling to engage in sectarian and group wars or join Bashar al-Assad's forces emigrate daily, joining the millions of Syrian refugees and displaced persons. The year 2015 has seen the highest statistics in this regard. Loyal forces to Bashar al-Assad are estimated to number less than 180,000 military personnel. As a result, Bashar al-Assad must buy the loyalty of Syrian army personnel in various ways. This method has led Syrian officers to remain loyal to Assad personally, to his family, and to his tribe. Access to exclusive benefits and advantages for several decades has made them dependent on the regime in all aspects of their personal or professional lives. Among Syrian officers, very few have defected or joined the opposition during the five years of war. However, the loyalty reward system, which has been in place since Hafez al-Assad's time in the 1980s, has continued with precision and intensity and has evolved as necessary. Among the benefits provided to Syrian armed forces officers are organizational housing and cash bonuses. In fact, Syrian army officers and their families live under special security measures and have access to all kinds of welfare facilities, separate from ordinary people, in special and protected towns. Security units monitor all movements and communications of officers and their families. In a context where poverty, hunger, unemployment, and despair about the future are prevalent in society, having a salary, housing, benefits for each family member, and security in protected neighborhoods has created loyalty that has protected Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian system to this day. In addition to the official military forces, pro-Assad militias, Iranian-affiliated forces, and Hezbollah-affiliated forces should also be added to these calculations, which have been particularly influential in the operational scene throughout 2015. The Syrian war underwent fundamental transformations in various aspects during 2015, some of which we will address here: Russia's entry into the war. Until the official entry of the Russians into the Syrian battles, most daily events were limited to areas strategically important for armed groups or the government. For example, in January, Kurdish fighters liberated 90% of the Kobani area from the occupation of the 'Islamic State' forces. In February, conflict observers reported the execution of about 50 people, ten of whom were young children, by Assad-loyal forces. Throughout the year, the Assad army repeatedly bombed and killed non-combatants and civilians. In mid-April, 'Islamic State' forces, after multiple clashes with other forces opposing Bashar al-Assad, took control of parts of the Palestinian refugee camp 'Yarmouk.' In contrast, the Free Syrian Army took control of parts of the Jordanian border crossing after bloody clashes. Such conflicts continued until the negotiations between opposition forces and United Nations representatives in November and December, and just when it was agreed that Palestinians and civilians trapped between the fire of fighters and government forces would be evacuated from Yarmouk, Zahran Alloush, the leader of the Jaish al-Islam group, was killed in a bombing, complicating the transfer. Alongside these confrontations, anti-ISIS coalition forces continued their airstrikes, but no significant changes occurred on the battlefield, and international efforts to end the war remained fruitless. A major obstacle existed: whether Bashar al-Assad would remain at the head of Syria's future political leadership or be ousted? From early September, the entry of Russia as an effective military factor and the start of airstrikes by this country disrupted existing equations. The Russian air and missile forces primarily targeted anti-Assad groups and, in some cases, 'Islamic State' forces, and their presence was officially confirmed by Syrian military sources on September 11. In early October, Egyptian military President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi endorsed the Russian military intervention in Syria. A few days later, Iran's cooperation with Russia on the battlefronts in Syria became officially clear, and the presence of Iranian personnel under the title of 'advisors' was made public. Later, the 'Defenders of the Shrine' brigades were also mentioned. A week later, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter contacted his Russian counterpart Sergei Shoigu and officially requested that Russia ensure its operations do not conflict with the U.S. and its allies. On October 20, Russian and American officials signed a memorandum of understanding to avoid military clashes over Syria. At the same time, new Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau announced that his country would no longer provide jet aircraft to the anti-ISIS coalition. In late October, Russian aircraft targeted a hospital around Damascus, killing thirteen people, including two medical personnel. Meanwhile, Syrian aircraft, using barrel bombs over the city of Daraa, killed civilians, including a woman and her child. In similar attacks, the Syrian army targeted dozens of civilians. In one incident, an attack on the outskirts of Damascus killed 40 civilians and injured 75 others. On December 26, following airstrikes by the Syrian army (some sources attribute this operation to the Russians), the leader and founder of Jaish al-Islam, Zahran Alloush, along with several of his commanders, was killed. The United Nations' plan to evacuate the wounded and civilians trapped in the Yarmouk camp was delayed due to Alloush's death, but ultimately about 450 of these individuals were transferred to camps in Lebanon and Turkey. The role of Iran since the beginning of Russian airstrikes. In fact, Russia's entry into the battlefield has had both positive and negative impacts politically and militarily. Initially, it was said that Russia entered the battlefield in coalition with Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In practice, Iraq's role is not very clear, and Iran's initial role diminished over time despite rumors about the death of Qassem Soleimani, commander of the Quds Force. During the four months that Russian airstrikes continued at their most intense, Iran also cooperated with Russia as an ally; it even allowed the Russians to use Iranian airspace to launch guided missiles fired from the Caspian Sea. When the Turks shot down a Russian warplane at a border point, leading to the plane's crash and the death of its pilot, the Iranians supported Russia. During this time, an unspecified number of Iranians or individuals of Afghan or Pakistani nationality hired by Iran were sent to the battlefronts in Syria to support Bashar al-Assad or through their presence in the 'Defenders of the Shrine' brigades and so on. This is while the objectives of Russia and Iran in assisting Syria are fundamentally not the same and lack strategic alignment. Each is pursuing its own goals, which cannot be addressed in this article. Several commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps were killed during this war. Although there are no official statistics, a rough estimate based on names reported in daily news indicates that about sixty individuals have been killed. In addition to the problem of verifiable statistics, there is still no clear news regarding the fate of Qassem Soleimani, the commander of the Quds Force, who was reportedly injured in military operations and, in some accounts, killed, but rumors about his relocation and travel to Moscow also exist. The start of the political process. Since June 2012, under the leadership of the United Nations, a conference aimed at finding a political solution to the Syrian crisis had begun in Geneva but faced multiple political problems and was abandoned. Russia's entry into the war and its unconditional support for Bashar al-Assad opened the way for the peace conference to be revived and for opposition groups to be invited to test a new process for reaching a political solution. Turkey and Saudi Arabia have been serious opponents of Bashar al-Assad's continued rule, but other regional and global powers have shown a pragmatic approach, suspending the condition for removing Bashar al-Assad. Of course, Russia and Iran insist on supporting Bashar al-Assad, contrary to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. In the meantime, Bashar al-Assad resorts to the argument that some of these groups are terrorists and that his government does not negotiate with terrorists. The repetition of these arguments until December 2015 rendered negotiations ineffective and the political process unsuccessful. Finally, in the first half of December 2015, Syrian government officials reached an agreement to negotiate with opposition groups, and this agreement laid the groundwork for UN Security Council Resolution 2254 (2015). This resolution is silent on Bashar al-Assad's future but includes almost all major opposition groups except for al-Qaeda, the al-Nusra Front, and the 'Islamic State.' The resolution stipulates that after a ceasefire is established and within 18 months thereafter, the parties should create a new inclusive political administrative structure and end the years-long hostilities by renewing the Syrian constitution. What is significant in this resolution is that it requests the Secretary-General to outline a roadmap for a ceasefire and urges conference members to cooperate and expedite efforts to achieve lasting peace, as well as facilitating the participation of all groups, including Syrians who have sought refuge abroad. Thus, 2016 begins with the hope that practical steps will be taken in this regard. The killing of Zahran Alloush, whose group participated in the negotiations, certainly does not help establish peace, but since...